Audit quality in the UK by Ireland, Jennifer Clare
                          
This electronic thesis or dissertation has been





Audit quality in the UK
General rights
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author, unless otherwise identified in the body of the thesis, and no quotation from it or information
derived from it may be published without proper acknowledgement. It is permitted to use and duplicate this work only for personal and non-
commercial research, study or criticism/review. You must obtain prior written consent from the author for any other use. It is not permitted to
supply the whole or part of this thesis to any other person or to post the same on any website or other online location without the prior written
consent of the author.
Take down policy
Some pages of this thesis may have been removed for copyright restrictions prior to it having been deposited in Explore Bristol Research.
However, if you have discovered material within the thesis that you believe is unlawful e.g. breaches copyright, (either yours or that of a third
party) or any other law, including but not limited to those relating to patent, trademark, confidentiality, data protection, obscenity, defamation,
libel, then please contact: open-access@bristol.ac.uk and include the following information in your message:
• Your contact details
• Bibliographic details for the item, including a URL
• An outline of the nature of the complaint
On receipt of your message the Open Access team will immediately investigate your claim, make an initial judgement of the validity of the
claim, and withdraw the item in question from public view.
AUDIT QUALITY IN THE UK
Jennifer Clare Ireland
A dissertation 'submitted to the University ofBristol in accordance with the





High profile corporate scandals in which blame attaches to the auditors focus global
attention on audit quality. Yet empirical academic studies of audit quality are scarce.
A low quality audit is not objectively observable unless an extreme event, such as
bankruptcy or litigation, occurs. In addition, I demonstrate that the concept of audit
quality, as reflected in the literature, is multidimensional, further complicating
attempts to measure audit quality. As suggested by theory, I examine whether large
(Big 6) audit firms provide higher quality than other audit firms. First, I confirm the
existence of large audit firm fee premiums in the UK when the selection of audit firms
by clients is taken into account. I next identify some determinants of modified audit
reports in the UK, using a large cross-sectional sample. I find no evidence that large
audit firms are more likely to issue audit report modifications than other audit firms.
Taking earnings management as an alternative measure of audit quality, I then study
the impact of audit firm size on earnings management in corporate financial
statements. I find that UK companies hiring large audit firms have lower signed
discretionary accruals. By identifying discontinuities around earnings thresholds, I
also show that earnings management to avoid losses is positively related to signed
discretionary accruals. Finally, I find that UK companies hiring large audit firms are
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INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Nature ofAudit Quality
Audits are no longer confined to the financial world but are applied with increasing
fervour to such diverse areas as education, health, government, and the environment
(Power, 1994). Financial auditing has itselfdeveloped from an essentially voluntary,
individual and untutored activity, to a professionally organised and regulated role
which is often a mandatory business requirement. This thesis is concerned with
exploring further some of the issues surrounding financial auditing in the UK. In
particular, the idea of audit quality: what do we mean by a 'quality audit', and what
factors affect audit quality? Attempts to measure audit quality are of particular
interest. Audit quality is multidimensional, and (normally) unobservable. It is only
when -something goes spectacularly wrong, as in the recent cases of Enron and
Worldcom in the U.S., thatthe auditor's work canbe criticised.
Consider the level of effort expended by the auditors as one aspect of audit
quality. This is not directly observable, unless the audit work is scrutinised during
litigation. We may not watch the auditor while she works- it would be prohibitively
costly, and there are issues of client confidentiality. Client confidentiality also
prevents us from reading the auditor's working papers. Even relying on litigation to
reveal audit effort is unsatisfactory as it is a relatively rare event, despite the high
1~
profile of cases such as BeeI and Enron. Auditors may also be sued even when they
are not at fault (they have 'deep pockets' and joint and several liability), although we
might nevertheless expect that samples of audit work obtained through scrutiny of
litigation records will be biased towards low quality.
Even if we could observe audit effort, that in itself would not be sufficient to
measure audit quality. Audit quality should depend not only upon the detection of
material misstatements in the financial statements, but also upon the reporting of these
misstatements once discovered. For the latter, factors such as auditor independence
are important. DeAngelo (1981a) defines audit quality as the joint probability that a
given auditor will both (a) discover a misstatement, and (b) report the misstatement.
Moore and Scott (1988) and Melumad and Thoman (1990) also consider both audit
effort and reporting choices in theoretical models of auditing, although other models
(e.g, Dye, 1993) do not. Ignoring reporting choices may be a dangerous
simplification. Whilst it is clear that an audit report which accurately reflects the
findings of incompetent fieldwork may not be safely relied upon, it is also possible
that auditors may fail to satisfactorily report the findings of competent fieldwork
(Accountancy, March 2000, p.96).
However, determining whether audit reports are appropriate or not is also
problematic. We may not observe a firm's true financial position and performance, in
order to determine for ourselves whether the financial statements it reports contain
material misstatements. Nor may we observe the pre-audited financial statements, nor
make comparisons between similar companies which are and are not audited, when
auditing is mandatory.' Any truly satisfactory definition of audit quality will clearly
I Audits arevoluntary for small,private companies in the UK. In orderto satisfactorily compare the
financial statements of auditedandunaudited UK companies where audits are voluntary, it wouldbe
necessary to control for factors affecting the decision to hire an auditor. However, for these small
companies, suchfactors are unlikely to be readilyobservable. Factors which may be observed or
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be multidimensional. Thus, even if we could observe it, it would be hard to find a
single measure that would capture the audit quality concept. This is reflected in the
audit literature, which employs multiple measures of audit quality. Arriving at an
objective measure is also impossible, because of the subjective nature of the audit
task.
A financial audit can be defined as the official examination of accounts with
verification by reference to witnesses and vouchers, on a sample basis. Its objective is
to enable auditors to express an opinion on financial statements and thereby to
provide reasonable assurance that they give a true and fair view and have been
properly prepared. Therefore, the exercise of professional judgement pervades the
audit process. For example, auditors express an opinion not a fact, they must evaluate
soft (subjective) evidence as well as hard (for example, relating to the appropriateness
of selected accounting policies or management estimates of accruals), and evidence is
gathered only on a sample basis, so the auditors must determine the quantity and
nature of evidence sought.
It is impossible to avoid subjectivity in the audit process as each audit client is
different from the next. Therefore, barriers to entry seek to maintain audit quality in
relation to professional judgement - namely, auditors must be highly technically
qualified and undergo programmes of continuing professional education. Even if
audit clients were identical, we might not wish to remove the scope for professional
judgement, as the exercise of professional judgement may enable auditors to signal
information to the users ofaudit reports (Grout et al., 1994).
proxied, for example, agency costs (arising fromthe separation of equityownership from daily
control), are unlikelyto playa part in demand for auditing amongthesecompanies as thesecompanies
are likelyto be owner-managed. Alternative factors suchas the presence of disputes between joint
owners, or concerns over financial controls, are more likely to be important but are not publicly
available data. Therefore, this thesisdoesnot compare auditedand non-audited financial statements
for companies that may choose whether or not to have an audit.
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Because of these problems, attempts to measure audit quality in the literature
are limited. For example, studies seek variouslyto identifythe information contentof
modified audit reports by analysing their effects on share prices (e.g. Dopuch et al.,
1986) and ability to predict bankruptcy (e.g, Lennox, 1999) or the incidence of
litigation against the client (Raghunandan, 1993). These studies produce no
consistent evidence that audit reports contain information, although there is other
evidence to suggest auditqualitymay differbetweenlarge and small audit firms. And
yet audit quality is hotly discussed. Auditors are frequently criticised for a perceived
lack of independence, producing formulaic and uninformative reports, operating
ineffective regulatory and disciplinary schemes, and failing to detect fraud or to warn
of impending bankruptcy. High profile audit failures such as BeeI and Enron are
seen to damage auditor credibility. In this climate it is important to understand and
extendthe body ofknowledge relating to audit quality.
Reisch (2000) divides the audit quality literature into two major areas -
supply-side research and demand-side research. Supply-side research focuses on
factors affecting the auditor's ability to supply a quality audit. In contrast, demand-
side research focuses on factors affecting the client and audit reportusers.
Supply-side factors that may influence audit quality include the auditor's
ability (for example, knowledge and experience, professional judgement, adaptability,
technology), professional conduct (for example, independence, objectivity, conflicts
of interest, provision of non-audit services), economic incentives (for example, fees,
costs, efficiencies, litigation, reputation), and market structure (for example,
competition, industry concentration, economies of scale, regulation). Demand-side
factors that may influence audit quality include agency costs, growth, risk, stock-
market flotations and the presenceofaudit committees.
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Ronnen (1996) links supply- and demand-side research by arguing that the
economic behaviour of participants in the audit market (auditors) affects the scope
and precision of financial statements, and the scope and precision of financial
statements in tum affect the economic behaviour of participants in the securities
market (audit report users). The perceived quality of audits will affect the degree of
reliance placed by users on audit reports. The level and sources of demand for audits
will in tum influence the quality ofaudits supplied.
The extant supply- and demand-side audit quality literature is reviewed in this
chapter. In particular, the literature which indicates that audit firm size affects audit
quality is discussed. Also reviewed is the literature on the information content of
audit reports. However, it is important to note that this research must be viewed in the
context of the general financial reporting framework. An audit will always be limited
by the benchmark to which financial statements are compared - the accounting
standards.
As well as leading to concerns over audit quality, the Enron scandal has
resulted in a wider debate over accounting standards and financial reporting. Enron's
auditors were Arthur Andersen. At the end of 2001, Andersen's former managing
partner and CEO Joe Berardino, called for a rethinking of accounting standards in the
US to better reflect economic substance over legal form, and to move the financial
reporting model away from historical reporting towards reporting more current values
(The Wall Street Journal, December 4th 2001). More recently, Berardino stressed in
an Andersen press statement that 'Enron's collapse was first and foremost a business
failure.... Few people realise that two thirds of Enron's market value was gone
before its accounting practices became an issue for the SEC' (Arthur Andersen,
January 28th 2002).
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These concerns can be related to the 'expectations gap' between the public
perception of the roleof auditors and scope of the financial audit, and that of the audit
profession and the law.2 Berardino's first concern relates to the public ignorance of
the auditor's role in relation to extant accounting practice. The auditor must work
within the prescribed accounting framework and is not responsible for the preparation
of the accounts which she audits. For the purposes of this thesis, accounting standards
are taken as given, and audit quality is interpreted in relation to the identification and
reporting of misstatements, where the accounts do not conform to those accounting
standards. Whether or not those accounting standards are desirable is outside the
scope of the thesis.
However, Berardino's second concern reflects a true expectations gap: the
public's belief that an auditor should successfully identify failing companies,
whatever the reason for the failure. Bankruptcy is an inherently uncertain event
which will not always be predictable, but it is probably reasonable to expect auditors
to predict it in manycases. After all, this is arguably the most important information
that users of audit reports want to know. Studies of the ability of auditors to identify
failing companies are reviewed in this chapter, together with other studies of the
information content ofaudit reports.
1.2 Research Strategy and Plan ofThesis
In addition to this introduction and literature review, the thesis contains four chapters
of original work, and a final concluding chapter. The focus of the research is audit
quality in the UK. Corporate financial audit is an important and interesting area to
research, and one which has lately become very topical. It is important because
markets and corporate report users in general depend on the information in financial
2 For a discussion of the form and history of the expectations gap in the UK, see Humphrey (1997) and
Humphrey et al. (1993).
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statements, but without independent audit this information maybe biased or incorrect.
It is interesting because even with an audit, the information may still be biased or
incorrect: audits may not be truly independent, or may fail to identify misstatements.
Studying the quality of corporate financial audits performed in the UK could enable
some of the factors which determine audit quality to be identified. Understanding
these factors would be of benefit from a policy perspective. However, as discussed
above, the quality of the audit performed is neither captured by any single measure,
nor objectively measurable.
Because of the nature of audit quality, I believe that the most tractable
approach is to assess relative audit quality between different audit firms (rather than
attempt to find an objective measure), and to do so over a range of different possible
proxy measures for quality. I have chosen to study audit quality in the UK
empirically, analysing large samples of cross-sectional company data with
econometric techniques. I focus on the UK as it is the country and regulatory
environment withwhich I am most familiar, and for which I have access to data.
The research topic could have been approached theoretically or empirically.
In addition, empirical research may employ a number of different approaches.
Constructing theoretical models enables the researcher to abstract from real-world
complications and focus on particular relationships of interest, and offers many
valuable insights, but is open to criticism for the use of simplifying assumptions.
Alternative empirical approaches include the collection and analysis of survey data,
and detailed analysis of a small sample of case studies. Survey data allows the
analysis of qualitative data and/or data which is not available through commercial
sources of company accounts data. However, it is time-consuming to construct
surveys, the data is costly to collect, response ratesmaybe low, andresponses maybe
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biased, either because the respondents are self-selected, or because they do not
respond truthfully. Case study approaches enable much more detailed study from
which to draw inferences than is possible through large-sample approaches, however
they are open to criticisms that inferences drawn from a small sample may not be
relevant to the population as a whole. For these reasons, I have chosen a large-sample
empirical approach.
In order to assess relative audit quality over a range of audit quality proxies, I
must first assess whether there is an audit quality differential in the UK. Prior
literature suggests that large audit firms may provide higher audit quality than other
audit firms. This literature is reviewed in Sections 2.6 and 3.1 of this chapter. One
source of evidence for a quality differential between audit firms is audit fees and the
large audit firm fee premium. The first piece of original work in the thesis, 'The
Large Audit Firm Fee Premium: A Case of Selectivity Bias?' builds on previous
studies of audit fees to further examine the largeaudit firm fee premium in the UK. It
is joint workwith CliveLennox (UST, HongKong).3
The existence of a large audit firm fee premium is often cited as evidence that
large audit firms provide higher quality audits. In a competitive market, the fee
premium represents a return to higher quality. Alternately. it may indicate market
powerand havepotential competition policy implications. It is therefore important to
determine the size of the premium charged by large audit firms in order to assess
either the quality differential or the extent of market power. Although I cannot
directly test whether the fee premium arises as a result of a quality differential rather
than market power, taken together with other evidence (reviewed in Section 3.1) the
findings of Chapter 2 support the existence of a quality differential between large
) This chapter has been published as a paper in the Journal ofAccounting, Auditing and Finance
(2002).
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audit firms and others, and the subsequent exploration of this differential in Chapters
3 to 5.
Traditional studies of audit fees treat audit finn choice as exogenous. In
contrast, Chapter 2 takes into account that companies are not randomly assigned to
audit firms, For example, Titman and Trueman (1986) and Datar et at. (1991) present
signalling models in which high quality companies prefer high quality auditors.
However, high quality companies may require less audit work after controlling for
size, complexity and inherent risk. For example, betterquality accounting systems or
high management integrity may mean that their accounts are less likely to contain
misstatements. Auditing these accounts will therefore require less effort and as a
consequence will be less costly. In this case, the premium estimated by prior studies
will be biased downwards as it will not take account of this reduction in audit cost.
Large audit firms' clients will pay lower fees to large audit firms than randomly
selected clients would pay to large audit firms, Using UK data, the effect of auditor
selection bias on audit fees is shown to significantly underestimate the size of the
large audit finn premium. Large audit firms benefit from advantageous selection bias
whereas smallaudit firms suffer from adverse selection bias.
Having confirmed the existence of a large audit finn fee premium in this way,
suggestive of a qualitydifferential, I next explore this differential with respect to three
different proxy measures of audit quality. Audit quality may be defined in different
ways and with respect to different aspects of the audit function. Definitions of audit
quality expressed in the literature are reviewed in Section 3 of this chapter. The
proxies of audit quality used in this thesis are: audit reports (Chapter 3), discretionary
accruals (Chapter 4), and earnings discontinuities (Chapter 5). Overall, the approach
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to audit quality taken in the thesis is to focus on the quality of information contained
in corporate reports.
In Chapter 3 'Does One Size Fit All? Evidence from a Multinomial Logit
Model for Predicting Audit Reports', I use the frequency of unfavourable audit
reports to proxy for audit quality," If audit quality is defined as the joint probability
that an auditor willbothdiscover and report a misstatement, then, all else being equal,
high quality audit firms will be more likely to issue unfavourable audit reports. The
purpose of an audit is to enable the auditor to express an opinion which is reported to
shareholders (and otherusers) via the audit report. These reports are the most readily
observable aspect ofthe audit. Prior studies have therefore also used the frequency of
modified audit reports issued as a measure of audit quality (e.g. Francis andKrishnan,
1999; Lennox, 2002). However, these prior studies are limited in terms of the types
of companies and audit reports studied.
There are four main types of audit reports in the UK. Clean audit reports
contain no qualification of the auditor's opinion on the financial statements, and are
not modified in any otherway by the inclusion of explanatory paragraphs. Qualified
audit reports contain a qualification of the auditor's opinion due to either a
disagreement (over accuracy or accounting treatment) or a limitation on scope (lack
of audit evidence). Finally, any audit report may also contain one or more
explanatory paragraphs highlighting fundamental uncertainties affecting the accounts,
suchas those connected withgoing concern. For the purposes ofthis thesis, I define a
modified audit report as any report other than a clean report. Reports with
unqualified audit opinions but whichcontain explanatory paragraphs are classified as
• A paper based on the work in Chapter 3, excluding the work on the predictive ability of the model,
has been acceptedfor publicationby the Journal ofBusiness Financeand Accounting. This paper is
entitled •An EmpiricalInvestigationof Determinantsof Audit Reports in the UK' .
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modified, but not qualified, even when the explanatory paragraphs relate to going
concerndifficulties.i
Understanding the factors that lead auditors to issue different types of audit
reports will inform discussions of audit quality when measured in this sense. It will
also inform studies attempting to evaluate the information content of audit reports.
Chapter 3 therefore identifies some of the determinants of modified audit reports in
the UK. using a multinomial logit model for different modified report types. The
model is a multinomial one because three different audit report outcomes are
distinguished (a standard logit model would only have two possible outcomes): clean
audit reports, going-concern related audit modifications, and non going-concern
relatedmodifications.
Distinguishing between different types ofmodifiedreports is important as they
are assumed to carry different information for users. Some modifications relate
specifically to the company's ability to continue as a going concern, whereas other
relate to lack of audit evidence or disagreements over accounting treatments or
accuracy, which do not affect going concern. A multinomiallogit model is used in
preference to a multinomial probit model primarily because of computational
convenience - the choice ofthe model is further discussedin Section3 ofChapter3.
In addition, in Chapter 3 I assess the multinomial model as a tool for
predicting audit reports. Models of audit reporting may be used to predict audit
reports. Dopuch et al. (1987)propose severaluses of such a model: audit firms would
be able to use it to screen potential clients or in peer review, the courts would be able
to use it as a benchmark in cases of auditor negligence, and researchers would be able
5 The form and wording of audit reports in the UK is governed by Statement ofAuditing Standard
(SAS) 600. In 1993, SAS 600 replaced the previous 'subject to' audit qualification relating to going'
concern with the fundamental uncertainty paragraph which explicitly does not constitute a
qualification.
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to use it to assess the extent to which audit reports are expected in tests of market
efficiency or the information content of audit reports. The extent to which audit
reports carry incremental information to users is likely to be inversely related to how
predictable audit report types are.
Chapter 3 follows the methodologies of Dopuch et a1. (1987) and Monroe and
Teh (1993) in assessing the audit reporting model's predictive power, but it is the first
time that a multinomial model (as opposed to a standard binary model) of audit
reporting has been assessed in this way. It is also the first time that a study has
examined audit reporting outcomes on both public and private UK companies, and
has analysed both going-concern and non going-concern related modifications.
The cross-sectional sample analysed in the chapter consists of 9,304
companies with the most recent accounting period ending 30 April 1998. Of this
sample, 7,125 received clean reports on the current financial statements, 431 received
going-concern related modifications, and 1,748 received non going-concern related
modifications. 8,289 companies are private, and 1,015 companies are public, of
which 374 (4%) are listed.
Chapter 3 provides evidence that the determinants of audit reports differ
between different types of audit report modification. For example, I show that
subsidiary companies are significantly less likely to receive non going-concern related
audit modifications than independently owned companies.
I also show that public non-listed or listed companies are no more or less
likely to receive any type of audit modification than private companies after
controlling for other observable company characteristics. This is interesting because
with greater separation of ownership from control, one might expect public or listed
companies to face more stringent audit reporting behaviour. It is possible that
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improved governance among such companies improves their corporate reports,
mitigating this effect. I am unable to control for many aspects of the governance
context. This is discussed in more detail in Section 4.
When assessing the ability of the model to predict audit reports, I find that the
multinomial logit model only marginally reduces prediction error costs relative to a
standard logit model or a naive prediction rule. This is likely due to the strong
persistence in audit reporting observed in the data, which is the basis of the naive rule.
In regard to assessing the audit quality differential between large audit firms
and others, Chapter 3 shows that clients of large audit firms are significantly less
likely to receive non going-concern related audit modifications than clients of other
firms, but that audit firm size has no effect on going-concern audit modifications. If
corporate report quality and corporate going-concern does not vary systematically
with chosen audit firm size, one would expect large audit firms' clients to receive
more modified audit reports (of both types) than other firms' clients. Either the
hypothesised audit quality differential does not exist, which does not seem likely
given supporting evidence, or corporate report quality and going-concern varies
systematically with chosen audit finn size. This latter could arise both because (i)
. audit firms influence corporate report quality (a measure of audit quality) and (ii)
audit firms are selected by the companies that they audit.
The selection of audit firms by their clients was controlled for in Chapter 2
using a Heckman selection model. However, I cannot control for it in Chapter 3,
although large audit firms' clients may produce higher quality corporate reports and
therefore be less likely to require audit modifications. For a Heckman-type selection
model to be identified, at least one variable must be included as an explanatory
variable in the auditor choice model but not in the subsequent (reporting) model.
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Director affiliations with audit firms are thought (and found) to be significant
determinants of audit finn choice, and in Chapters 2 and 4 serve to identify the
selection model. However, most of the companies analysed in Chapter 3 arenot listed
so data on director affiliations to audit firms is not available. I cannot confine my
study in Chapter 3 to listed companies only, as my sample would not include
sufficient audit report modifications. Furthermore, director affiliations with audit
firms may influence audit reporting as well as audit finn choice, as auditor
independence maybe compromised, hence these variables should be included in both
stages of the selection model and the model would no longer be identified. This is
why I do not control for the endogeneity of the audit finn choice in Chapter 3.
I therefore test whether there is an audit quality differential with respect to
corporate report quality in Chapters 4 and 5, using discretionary accruals (Chapter 4)
and earnings discontinuities (Chapter 5) as proxies for corporate report quality (and
hence audit quality). Discretionary accruals and earnings discontinuities are both
indications of earnings management, and high quality corporate reports are defined as
those in which (income-increasing) earnings management is not undertaken. In these
chapters I confine my study to listed companies, so that I can treat the audit firm
choice as endogenous using a selection model. I can do this not onlybecause dataon
director affiliations is available, but because there is no reason to believe that director
affiliations affect thedegree of earnings management in the corporate reports.
In Chapter 4 «Are Large Auditors More Conservative? Earnings Management
and Auditor Choice in the UK', I examine whether the clients of large audit firms
create fewer income-increasing discretionary accruals than the clients of small audit
firms. This is an indirect examination of audit quality, which takes account of the
influence of the audit on financial reporting through its impact on the behaviour of
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management, rather than directly via the audit report. The chapter uses reported
discretionary accruals as a measure of earnings management, estimated using a cross-
sectional version of the modified Jones model after Dechow et al. (1995) and Jones
(1991).
The degree of earnings management activity engaged in by a company in
preparing its financial statements, may indicate both management's quality, and that
of the auditor. For example, Nelson et al. (2000) survey auditors working for an
(anonymous) Big Five audit finn to examine managers' decisions to attempt earnings
management, and auditors' decisions to waive or reject such attempts. They find that
60% of earnings management attempts (EMAs) are income increasing, and that in
43% of EMAs, the auditors require adjustment. Auditors are found to be most likely
to waive adjustment of an EMA when it decreases current-year income, is governed
by an imprecise accounting standard or is structured to meet a precise standard, is
considered immaterial, or is attempted by a large client. Note that discretionary
accruals generated by Jones-type models are estimated by reference to published
financial accounts data. Therefore thesediscretionary accruals will not include EMAs
which have beenadjusted by the auditors.
Earnings management can be defined as the presentation of financial
performance in a favourable light that does not necessarily reflect the underlying
reality. For example, earnings may be managed by adopting inappropriate accounting
policies and/or by unduly stretching judgements as to what is acceptable when
forming accounting estimates. Earnings management practices are receiving
considerable attention in the UK at the time of writing. Discussion papers on revenue
recognition and aggressive earnings management havebeen issued by the Accounting
Standards Board (ASB) and Auditing Practices Board (APB) respectively. Where
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aggressive earnings management results in financial statements that do not show a
true and fair view, auditors are required to qualify their audit opinion (for a
disagreement) unless management restate those financial statements prior to
publishing. Ceteris paribus, a higher quality auditor (who is more likely to discover
misstatements and/or to prevail upon management to amend the financial statements)
may therefore be associated with lower levels of earnings management in financial
statements. Large audit firms are expected to be higher quality in this sense as they
have more reputation and/or wealth to lose from litigation or criticism as a result of
audit failure (seeSection 3).
Alternately, (for the same reason) large audit firms maybe morelikely to issue
audit modifications when earnings management occurs. Bartov et al. (2001) find a
positive association between DA and audit report qualifications. Francis and
Krishnan (1999) compare audit report modifications issued by large and small audit
firms, and find that large audit firms are more likely to issue modifications when they
report on companies withhigh values of income-increasing accounting accruals.
Prior research on the impact of audit finn size on the level of reported'
discretionary accruals 'shows that companies which hire large audit firms report lower
levels of income-increasing discretionary accruals than other companies (Francis et
al., 1999; Becker et al., 1998). But companies self-select auditors, so it is potentially
invalid to conclude from this research that large audit firms are higher quality in the
sense that they restrict potentially misleading reporting. In particular, Becker et al.
(1998) note that it is possible that 'non-Big 6 audit firms are preventing a higher
proportion of unwarranted accruals, but their clients have relatively higher levels of
pre-audit earnings management' (p.21). Similarly, Francis et al. note that 'it is
possible that [Big 6 and non-Big 6 audited companies] may differ from each other in
ways that systematically affect the estimation of expected accruals' (p.30).
Francis et al. find that large audit firms' clients have higher levels of total
accruals. Total accruals are the sum of discretionary and non-discretionary accruals.
They also find that companies that have greater propensity to generate accruals, as
measured by the length of the operating cycle, and capital intensity, are more likely to
hire large audit firms. If this implied that companies hiring large audit firms reported
higher values of discretionary accruals than other companies in their pre-audited
accounts (unobserved), it would suggest that previous studies of audit firm size and
discretionary accruals may underestimate the quality differential between large and
smallaudit firms.
However, because theory suggests that large audit firms' clients are higher
quality (Titman andTrueman, 1986; Dataret aI., 1991), large audit firms' clients may
instead share (unobservable) characteristics which are associated with low levels of
discretionary accruals in the pre-audited accounts. Even if, because of the nature of
their business or their size, they may have greater opportunities to generate accruals,
they may choose not to. Examples of such characteristics would include a high
degree of management integrity or successful corporate governance monitoring
systems. In this case, prior earnings management studies would overestimate the
audit firm quality differential. Companies with greater opportunities to generate
discretionary accruals may choose large audit firms because they wish to signal they
are high quality and have therefore not made large discretionary accruals in their pre-
audited accounts (Francis et aI., 1999). Client characteristics, rather thanconstraining
actions on the part of large audit firms, may be responsible for the observed
differences in discretionary accruals.
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By controlling for the auditor choice in a two-stage selection model similar to
that employed in Chapter 2, I distinguish auditor characteristics from unobserved
client characteristics which affect the reporting of discretionary accruals. I show that
large audit firms are more conservative in their reporting of signed discretionary
accruals. On average, companies report lower levels of signed discretionary accruals
with large audit firms than with small audit firms, However, I find no evidence that
large audit firms areassociated with lower levels of absolute discretionary accruals.
I also show in Chapter 4 that clients of large audit firms report higher levels of
signed discretionary accruals with large audit firms than the average company would
with large audit firms. Furthermore, when analysing positive and negative
discretionary accruals separately, I show that clients of small audit firms report less
positive DAwith small audit firms than othercompanies (clients of large audit firms)
would. This would be consistent with the argument of Francis et al., that companies
hiring large audit firms share characteristics that are associated with high levels of
discretionary accruals, if these companies also chose to generate such accruals.
However, this would not be consistent with the arguments presented in theory and in
Chapter 2, that large audit firms' clients are higher quality, if such accruals are
undesirable and require expensive audit effort. As I am also unable to replicate
Francis et al.'s results concerning the influence of operating cycle and capital
intensity on the auditor choice decision, it is likely that there is an alternative
explanation for this result.
High quality clients are not necessarily associated with low earnings
management unless earnings management is undertaken for opportunistic reasons, for
example to increase managerial compensation. Managerial accounting choice may
alternately be exercised to convey private information to investors (Fields et al.,
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2001). As auditors may share or at least partly observe manager's private
information, or possess independent private information on the quality of their clients,
they may allow 'good' clients to report higher signed discretionary accruals than the
average client. In this way, large audit firms may signal that their clients are higher
quality. Similarly, small audit firms may constrain their clients' use of discretionary
accruals more than they would the average client, to signal that their clients are lower
quality. The possibility that auditors may signal private information in this way is
discussed further in Section 3.3.
The final chapter of original work, Chapter 5 'Earnings Management and
Auditor Choice: Further Evidence from Earnings Discontinuities', provides
additional evidence in support of the results reported in Chapter 4. However, in
contrast to Chapter 4, earnings management is not measured in terms of discretionary
accruals. Instead, the methodology is to examine the cross-sectional distributions of
earnings and earnings changes in the sample. Prior research on earnings
discontinuities notes that unusually low frequencies of small losses and small
decreases in earnings (relative to prior year earnings and to forecast earnings) occur,
coupled with unusually high frequencies of small positive incomes and small
increases in earnings (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge et al., 1999).
Chapter 5 provides evidence of a similar earnings discontinuity around the
threshold of zero earnings, but finds no evidence of a discontinuity around the
threshold of zero change in earnings relative to the prior year. For companies which
fall into 'suspect' categories for earnings management to meet the threshold of zero
earnings, I show that these companies are significantly more likely to be audited by
small audit firms than other companies. In addition, I show that the signed
discretionary accruals calculated in Chapter 4 are positively associated with
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membership of these 'suspect' categories. This suggests that discretionary accruals
are indeed associated with earnings management attempts.
The final chapter of the thesis summarises the results and conclusions of the
four chapters of original work, and suggests policy implications and directions for
future research.
The remainder of this chapter reviews areas of the academic background
which are most relevant to the work presented in this thesis. Section 2 discusses the
demand-side literature relating to audit quality, and describes and explains sources of
demand for audits. Section 2 also discusses themarket for supply of audits. Section 3
discusses the supply-side literature relating to audit quality, and studies related to
testing audit quality including tests of the information content of audit reports.
Section 4 concludes.
Extant literature which is directly relevant to the original work in the thesis is
reviewed in more detail in the appropriate chapters. However, the discussion here of
sources of demand for audits is particularly relevant to the models of auditor choice
which areapplied to control forauditor self-selection in Chapters 2 and4.
2. DEMAND FOR AUDITS AND THE AUDIT MARKET
Sources of demand for audits are important for the research presented in the thesis. In
particular, theyare important for the models of auditor choice presented in Chapters 3
and 4. Issues surrounding auditing are betterunderstood by understanding the factors
that give rise to auditing in the first instance. Demand-side factors are also important
influences on audit quality. It is reasonable that factors influencing the demand for
audits when auditors are identical will also influence demand for audits from high (as
opposed to low) quality audit firms when audit quality is differentiated.
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Research indicates that the main sources of demand for audits are stewardship
(monitoring), signalling, insurance, and the provision of services to management.
Theseare discussed in tum below. The final subsections discuss the audit market and
the pricingof audit services. Demand for audits will interact with supplyand provide
a link via audit pricing between the demand- and supply-side literature on audit
quality. For example, audit fees are believed to influence the quality of audits
supplied. In particular, low fees, especially fees that are below cost ('iowballing'),
are popularly believed to adversely affect audit quality, despite arguments to the
contrary (e.g. DeAngelo, 1981b).
2.1 Stewardship
Possibly the most important source of demand for audit services is stewardship or
monitoring. This role for the audit is an effort to resolve the moral hazard problem
inherent in the agencyrelationships of the firm (explained below). The statutory audit
requirements in the UK were first introduced for such purposes. Throughout the
eighteenth and. nineteenth centuries, incorporation led to the increasing separation of
the ownership ofbusinesses from their day-to-day control. Following the birth of the
limited liability company, the Companies Acts introduced mandatory auditing
requirements for the protection of investors.
The original motivation for mandatory auditing was to protect all investors,
including those sufficiently removed to be unable to impose an audit requirement
directly on the firm, for example minority shareholders, lenders, and suppliers.
Therefore, throughout the nineteenth century the auditorwas regarded as the guardian
of the interests of all parties (Woolf, 1997). However, the responsibilities of auditors
have since been refined and developed by case law. In recent years auditors in the
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UKhave been held to hold a 'duty of care' to onlya limited class of potential litigants
- essentially existing shareholders as a class - and onlyin limited circumstances.P
The moral hazard problem inherent in the firm is that the agents who are
entrusted to run the business have interests of their own which may not coincide with
those of the principal(s), and their actions after hiring may not be contractually
enforced. Shareholders (the principal) who are not management active therefore
require protection from management (the agent) who may prefer to spend on benefits
for themselves than to invest in worthwhile projects, or if effort is costly, to shirk
rather thanwork.
In an ideal world, contracts would be written between the shareholders and
management to prevent this conflict of interest. However, it is not possible to write a
legally enforceable contract to ensure management effort, because management effort
is likely to be both unobservable (or at least prohibitively costly to observe) and
unverifiable by shareholders. Management effort will be unobservable if the
shareholders are physically remote from the business. Distant shareholders may only
observe company performance as reported in the financial statements, but this is not
verifiable because the financial statements are prepared by management so may be
biased in management's favour. Even if they are physically on site to access the
accounting records, the information in financial statements is complex, and
shareholders who lack the necessary skills will still be unable to verify it.
6 The purpose of a statutory audit,under the currentCompanies Act,has beenmostfamously
interpreted by thecourts in Caparo Industries v Dickman and Others (1990). This case essentially
confined the class of potential litigants in a negligence suit to existing shareholders, as a body,
suffering lossas a resultof relying on the audit report to makestewardship decisions. The courts
currently apply a tripartite test to determine whether a defendant owes a dutyof care to anyother
potential litigant, the conditions of whichare hard to meet(Woolf, 1996). InMarch 1998, the
Department of Tradeand Industry launched a review of core company law whichhas proposed that
auditors'dutyof carebe widened to include shareholders whorelyon auditreports to buy or sell
shares, and to creditors andpotential investors (thirdparties); however this has since beenrejectedas
unworkable in practice. Furthermore, audit firms maynowincorporate as eitherlimited companies, or
limited liability partnerships, reducing the extentof their liability still further.
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Furthermore, even if shareholders could perfectly observe and verify company
performance in order to try to measure management effort, management effort is not
the only factor which affects company performance. Secondly, it is hard to imagine
being able to specify all possible actions and contingencies that may arise in any
single contract, even if everything was observable and verifiable. Shareholders
therefore have incentives to hire (skilled and independent) auditors to monitor
management on theirbehalf.
Audits are therefore demanded to fulfil a stewardship, or monitoring function,
when there is moral hazard. To summarise, conflicts of interest between an
information preparer such as a director, and an information user such as a shareholder,
can result in biased information production. This in tum can lead to a demand for
auditing to ensure that the information produced is unbiased. In particular, this
demand will arise when the information is complex, requiring expertise for
verification (for example, financial statements based on underlying accounting
records), and/or where users are sufficiently remote to prevent themselves from
directly assessing the quality of the information (for example, minority shareholders
in a multinational corporation). The problem, of course, is that the auditor is also a
self-interested economic agent. Therefore the auditor also faces an effort choice,
leading to further moral hazard.
There is empirical evidence to support the importance of monitoring as a
source of demand for audits. Agency cost considerations arising from conflicts of
interest between management and shareholders (and lenders) have been shown to play
an important part in the demand for audits where there are no compulsory audit
requirements (Chow, 1982). Chow conducted empirical tests of the variables which
proxy for agency costs. His results support the positive influence of leverage
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(gearing) and the presence of accounting-based debt covenants on the decision to hire
an auditor, and provide some evidence for the influence of firm size (also positive).
The effects of manager share ownership, which is predicted to reduce the demand for
auditing, could not be tested due to data limitations.
Where audits are mandatory, agency sources of demand for audits may playa
part in demand for high quality auditors rather than low quality auditors. For
example, DeFond (1992) found that changes in institutional ownership and leverage
are positively associated with changes in audit quality. In Chapters 3 and 4, models
of auditor choice are estimated in order to control for unobservable client company
characteristics that are expected to be associated with, respectively, audit fees and
earnings management. Two proxies for agency costs are used in these models -
financial gearing (leverage), and the proportion of non-executive directors on the
board. Gearing is not found to be significant in determining chosen audit firm size,
however companies with relatively high numbers of non-executives (high demand for
monitoring) are found to be significantly more likely to hire to large audit firms.
In the UK, under the Companies Act, audits are mandatory for the majority of
companies. Audits are compulsory for all public companies and for certain
companies (private or public) whose area of business is deemed to be in the public
interest. Exemptions are only available for very small private companies. For the
date of the company year-ends used in this thesis, the general requirements that a
private company must have met in order to qualify for an audit exemption were that
the company must qualify as 'small' for the purposes of filing abbreviated accounts,
must have turnover of no more than £350,000, and must have total assets of no more
37
than £1.4 million.i To protect minority interests, ten percent of ordinary shareholders
maystill require the company to havean auditeven if it meets the exemption criteria.
The demand for auditing for stewardship purposes is unlikely to exist where
companies are owner-managed, unless there are outside minority interests. This is the
rationale for the small private company audit exemption in the UK. Demand for
auditing from companies meeting the audit exemption requirements may also arise if
there are disputes between joint owners, or for general managerial purposes. For
example, audits mayprovide compensatory control systems (Abdel-Khalik, 1993).
2.2 Signalling
The agency-cost arguments for auditing arising to solve moral hazard problems can
also be applied to adverse selection. Audits may be demanded as signals of
management, company or shareholder quality to counter adverse selection problems.
These arise because different parties have different information. For example,
investors may be unable to distinguish high quality securities (shares in high quality
businesses) from low quality securities before they buy them, whereas the current
owners of the securities will knowsomething abouttheir type.
In this situation, market prices will simply reflect the average expected quality
of securities. Sellers of high quality securities will not wish to sell at this price (they
know that their securities are worth more) and will withdraw from the market; only
low quality securities (which are worth less than the average sales price) will remain
in the market. To counter this adverse selection, owners andmanagers of highquality
businesses may engage in signalling.
A signal is an activity that would be irrational were the signaller's claims of
type (i.e. high or low quality) incorrect. As audits are costly, one signal available to a
7 At the time of writing, the turnover limit has been increased to £1 millionand there are indications
that it may be further raised to the maximumcurrentlyallowedunderEU law, namely £4.8 million.
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manager is to hire an auditor (where audits are not mandatory) or to hire a higher
quality auditor (where audits are mandatory). Audits are costlyboth because a fee is
paid, and because the auditor may uncover and report information that a manager
would wish to remain undiscovered.
For example, shareholders may protect themselves from self-interested
management without audits, by reducing remuneration according to the expected level
of wealth management will seek to transfer to themselves. Now a demand for
auditing may arise from management themselves, if the value of the foregone
remuneration would exceed that of the wealth transfer gained and the cost of the audit
(Evans, 1980). Management would wish to demonstrate their good performance by
hiringauditors to attestto it, and so maintain their remuneration.
Similarly, shareholders may have incentives to hire auditors to demonstrate
their good performance to non-shareholder investors. As shareholders have only
limited liability for business losses, non-shareholder investors such as trade creditors
and bondholders, whose interests may not coincide with those of the shareholders,
require protection from the shareholders in the event that a business cannot repay its
debts. For example, in investment and asset substitution problems, once investors
have purchased bonds, shareholders' actions are not observable or verifiable by the
bondholders. Shareholders, or managers as their representatives, choose which
projects (assets) to invest in subsequent to receiving the bondholders' consideration.
As their choice is unobservable or unverifiable, they may choose projects which
benefit themselves at the bondholders' expense, thereby transferring wealth from the
bondholders. As non-shareholder investors cannot require the company to have an
audit, the bondholders may protect themselves by reducing the market price of bonds.
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To avoid this, shareholders may hire auditors, if the benefits in terms of higher bond
prices exceed the costsof the auditand the wealth transfer foregone.
In manysignalling models of auditing the auditor is treated as a machine (e.g,
Bar-Yosefand Limat, 1984; Titman andTrueman, 1986; Datar, Feltham and Hughes,
1987). In otherwords, the actions (e.g, effort choices) of the auditor are not modelled
but simply taken as given. In contrast, Melumad and Thoman (1990) incorporate a
utility-maximising auditor as found in agency models into a simple signalling setting.
The auditor chooses effort and reporting strategies in order to maximise her expected
utility. In their paper, firms with unobservable risk-types requiring loans choose
whether or not to hire auditors. If they hire an auditor, firms disclose (possibly false)
information about their type to the auditor which is unobserved by the lender, the
auditor chooses effort level and whether to report audit findings truthfully, and both
the firm andthe lender may sue the auditor.
The adverse selection problem arises because the (ex ante) project risk is
unobservable - 'good' firms become bankrupt less frequently than 'bad' firms, but
lenders cannot tell who is 'good' and who is 'bad' although they must price loans
according to their assessments of the probability of beingrepaid. Hence firms choose
(i) whether to hire an auditor; and (ii) what information to provide to that auditor if
the auditor is hired. The idea is that firms mayhire auditors to provide information to
lenders about theirtypes (good or bad).
There is also a moral hazard problem because, unless disciplined, the auditor
would choose not to expend costly effort, making the audit report useless. This is
why the model allows the firm and the lender to sue the auditor for a perceived audit
failure. The threat of litigation may induce the auditors to work and truthfully report
their findings, in order to pay less damages. Alternately, or in conjunction, potential
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reputation losses may act to ensure audit effort and truthful reporting (see e.g.
DeAngelo, 1981a; Firth, 1990; Wilson and Grimlund, 1990; and Datar and Alles,
1999).
When the auditor is assumed to always work and report truthfully (i.e. is
treated as a machine), and audits are optional, Melumad and Thoman find there are
separating equilibria where only good firms hire auditors. An auditor will always
discover and report a firm's true type, and is therefore only worthwhile for good
firms. However, Melumad and Thoman also show that, when the auditor is strategic
(i.e, allowed to choose effort and reporting strategies), fully separating equilibria no
longer exist. This should not be surprising. Bad firms may also hire auditors if
auditors do not always expend effort and/or report truthfully- they may successfully
masquerade as good firms.
Although the paper primarily concerns a non-mandatory audit setting, the
authors also consider mandated auditing in a regulated setting. When audits are
mandatory, the authors conclude that the signal provided by firms' choices as to
whetheror not to hire an auditor is lost. However, there do exist equilibria in which
auditing is effective (i.e. audit effort is expended and reporting is truthful). Melumad
and Thoman also show that, for these equilibria, an increase in the auditor's damage
payment raises the 'bad' firms' expected borrowing costs while reducing the 'good'
firms' expected costs, even though auditors charge both firm types the same fee. In
other words, borrowing costs are more appropriately assigned.
Also within a mandatory audit setting, the authors consider what impact
changes in audit accuracy (defined as the probability z that a false message will be
found) have on the equilibriaof the model. They find that when the auditor's damage
payment is large and z is close to 1, increases in accuracy raise the good firms'
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expected borrowing costs and lower the bad firms' expected borrowing costs. This is
undesirable - in otherwords, auditors can be too accurate!
Melurnad and Thoman view all auditors as identical. If, however, some
auditors are higher quality (more accurate and/ormore credible- and more expensive)
than other auditors, then choosing a higher quality auditor rather than a lower quality
auditor may still signal finn type successfully even in a mandatory setting (Titman
and Trueman, 1986). For example, large audit firms are often regarded as providing
higher quality than other audit firms (see Sections 2.6 and 3.1 below). A limitation is
that Titmanand Trueman take auditorquality in their model as given (andverifiable),
and do not allow auditors to act strategically. Obtaining model equilibria is unlikely
to be (computationally) straightforward if a model includes multiple auditor types
who are allowed to act strategically (Antle, 1982).
2.3 TheAuditor as Insurance
A third source of demand for audits could arise as a result of their risk-sharing
abilities. The auditor shares joint and several liability with company directors for the
contents of the published financial statements. Employing an auditor therefore shares
the litigation risk between management and the auditor. This may make risky
enterprises more attractive to managers who may otherwise refuse employment, or to
third party investors who doubt the ability of the business and/or management to pay
damages.
It is not only management or third parties who may benefit from risk-sharing
with an auditor; Antle (1982) developed a game theoretic model in which the auditor
acts as insurance for risk-averse shareholders. Individual managers are unlikely to
have sufficient funds to meet plaintiffs' claims, and the client companies themselves
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may be insolvent. In contrast, the 'deep pockets' of auditors are frequently cited as
the reason they are often the first targets in a suit.
A belief that auditors should insure investors against market losses was
expressed in the US case of Rosenblum v Adler (1983). Lys and Watts (1994)
investigate the significance of market returns in explaining the incidence of auditor
litigation in the US between 1955 and 1994. They find some evidence that client
firms involved in law suits had lower stock market returns than other firms over the
period as a whole. They also test whether the Rosenblum decision increased the
probability of an auditor lawsuit by examining whether other explanatory variables,
not related to investor losses, are less important in the period following the Rosenblum
case. Lys and Watts find that some variables do become less significant, and interpret
these results as supporting insurance as a consideration in auditor litigation.
However, in her discussion of the paper, Francis (1994) points out that if the
insurance hypothesis were literally true, then auditors would always be included as a
defendant in relevant litigation, when in fact they are not. She also points out that a
less extreme, but untested, implication of the hypothesis is that the incidence of
litigation against auditors in the US could be expected to increase following the
Rosenblum decision. Francis proposes that a test ofthe hypothesis would therefore be
to examine whether lawsuits which name the auditor as a defendant increased as a
percentage of total lawsuits.
The usefulness of auditor liability to third parties seeking to rely on financial
statements depends on the extent of the auditor's duty of care, which is heavily
restricted in the UK. A question also remains as to why managers would look to the
auditors for insurance, rather than or in addition to a conventional insurance company.
Wallace (1980) suggests that auditors may provide managers with more effective
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protection against liability claims than a conventional insurance company, because
both auditors and managers attach value to reputation (Farna, 1980). Enjoining the
auditor in the defence of allegations in which the manager is implicated increases the
probability that the manager will emerge with reputation intact or with less damage
suffered. Furthermore, unlike other types of insurers, auditors can actively avoid
payments by expending effort (andreporting truthfully) or by reporting conservatively
(i.e. always modifying their reports). This may be one reason why auditors could be
preferred to other insurers - they are likely to be cheaper as a result. Furthermore, it
may be difficult to find other insurers willing to take on all the risks associated with
investment in businesses.
Antle (1982) shows that, in his theoretical model, the auditor will preferrisk-
sharing providing he or she is sufficiently compensated for the risk borne. However,
Bockus and Gigler (1998) provide an auditor switching theory which argues that
incumbent auditors face an adverse selection problem with respect to liability risk. In
their model, if the expected liability to the incumbent auditor is sufficiently high, any
attempt by the incumbent to compensate her expected liability with the audit fee will
result in a good client switching to a (cheaper) auditor but a bad client retaining the
incumbent.
Bockus and Gigler assume that successive auditors are always cheaper
because they have less information about the risk posed by any individual client.
Pong and Whittington (1994) find evidence in the UK that new auditors charged less,
on average, than continuing incumbent auditors, although this could alternately be
explained by the practice of 'lowbalIing' (see Section 2.7). If auditors are unable to
compensate themselves for liability risk, this would suggest that Antle's argument
does not holdwhen incumbent and successive auditors are differentiated.
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2.4 A Service toManagement
Finally, management may also benefit from audits as a check on the adequacy and
operation of the internal controls of the company. For example, auditors provide a
'management letter' to client directors in an advisory capacity, detailing shortcomings
in the accounting systems and controls of the client company and suggestions for
improvement. Hence audits may be viewed as providing a service to management
(Turley and Cooper, 1991). Abdel-Khalik (1993) also argues that audits mayprovide
a compensatory control system. More recently, Gwilliam (2002) argues that the new
business risk audit methodologies more closely align the auditor and client
management, as a concentration on 'adding value to the client' effectively transforms
the audit role into a consulting role.
The audit may, in particular, serve as an important fraud detection (or
deterrence) service. This is not distinct from the auditor's duty to report on the truth
and fairness of the financial statements> the auditor is expected to undertake to plan
the audit so as to have a reasonable expectation of detecting material misstatements,
whether caused by fraud or other irregularity or error. Despite this, auditors' abilities
to detect fraud are often called into question. For example, Woolf (1996) reports
statistics provided by the professional indemnity insurance provider Bowring Finpro
that show claims related to failure to detect defalcations exceed those arising from all
other audit work, in both incidence and monetary amount. However, such evidence
alone cannot show whether audits are successful at detecting or deterring fraud.
Incidences where fraud has been successfully detected are not reported, let' alone
incidences where it has been deterred, so we cannot rely on claims evidence to draw
conclusions about auditors' abilities in this respect.
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2.5 The Supply ofAudit Services
The different sources of demand for audits may all influence audit quality. Supply-
side characteristics also influence audit quality. Supply-side audit quality research
explores the economic characteristics of the audit firms themselves, and the markets
in which they operate. Demand for audits will interact with the supply of audits
through market mechanisms. If the structure of the audit market is highly
competitive, commercial pressures may influence the quality of service provided by
lowering fees. Alternately, if the market is dominated by just a few suppliers (e.g. the
Big 6), they may be able to exercise considerable market power, for example they
may charge fee premiums."
In October 2000, Accountancy published research that showed that the Big 5
accountancy firms audited all of the FTSE top 100, and that other firms audited only
17 out of the FTSE 350 (4.9%). In a recent report, 'Restrictions on Competition in
the Provision of Professional Services' for the Office of Fair Trading (December
2000), LECG Ltd found that, in 2000, the Big 5 had a market share of 79.2% in
accountancy services as a whole.
There is therefore a high degree ofsupplier concentration in the listed market-
a relatively small number of audit firms account for a significant proportion of the
total volume of audit work being carried out. Dominance of the market by the Big 5
audit firms could be an oligopoly. This could lead to a sub-optimum allocation of
resources and internal inefficiencies, because the decisions taken by one supplier will
be heavily influenced by the possible reactions of that supplier's few competitors. It
aTheDig6 areArthur Andersen. Deloitte andTouche. Ernst andYoung. KPMG. Price Waterhouse
andCoopers andLybrand. In 1998. Price Waterhouse andCoopers andLybrand merged to form
PriceWaterhouseCoopers. reducing the large auditfirms to a 'Big S'. Following from thescandals in
2002 involving Arthur Andersen (e.g. Enron), andthis firm's subsequent collapse. there is now a 'Big
4',
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is generally argued that in these circumstances, the suppliers will adopt some form of
(perhaps implicit) collusion (Moizer andTurley, 1989).
Research in theUK. shows a pattern of increasing concentration over the past
thirty years or so (Pong andTurley, 1997). PongandTurley argue that the underlying
reasons for the use of larger audit firms could include the quality of service provided
and the credibility thus obtained, good marketing, or the increasing globalisation of
the top UK. clients (who may therefore require a global accountancy firm). They
conclude that the increases in concentration appear to have come about mainly
through mergers between audit firms (most recently, the merger of Price Waterhouse
withCoopers and Lybrand in 1998).
This may not be the only reason that large audit firms dominate the audit
market. Accountants are prohibited from seeking the business of potential clients by
telephone and from comparative fee advertising (ICAEW handbook 2000; ACCA
Guidelines). There is evidence that this may restrict competition by smaller firms for
thecustom of smaller businesses andindividuals or smaller clients.
There are also barriers to entry in the audit market - initially, theseconcern the
technical qualifications and other requirements to be an auditor, which effectively
provides accounting firms with a legal monopoly over audits. The justification for
these barriers is to ensure audit quality, but they may also be considered restrictive
practices. Indeed, the accountancy profession is identified in an Office of Fair
Trading report 'Competition in Professions' (OFT, 2001) as one in whichrestrictions
on supply operate. Effective barriers to entry may also arise from the existence of
economies of scale and scope (e.g, developing in-house audit software and training




These restrictions may be justified, if knowledge of accountancy and
compliance with auditing standards ensures audit quality. Barriers to entry may also
help to ensure a high standard of professional judgement (and hence audit quality).
These considerations are important as consumers of audits include the public, who
have no direct control over hiring and remuneration of auditors, not just the customer
(the firm) who pays for them.
2.6 Pricing ofAudit Services
Audit fees vary considerably from one client company to the next. It is of interest to
know what determines the prices charged for audit services, and what constitutes
value for money in audit fees. Studies of audit fees may shed some light on questions
concerning audit quality. In particular, fee premiums are often cited as evidence that
certain auditors provide higher quality. Furthermore, unusually high or low fees may
indicate a lack of auditor independence. At one extreme, high fees may represent a
reward to the auditor in return for reporting favourably. Alternately, low fees in one
period ('lowballing') are widely believed to increase auditor reliance on client
retention in future periods. However, DeAngelo (1981b) points out that this is not a
rational belief, as low fees in one period are sunk from the perspective of future
periods (lowballing to obtain new clients is discussed in more detail in Section 2.7).
Ignoring independence issues, the main factors likely to influence audit fees
are those that determine the amount of audit work that will be performed (e.g. client
size, complexity, control and inherent risk, or the presence of certain assets or
liabilities that require particular efforts or expertise to verify). In addition, if large
audit firms provide higher quality in some sense (e.g. do more work, are more likely
to report consistently with their findings, provide a better or additional service to
management, or simply employ better trained or qualified personnel) or have market
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power, they may charge a fee premium. For example, there have been several
empirical studies of the determinants of audit fees which show, after controlling for
client characteristics, that large audit firms tendto receive higher fees than small audit
firms (e.g. Simunic and Stein, 1987; Beatty, 1989; Chan et al., 1993; Craswell et al.,
1995; andPong andWhittington, 1994).
Chapter 2, 'The Large Audit FirmFee Premium: A Case of Selectivity Bias?'
builds on these studies of the large audit firm fee premium. Previous studies treat the
auditor choice as exogenous. However, iflarge audit firms arehigher quality in terms
of accuracy, then companies choosing large audit firms are likely to share
characteristics, such as a low risk of misstatements occurring in the financial
statements, that are also associated with lower audit fees. The premium estimated by
prior studies is therefore likely to be biased downwards. By controlling for the
endogeneity of the auditor choice, this chapter finds that the true premium is more
than twice as large as previously thought.
2.7 Lowballing
Auditor independence, and hence auditquality, maybe threatened when firms engage
in lowballing. Lowballing occurs when an auditor reduces the quote for an initial fee
in the hope of attracting a new client, despite the set-up costs involved in an initial
audit (for example, learning about the company's business, internal controls and
accounting system). It is commonly believed to harm auditor independence as the
new auditor needs to retain the audit for several years to recover these set-up costs.
For example, the state of Texas outlawed lowballing in 1991. The relevant Act
specifies that an accountant 'who performs or offers to perform a service involving
auditing skills for compensation that is less than the direct labour cost reasonably
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expected to be incurred in performing the service creates a presumption of loss of
independence' .
There is much anecdotal but little substantive evidence that lowballing occurs.
Pong and Whittington (1994) find evidence in the UK that new auditors charge less,
on average, than continuing incumbent auditors. However, this could be due to lower
costs rather than low-balling per see We cannot directly observe the split between the
cost and rent elements in audit fees.
DeAngelo (1981b) argues that lowballing does not impair independence, as it
is simply a result of competition for future 'quasi-rents'. She points out that it is the
existence of the client-specific quasi rents which (potentially) impairs independence,
and not the lowballing itself, as rational auditors recognise that initial costs are sunk
from theperspective of future periods.
DeAngelo defines a given period's client-specific quasi-rents as the excess of
revenues over avoidable (relevant) costs, where avoidable costs include the
opportunity cost of auditing the next-best alternative client. If no quasi-rents are
expected, the auditor is indifferent to losing the client and will report perfectly
independently, where the level of auditor independence is defined as the conditional
probability that, given a breach has beendiscovered, the auditor reports the breach. If
quasi-rents are expected, then the auditor has an economic interest in retaining the
client. The greater the auditor's economic interest (quasi-rents), the lower the
perceived probability that the auditorwill report a discovered breach.
When contracting is costly, incumbent auditors do expect to earn quasi-rents,
because the transaction costs of changing auditors mean incumbents can set fees
so
higher than their avoidable costs.' In other words, future quasi-rents arise because
client firms face switching costs should they change auditor. Competition among
auditors for the initial engagement, i.e, for the rights to those quasi-rents, results in
lowballing. The maximum amount of the initial discount is equal to the discounted
value of the future expected quasi-rents. Lowballing does not cause future quasi-
rents, but vice versa. DeAngelo concludes that agreements to prevent lowballing do
not ensure independence, as they are irrelevant in future periods, and do not prevent
auditors from earning quasi-rents in those periods.
3. AUDIT QUALITY
The issue of independence is important in audit quality. For example, DeAngelo
(\9~\a) defmes audit quality as the joint probability that a given auditor will both (a)
discover a breach (misstatement or fundamental uncertainty) and (b) report the
breach. Auditor ability and effort determine whether an auditor will discover a
misstatement, whereas auditor independence influences whether a breach will be
reported. In this section I discuss the possible meaning of 'audit quality' in relation to
the auditor's work and attributes, and identify definitions of audit quality in the
literature. In particular, the notions of auditor accuracy and auditor conservatism are
explored. In addition to the large audit finn fee premium, further evidence to support
the existence of a quality differential between large and small audit firms is briefly
reviewed, and attempts to identify the information content of audit reports (and hence
measure audit quality in one sense) are discussed. Finally, I describe how the
approach presented in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 relates to definitions of and approaches to
audit quality in the literature. I do not extend the literature on the information content
of audit reports, instead I focus on the quality of the accompanying financial
9 Changing auditors mayalso sendan unfavourable signal to investors, if theybelieve that the change
is motivated by a desire to avoid an audit reportmodification.
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information, as evidenced by audit reports (Chapter 3) or earnings management
(Chapters 4 and 5).
Recall that, in Section 1, I described how audit quality is generally
unobservable, and is multi-dimensional. This section expands on the notion that audit
quality is multi-dimensional. In addition to the DeAngelo definition of audit quality
presented above, I identify a number of different approaches in the literature,
consistent with the multi-dimensionality of the concept. Some of these approaches
are apparent in the literature which relates to the existence of an audit quality
differential. This literature is reviewed first.
3.1 Evidence ofan Audit Quality Differential
Section 2.6 reviewed empirical studies of the determinants of audit fees which show
that large audit firms tend to receive higher fees than small audit firms. These studies
can only suggest that large auditors are associated with higher quality. The results
may also be consistent with greater market power, and indeed the studies do not seek
to define audit quality. Nevertheless, there is a general consensus that a quality
differential does exist. For example, Lee (1996) find no evidence to support a market
power argument. Lee discriminates between market power and product (quality)
differentiation effects on fees in Hong Kong, where a non-Big 6 auditor has
comparable market share to the third and fourth largest Big 6 firms and there is wide
variation in market shares ofBig 6 firms, Lee finds that Big 6 auditors still earn a fee
premium over the large local firm, which is consistent with product differentiation
rather than monopolypricing. The results in Chapter2 also help support the existence
of a qualitydifferential.
In addition to studies of audit fees, there are several empirical and theoretical
papers which support the idea that large audit firms provide higher quality audits. For
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example, Dye (1993) shows theoretically that large audit firms will provide higher
quality because they have more wealth at risk from litigation. Similarly, DeAngelo
(l981a) proposes that consumers of audits may rely on audit firm size as a surrogate
for audit quality, as large audit firms have more at risk from reputation losses
(because they have more clients and/or larger clients). Empirical papers also provide
suggestions for definitions of audit quality.
Empirical studies show that high reputation investment banks underwriting
initial public offerings prefer their clients to hire large audit firms, and those that do
so are charged a lower banking fee (Menon and Williams, 1991; Balvers et al., 1988).
In addition, DeFond et al. (2000) find that hiring large audit firms significantly
increases the likelihood of audit qualifications in companies listed on the Shanghai
and Shenzhen stock exchanges and argue that this is because they are higher quality.
Keasey et al. (1988) also find large audit firms significantly increase the likelihood of
(small company) audit qualifications in the UK. Similarly, Francis and Krishnan
(1999) compare audit report modifications issued by large and small audit firms, and
find that large audit firms are more conservative (in the sense that they are more likely
to issue modifications) in their reporting on companies with high values of income-
increasing accounting accruals (earnings management). In this thesis I examine both
whether large audit firms are more likely to issue modified audit reports than other
audit firms (Chapter 3), and whether large audit rums ate assoc\ateu witb less
(income-increasing) earnings management than other audit firms (Chapters 4 and 5).
3.2 Accuracy and Conservatism
Perhaps the most natural way to think of audit quality is not in terms of conservatism,
but in terms of accuracy. Using this as a definition, a high quality audit could be
defined as one which minimises the likelihood of both Type I and Type II errors,
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where a Type I error is the issue of a clean audit report when the report should have
been modified, and a Type II error is the issue of a modified audit report when the
report should have been clean. If the frequency of such errors can be measured, this
would provide a natural measure of relative audit quality.
There will always be some chance of error as auditors perform audit tests on a
sample basis (and consider subjective choices of accounting policy and accounting
estimates). It may not be straightforward to determine an acceptably low threshold
level of error for a 'quality' audit, but relative levels may be compared (the lower the
better), and it must be recognised that there is a trade-off with cost. A more serious
concern is the identification of errors when they occur. Academic attempts to
measure the accuracy of audit reports are limited to studies of auditors' ability to
predict corporate failure (e.g. Lennox, 1999), and the incidence of litigation against
the client (Raghunandan, 1993). This is because we may not generally observe a
firm's true financial position and performance, in order to determine for ourselves
whether the reported financial statements contain material misstatements. The very
factors that give rise to a demand for auditing for monitoring purposes, prevent the
researcher from assessing thisaspect ofthe auditor's work.
In order to measure audit accuracy, both Type I and Type II errors must be
considered. Balachandran and Nagarajan (1987) and Nelson et al. (1988), for
example, consider both types of error. However, different types of error may carry
different costs. For users and auditors, for example, a Type I error is likely to be more
costly than a Type II error, whereas Type II errors are more likely to result in loss to
the company or its management (in relation to going-concern modifications this might
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include 'self·fulfilling prophecy' effects). Auditors do not appearto face litigation for
Type II errors,whereas the scaleof litigationrelated to Type I errors is considerable.l''
Conservatism is a related definition of quality which takes account of the fact
that Type I and Type II errors are likely to have different costs. In particular, Type I
errors are likely to be more costly to society as a whole (and to users of audit reports
and the auditors themselves in particular). We may therefore define a quality audit as,
alternately, one which has a very low Type I error rate, regardless of the Type II error
rate (with which there may well be a trade-off). Thus, the more conservative an
auditor is, the more likely he or she is to issue a modified audit report on a given
company, and the lower the Type I error rate will be. This definition differs from
accuracy as only one error type is considered.
Palmrose (1988) uses a conservative definition of audit quality by only
considering Type I errors. Similarly, Francis and Krishnan (1999) define a more
conservative auditor as one which is more likely to issue audit report modifications.
Basu's (1997) interpretation of conservatism is more subtle in that it captures
accountants' tendency to require a higher degree of verification for recognising good
news than bad news (prudence), so that earnings reflect bad news more quickly than
good news. Basu's interpretation is related to the definition of auditor conservatism
applied in Chapter 4 of the thesis. These definitions are not, however, inconsistent
with a tendency to issue audit modifications more easily than clean reports.
3.3 Audit Effort, Assurance and Reporting
Whether a quality audit is one which is accurate or conservative, there is a natural
relationship between audit quality and audit effort (i.e, the nature, extent, and timing
10For example, at the time of writing, Ernstand Young facea $6Smcivil law suit fromthreeUS banks
in relation to the 1995 and 1996 audits of Kent International Associates. ArthurAndersen has also
effectively beendestroyed as a resultof the Enronscandal.
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of the audit work performed).'! This provides us with alternative means of defining
audit quality, i.e. in terms of inputs to the audit process. However, as discussed
earlier, any consideration of audit quality must not stop merely with the performance
ofthe auditwork, but must also considerthe auditor's subsequent reporting decisions.
This gives rise to DeAngelo's (1981a) definition.
DeAngelo (1981a) and Palmrose (1988) define audit quality in terms of the
level of assurance provided, i.e, the probability that financial statements contain no
material omissions or misstatements. Higher assurance levels correspond to higher
audit quality. Palmrose refers specificallyto instances in which the auditors provide a
clean audit report on financial statements. This is reasonable as, in practice, auditors
only face litigation when they fail to modify their audit reports, and Palmrose was
specifically studying comparative litigation activities among different sizes and firms
of auditors.V Unwarranted audit modifications are ignored for the purposes of her
definition of quality, which is therefore one of auditor conservatism. In most cases
auditors are effectively prevented from modifying audit reports without cause, as the
reason for the modification must be disclosed • an exception may be audit reports
relating to goingconcern issues which are open to subjective interpretation.
In contrast, Dye (1993) equates audit quality with adherence to auditing
standards, and presents a model in which the prospect of facing litigation arisingfrom
II The extentof audit workconcerns sample size or staff time expended. The nature of the audit work
performed concerns the choice of audit tests and the type (e.g. reliability) of the auditevidence
gathered. For example, original documentary evidence obtained directlyby the auditoris deemed to be
morereliable (Statement of Auditing Standard- SAS·400) thanphotocopied documents obtained by
the clientmanagement. The timing of the audit workconcerns when, in relation to the end of the
accounting period, the auditworkis conducted.
12Note that although Lys and Watts (1994)provide evidence that auditors whodo issuemodified audit
reportsare sometimes sued,such suitsarise whenmodifications in one yearidentify a problem that the
auditorfailed to discover in previous yearswhenthe audit reportwasnot modified. Additionally, it is
possible that the clientcompany couldsue an auditorfor issuing an unwarranted auditmodification,
but I havebeenunable to identify any actual instances. It has beenshownthatcompanies switch
auditormore frequently after receiving modified audit reports (Chowand Rice, 1982; Craswell, 1988;
and Citronand Tamer, 1992) and I wouldsuggestthat this is a far cheaper (andmorecertain) method
for companies to punishtheir auditors, albeit less rewarding as there is no litigation settlement.
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substandard audits provides motivation for auditors to adhere to auditing standards.
Dye argues that large audit firms with more wealth at risk from litigation, the
proverbial 'deep pockets', have more incentive to provide quality.u He does not
specifically address auditor reporting choices.
Moore and Scott (1988) do consider auditor reporting choices in an extension
to their model of audit effort, whereby auditors may collude with management in
reporting book rather than audit asset values. Melumad and Thoman (1990) also
consider both audit effort and reporting choices in their model.
Hatherly, Nadeau and Thomas (1996) argue that it is also important to
consider the influence of the audit on the behaviour of management. They identify
two constructs of audit quality; one is concerned with high auditor effort and
consistency between the audit report and the audit findings, the other is concerned
with high auditee effort invoked by auditor behaviour (which may not necessarily
involve high effort on the part of the auditor).
Similarly, Pae and Yoo (2001) present a model in which a firm's owner, an
auditor, and outside investors strategically interact. The owner's investment in the
firm's internal control system and the auditor's effort jointly affect the
informativeness of the auditor's report on the financial statements. Pae and Yoo show
that, depending on the size of the auditor's legal liability to investors, either the owner
under-invests and the auditor over-invests, or vice versa. According to their model,
no damage award to outside investors can induce both the owner and auditor to make
socially optimal investments.
t3 'Deep pockets' arise in part because of the professional indemnity insurance heldby auditors. A




As noted in Section 1.1, audit effort and reporting decisions necessarily involve the
application of professional judgement on the part of the auditor. Auditing standards
are not prescriptive. Furthermore, the auditor must judge the appropriateness of the
accounting policies applied by the company directors, and also the reasonableness of
estimates where these have been included in the accounts. These are by their nature
subjective so it is important that the auditor is sufficiently skilled, knowledgeable and
experienced to reach reasonable conclusions (note that there may be more than one
acceptable opinion). Hence the qualityof the auditor's professional judgement must
feature as part of any assessment of overall audit quality.
It has also been suggested that the application of professional judgement to
auditor reporting decisions may enable auditors to signal their private information
about the company to users of the audit report (Grout et al., 1994). Grout et al. view
auditors as being able to signal their private, subjective information about the client
company, by choosing to issue modified or clean audit reports when the information
reported in the financial statements, or the manner in which it is disclosed, is suchthat
the auditreport appears unjustified.
Signalling favourable private information in this way requires that the user of
the accounts can indeed identify the problems 'revealed' by the financial statements.
The current regulatory framework for financial accounting with its detailed disclosure
requirements are such that it is difficult to perceive of many modern situations where
this could occur. The authors use as illustration the 1931 case of R v Kylsant and
Mor/and, 'The Royal Mail' case. In this case, sizeable transfers to and from reserves,
which in some cases turned losses into profits, were not disclosed by amount in the
accounts, but only as a note indicating that the reported results 'included transfers
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from reserves'. The only possible justification for similar reporting practices under
the modem system would have to be that the adoption of accounting treatments,
outlawed by accounting standards, was necessary under the 'true and fair view'
departure clause." 'True and fair view' is a somewhat vague term which is not
clearly defined in statute. However a legal opinion on the meaning of the term was
reported in Accountancy (November, 1993). Counsel stated that ' ... the courts will
treat compliance with accepted accounting principles as primafacie evidence that the
accounts are true and fair'. This definition would make a true and fair view override
of accounting standards highly unlikely to be accepted.
However, an area where this type of signalling may feasibly occur is in the
reporting of discretionary accruals. Accruals feature in all UK. financial statements,
and are by their very nature subjective and open to manipulation. The level of
discretionary accruals in a given set of accounts may be estimated from financial
statement data using a number ofdifferent empirical models (e.g. Jones, 1991). Users
doing so are therefore able to identify what appear to be abnormally high levels of
discretionary accruals in company accounts, and to interpret the accompanying audit
report accordingly.
Chapter 4, 'Are Large Auditors More Conservative? Earnings Management
and Auditor Choice in the UK' considers audit quality in terms of the level of
earnings management (measured by discretionary accruals) in reported financial
statements. Clients of large and small audit firms are compared. Audit quality here is
equated with conservatism in the sense that a high quality auditor is regarded as one
who is associated with low levels of earnings management. This is an indirect
examination of audit quality, which takes account of the influence of the audit on the
14 Although compliance withaccounting standards will normally be necessary for financial statements
to givea trueand fair view(Foreword to Accounting Standards, ASB, 1993), the trueand fairview
requirement as laid out in Sections 226 and 227 of the Companies Act 1985 (as amended) is overriding.
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behaviour of management, as suggested by Hatherly, Nadeau and Thomas (1996). I
show both that large auditors are associated with lower levels of reported signed
discretionary accruals, and that clients of large audit firms report higher levels of
signed discretionary accruals (i.e. more positive discretionary accruals) with large
audit firms thanothercompanies would.
From the viewpoint of users who would benefit from observing auditors'
private information through their choice of auditreport, a 'quality' audit would be one
that signalled private information successfully. It is not clear that such a definition
coincides with either conservatism or accuracy, although successful private
information signalling is not inconsistent with audit accuracy as long as the auditor's
subjective private information is correlated with the 'true' report type. Excessive
conservatism, on the other hand, would likely prevent the transmission of any
favourable private information; companies which appeared 'bad' on paper would
always receive modified auditreports.
Recall that there is a menu of different audit reports available to UK auditors.
A modified audit report may contain a qualified audit opinion (on the grounds of
disagreement or lack of audit evidence) and/or an explanatory paragraph highlighting
a fundamental uncertainty (including fundamental uncertainties relating to going
concern). A clean audit report contains neither. Of course, any qualified audit
opinion is essentially a signal of the private information gathered by the auditor in the
course of the audit work (that the financial statements are or might be materially
misstated). Modified reports detailing fundamental uncertainties, including those
relating to going concern, are stressing issues that are deemed to have been already
adequately disclosed in the accounts.
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Thechoice of one audit report overanother (for example, choosing a relatively
mild 'except for' disagreement qualified audit opinion rather thanexpressing a severe
'adverseopinion') rna)' be one method by whichauditors can attempt to signal private
information, although any type of qualified audit report is rare. This method of
signalling information would only work if it is possible to form an expectation of the
audit report, by transparent financial (mis)reporting, as discussed above. In order to
form suchan expectation, a model of audit reporting maybe developed.
Chapter 3 'Does One Size Fit All? Evidence from a Multinomial Logit Model
for Predicting Audit Reports' identifies some of the determinants of modified audit
reports in the UK using a multinomial logit model to distinguish between clean
reports, going-concern related audit modifications, and othermodifications (including
qualifications on the grounds of disagreement or limitation of scope). Included in the
explanatory variables are two dummy variables indicating the corresponding audit
report type for the prior year - the lagged audit report. These variables are found to
be highly significant in determining the current audit report type. This chapter
provides strong evidence ofpersistence in both going-concern andnon-going-concem
related audit report modifications. It also provides evidence for the ability of these
models to successfully predict audit report type.
Earlier empirical studies have also shown that there is strong persistence in
audit reporting (e.g. Keasey et al., 1988; Monroe and Teh, 1993; Krishnan et al.,
1996; Citron and Taffler, 2000). There are various explanations for reporting
persistence - auditors maybe unwilling to givenewlymodified reports because of the
fear of client loss. In addition, newly modified reports may trigger litigation if they
signal that auditors failed to discover problems in previous years. However, once a
report has been modified in one year and the client has not switched auditors, the
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auditor then has incentives to continue to modify in subsequent years; the 'switch
threat' has been removed but a modification could still avoid litigation. These factors
suggest that newly modified reports may be associated with more serious problems
thanrepeated modified reports.
In addition, Chapter 3 assesses the ability of the multinomial logit model to
successfully predict audit report types, and compares it to a naive model which
predicts the audit report type to be equal to the prior year report type. Although the
lagged audit report variables are not the only significant determinants of current audit
report type, use of the multinomial logit model does not significantly reduce
prediction error costs relative to the naive model. The relative importance of lagged
audit reports suggests that the signalling value of repeated audit report modifications
may be low. Therefore, the information content of modified audit reports may be
greater when previous reports areclean rather than modified.
3.5 Credibility and Independence
A quality audit implicitly requires that the audit report be credible. Concerns over
lack of auditor independence from their clients threaten the credibility of audit
reports. For example, in the wake of the collapse of Enron, Sir Bryan Carsberg, the
former secretary-general of the International Accounting Standards Committee,
commented that 'the fundamental problem ... the essential conflict of interest is in the
audit process itself. So long as the auditors of a company are, in practice, chosen by
the executives of that company ... it is very difficult for auditors to maintain
objectivity' (The Financial Times, April2nd 2002).
Carsberg's concern over independence stems from the fact that auditor tenure
is usuallyin the gift of management. Auditors report to shareholders but in practice it
is management who control auditor hiring and remuneration. Hence auditors may not
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report management failings truthfully to shareholders, fearing theymay lose business
as a result. Acemoglu and Gietzmann (\997) show that auditors' potential legal
liability may make it credible to expect that auditors will not collude with
management. To further safeguard auditor independence and integrity in the UK, the
Companies Act contains minimum requirements that statutory auditors may not be
officers or employees of the company audited. These factors are augmented by
ethical and professional standards, but their efficacy is frequently criticised in the
press. Sometimes this is clearly justified, for example when breaches of guidelines
are discovered. However, it is usually hard to judge objectively how successful such
standards are. Arriving at an accurate and objective measure of the degree of
independence of any auditor is particularly difficult as it is likely to vary from one
client to thenext.
Auditor independence is very much an international concern. In the UK,
AccountingWeb reported on 18th January 2002 that labour MP Austin Mitchell had
tabled a motion calling for auditors to be banned from undertaking non-audit workfor
their audit clients. The International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) recently
published a new code of ethics. In the US, public concern first grew following the
SEC's discovery of 8,000 violations of client shareholding rules at
PriceWaterhouseCoopers during an investigation on the newly-merged firm in 2000.
Following the discovery of this widespread non-compliance by
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, the SEC issued proposals for new independence rules in
November 2000. For the first time in the US, audit fees and fees for IT and
consultancy workmust now be disclosed in company financial statements. The new
rules further govern investments by auditors or their family members in audit clients,
employment relationships between auditors or their family members and their client,
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and the scope of services provided by audit firms to their audit clients. Non-audit
services initially banned were bookkeeping, systems design and implementation
except for IT consultancy (subject to certain criteria), appraisal or valuation services if
material to the financial statements, certain types ofactuarial services, some types and
amounts (in hours) of internal audit work, management functions, human resources
except for advice regarding and interview of prospective job candidates, broker-dealer
services, and legal services. However, the rules regarding investments in shares were
in fact relaxed by narrowing the definition of those affected to include only those who
work on or who can influence the audit of the company concerned, rather than to
include all employees of the audit finn.
The rules banning provision of bookkeeping services were also relaxed
following the events of September 11 th 2001. However, subsequent to the collapse of
Enron in December 2001, Congress introduced the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in July 2002.
This Act creates a Public Company Accounting Oversight board and severely curtails
the consulting services audit firms can perform for their clients in line with the
original SEC proposals, reinstating the ban on bookkeeping. The Act covers audit
reports by foreign accounting firms as well as US firms,
Auditor independence can be threatened by over reliance on revenues from the
client, over familiarity with the client, mutual or conflicting interests, or if the auditor
is effectively auditing their own work. Over reliance on client revenues is an issue
because of the de facto control of auditor choice and remuneration by management
rather than by the body of shareholders to which they report, and the provision of
lucrative additional services (such as taxation advice or management consultancy) to
audit clients. Client switch threats (the threat that the auditee company mayswitchto
an alternative audit finn) may influence auditors' reporting decisions when the threat
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is credible and the potential loss of income is sufficiently high. Chow and Rice
(1982) provide evidence that companies do switch auditors more frequently after
audit modification, and Lennox (1999) shows that auditor switching can influence
audit reporting, although the effectof switch threats is not directly examined.
Over reliance can arise either because the client is particularly large relative to
otherauditclients, or if fees for audit or non-audit services are unusually high relative
to costs. The former should be prevented by ethical guidelines concerning the
acceptability of new clients. The latter is harder to enforce as information on audit
costs is confidential to the auditor. It may impair independence because auditors may
be reluctant to lose such profitable clients by issuing unfavourable audit reports (they
are earning quasi-rents). Income from non-audit services is also suggested to impair
independence, particularly as it is often higher than the audit fees for the same client.
In October 2000, Accountancy reported that only 30% of the £900m fees earned
annually by audit firms from FTSE 350 clients came from the statutory audit. Non-
audit services may conversely improve audit quality by increasing the auditor's
knowledge of the client (and may also, in this case, result in naturally lower audit
fees) (Canning and Gwilliam, 2002). The results of the audit report model
estimations reported in Chapter 2 show that non-audit fees are not significant in
determining audit report types in the UK, suggesting either that they do not affect
auditquality, or that the two effects cancel each other out.
Low fees may also be a threat to auditor independence if lowballing is thought
to have occurred. Recall that lowballing is the practice whereby auditors win new
clients by underbidding their competitors by so much that they are likely to incur a
loss on the cost of the audit. However, Lee and Gu (1998) argue that as lowballing
reduces the transaction costs associated with the audit engagement, it can actually
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improve auditor independence as it makes it easier for the shareholders to switch
auditors if the auditor is found to have colluded with management.
Over-familiarity with the client arises through repeated contact between
individuals such as the audit partner and/or manager and key client staff. Such
contact may extend to social events. Mandatory auditor rotation would alleviate the
risk that personal friendships may pose to auditor independence, but at the price of
incurring set-up costs with each new auditor. Mandatory rotation may also alleviate
auditors' reappointment concerns. In this respect, Gietzmann and Sen (2002) analyse
the trade-off theoretically, and show that the improved incentives for independence
outweigh the associated costs in 'thin' auditmarkets withrelatively few large clients.
3.6 The Information ContentofAudit Reports
Studies have tested whether audit reports signal valuable information to investors by
examining the impact of modified reports on stock market values (via event studies),
the probability of bankruptcy or litigation, and lending decisions. These studies are
discussed below.
The ability of audit reports to signal incremental information is generally
reduced if the audit report is predictable from publicly observable characteristics such
as thoseincluded in the multinomiallogit model of auditreporting in Chapter 2. They
can only carry information to the extent that they are unexpected. Hence studies of
the information content of audit reports should focus on unexpected audit reports. As
it highlights the importance of persistence in audit reporting, Chapter 2 provides
evidence that first-time audit modifications can be used as a proxy for unexpected
audit reports. This approach has been used by event studies (e.g, Dodd et al., 1984;
Dopuch et al., 1986).
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Event studies have tested the information content of audit reports by
examining how the stock market reacts to news of modified audit reports. Abnormal
returns are indications that an event carries information content. Some studies have
found that share prices fall following qualified reports which suggests that audit
reports do signal useful information to investors (Firth, 1978; Banks and Kinney,
1982; Dopuch et a1., 1986; Fleak and Wilson, 1994). In contrast, other studies have
found no relationship between the content of the audit report and share prices (Elliott,
1982; Dodd et al., 1984). Thus, the evidence from event studies is inconclusive.
Dopuch et a1. (1986) attempted to explain the differences in their results and those of
the earlier paper by Dodd et a1. (1984), but without complete success.
Event studies suffer from difficulties in identifying precise event dates, and the
presence of concurrent events or the simultaneous release of confounding information
(particularly problematic when audit opinions are announced concurrently with other
accounting information such as earnings), and problems of methodology. For
example, there is choice over the length and timing of estimation and event periods,
and of the model used to estimate expected returns for the abnormal return
calculations. Event studies also rest on an assumption of semi-strong market
efficiency.
More recently, research by Choi and Jeter (1992) has concluded only that
'audit qualifications reduce the market's responsiveness to earnings announcements
by altering themarket's perception of earnings noise or the persistence of earnings, or
both'. This last conclusion is consistent with the comment made by Craswell (1985)
in his review of the literature that 'audit reports are, in general, not important for
themselves but for their influence on investors' assessments of the financial
statements. It may be unrealistic, therefore, to expect to disassociate audit reports
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from the companies' financial statements and to aim to identify the information
content of qualified audit reports per se',
Event studies can generally only identify short-term effects. A recent
literature has evolved which examines long-run abnormal returns in response to
events. However, a problem with using this approach to examine the effects of
modified audit reports is that many companies receiving such reports in the UK delist
or go bankrupt less than a year from the announcement date, so that there is very little
data to analyse. The long time periods concerned also increase the likelihood of
confounding events occurring within the time frame.
A second way to determine whether audit reports signal useful information, is
to examine whether they affect managerial payor appointments, although there is no
empirical evidence on this to date. Any studies would also encounter many of the
same difficulties faced by event studies, for example regarding confounding
information releases. Ifmodified reports signal to investors that there are stewardship
problems, one might expect modified reports to reduce managerial pay and/or
increase the probability than managers are replaced. Since modified audit reports are
generally given to companies that are financially distressed and/or employ
questionable accounting policies, we might expect modified reports to signal to
investors that managers have performed poorly • investors might respond to such
information by reducing managerial pay and/orremoving themanager.
It is reasonable to assume that auditor-client disagreements over accounting
policy are within the control of management. On the other hand, companies may
experience going-concern problems due to factors outside of management control.
The pay-performance literature has argued that when managers are risk-averse and
poor performance is mainly due to exogenous factors, one should find only a weak
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correlation between performance and compensation/turnover. Thus, the strength of
any association between audit reports and compensation/turnover is likely to depend
on whether reports were modified for going-concern or other accounting issues, if
managers are not responsible for poor performance. However, it is difficult to
determine whethermanagers are responsible for performance.
A third way to evaluate the information content of audit reports is to test
whether they help to identify failing companies (Koh, 1991; Hopwood et aI., 1989;
Lennox, 1999) or the incidence of litigation againstcompanies (Raghunandan, 1993).
Existing evidence indicates that audit reports are not accurate indicators of
financial distress. Although Hopwood et al. (1989) find audit reports significant in
explaining bankruptcy, Lennox (1999) points out that publicly observable variables
which help to identify failing companies, such as company size, industry sector, and
the economic cycle, are omitted in their study. By controlling for these variables, and
non-linearities, Lennox finds that the significance of the audit report dummyvariable
disappears. Koh (1991) also finds evidence that, compared to statistical models used
to predict bankruptcy, audit opinions carry little or no incremental information for
identifying failing companies.
Furthermore, few failing companies even receive going-concern related audit
report modifications. Lennox (1999) finds that auditors disclose going-concern
uncertainties in only 17% of failing listed UK companies, consistent with the results
of Citron and Taffler (1992). For private companies in the UK, Lennox notes that
only 5% of failing companies receive going-concern modifications (Barnes and Hooi,
1987). In Koh's (1991) sample of 141 failing and 189 non-failing US companies,
approximately 46% of the failing companies did not receive audit report
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modifications, comparing unfavourably to the 85% successful classification rateof his
benchmark bankruptcy model.
Going-concern related audit modifications may also be given to ultimately
healthy companies - in a sample of 40 listed companies that received modified
reports, Taffler and Tseung (1984) find that only 10 failed. Lennox similarly finds
that out of 124 companies receiving going-concern modifications, only 21 fail in the
subsequent year.
Bankruptcy studies suffer because they can only evaluate one type of audit
report modification, and because the frequency of going-concern related audit
modifications may be reduced because of the 'self-fulfilling prophecy hypothesis'. It
is sometimes argued that auditors fail to modify audit reports for going concern
uncertainties when they feel that the modification will in itself result in financial
difficulties or bankruptcy for the company concerned, whereas without a modification
the company would continue without such difficulties. This is known as the self-
fulfilling prophecy hypothesis and rests on the assumption of incremental information
contained in auditreports.
However, although it is theoretically possible that the issue of a modification
on going concern grounds could contribute to the failure of an otherwise viable
company (Matsumura et aI., 1997), empirical testing of the going-concern hypothesis
is hampered by issues of causal direction - it is important to be able to isolate the
impact on going-concern of issues leading to a going-concern auditmodification from
the impact of the modification itself, but these issues may not always be observable.
Controlling for observable characteristics that influence bankruptcy, Lennox (1999)
shows no significant incremental effect of going-concern related audit modifications
on bankruptcy, which suggests that the hypothesis is false. Other empirical evidence
70
to date in the UK also suggests that it does not occur in practice (Citron and Taffler,
2000).
Citron and Taffler use a matched sample approach to control for company
characteristics. One of the matching criteria they use is z-score, generated by a
statistical bankruptcy model.P Unfortunately, their study is potentially flawed, as
non-bankrupt firms with going-concern modifications are only included in the study if
they have negative (or almost negative) z-scores at some point in the period under
examination. As, by construction of the z-score model, companies with low z-scores
are more likely to become bankrupt, and as the non-modified companies are only
included in the sample if they are matched with modified companies on the basis of,
among other things, z-score, one might expect that the sample would be biased
towards underestimation of the effect of modification on bankruptcy. However, it is
unlikely that a company with a high z-score would receive a going-concern
modification.
An alternative method of examining the information content of audit reports is
to conduct experimental studies looking at the effect of audit reports on decisions by,
for example, bankers as to whether or not to lend money to companies (Firth, 1980).
The main difference between the other studies of the information content of
modified audit reports and these experimental studies, is that decisions are simulated.
This enables some of the problems, for example of simultaneous information releases,
to be overcome. However, only limited conclusions maybe drawn from experimental
studies due to problems of internal and external validity. Craswell (1985) includes a
ISThe othermatching criteria used are listingstatus- full listing or listedon the UnlistedSecurities
Market (nowAIM), industry sector,and size. Z-scores are linear combinations of various financial
ratios anda constant termderivedfrombankruptcy models estimated in prior studies, similarto that
employed by Altman (1968), thatindicate degree of financial distress.
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summary of experimental studies and their shortcomings, concluding that any
conclusions drawn from experimental studies shouldbe treated with caution.
In each of the studies discussed by Craswell, cases were prepared and
presented to subjects who were required to undertake an experimental task, including
estimation of the maximum loan that could be made (Estes and Reimer, 1977; Firth,
1979; and Firth, 1980), estimation of share prices (Estes and Reimer, 1979) and
estimation of interest rate premiums (Libby, 1979). Results suggest that
modifications do not provide information for lending officers apart from the reasons
givenby the auditors, but that lending officers and credit analysts appear to be able to
distinguish reasons relating to going concern and uncertainties from those that record
technical breaches of accounting rules. These results are, however, subject to severe
problems of validity due to the abstract nature of the experimental tasks performed,
subjectselection, and problems of bias in the studies by Libby and Firth.
3.7 OtherDimensions ofQuality
Any discussion of audit quality would not be complete without mentioning other
important dimensions of the audit process that may impact on quality. For example,
the timeliness of the audit report is likely to be important for users' decision-making
purposes, but there may be a trade-off between speed and accuracy. Similarly, the
length of the audit visit may be important to management wishing to keep disruption
to normal procedures to a minimum, but again theremay be a trade-offbetween speed
and accuracy. If an audit is demanded primarily to provide services to management
(see Section 2.4), for example by a small owner-managed company, then its ability to
fulfil thoseservices should take precedence over other qualityconsiderations.
Interestingly, provision of a 'high quality' audit in terms of fielding better
qualified audit staff and/or fielding more audit staff may incidentally both reduce the
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length of the audit visit, improve advice or other services provided to management,
and increase the likelihood of detecting misstatements in the financial statements. I
would however suggest that these considerations should not form a primary definition
of audit quality, and that the quality of an audit should be measured on its outcomes
not its inputs.
3.8 The Interpretation ofAudit Quality in the Thesis
In this thesis I do not consider audit quality in terms of services to management
(Section 3.7), or the incremental information content of audit reports (Section 3.6).
After confirming that there is evidence that a quality differential exists between large
audit firms and other audit firms (Chapter 2), I examine the quality differential with
respect to the quality of financial information in corporate reports. In this respect I
draw upon DeAngelo's (l981a) definition of audit quality. As discussed earlier in
Section 3, DeAngelo considers audit quality in relation to the level of assurance
provided by the audit, i.e. the probability that financial statements contain no material
omissions or misstatements (or fundamental uncertainties). She equates this to the
joint probability that a given auditor will both (a) discover a breach and (b) report the
breach. However, I cannot measure audit quality directly in terms of the inputs to the
audit process (auditor ability, effort and independence) which determine this joint
probability. Therefore I use proxies to measure the output to the audit process,
namely the level of assurance provided and the quality of the financial statements
(whether they contain material omissions or misstatements). I examine the audit
reports issued (Chapter 3) as a measure of the level of assurance, and the level of
earnings management in the financial statements (Chapters 4 and 5) as a measure of
the quality of the financial statements.
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In Chapter 3 I test whether large audit firms are more likely to issue modified
audit reports than otheraudit firms. If large audit finns provide more assurance, they
should be both more likely to discover and to report a breach. This is done via the
audit report. All else being equal, if large audit firms are higher quality then they
should be more likely to issue modified audit reports. As I have no benchmark
against which to judge the accuracy of the audit reports, I equate audit quality in this
chapter with conservatism in audit reporting (Section 3.2). Although I cannot directly
measure auditor independence, I do include audit and non-audit fees as explanatory
variables to test whether fee levels affect independence and hence audit reporting. In
so far as these variables control for independence, the effect of audit finn size on audit
reporting should capture auditor effort and ability. This chapter most closely reflects
DeAngelo's definition of auditquality.
In Chapter 4 I test whether the clients of large audit firms engage in less
(income-increasing) earnings management than other audit firms' clients, using
estimated discretionary accruals as a measure of earnings management. Audit quality
is therefore equated to conservatism in corporate reports, and I separate the auditor
effect from the effect of client characteristics on financial statement content.
Similarly, in Chapter 5, I test whether the clients of large audit firms engage in less
earnings management, using earnings discontinuities as a measure of earnings
management. In these chapters I define the level of assurance provided by the audit
not in terms of the inputs to the auditprocesses of discovering and reporting breaches,
or in terms of the audit report, but in terms of the effect that the audit has on the
content of the financial statements themselves. Either the auditor requires the
financial statements to be adjusted to correct discovered breaches, or the manager
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preparing the financial statements puts in additional effort to avoid breaches in
anticipation of theauditor's findings.
4. THE GOVERNANCE CONTEXT OFTHEUK
In the discussion of audit quality in this chapter and in the thesis as a whole, it is
important to note that the contribution of auditing to financial reporting quality is
perhaps not independent of the general corporate governance context of the reporting
finn. For example, corporate governance provisions which relate to the operation of
audit committees potentially improve auditor independence, and provisions which
relate to managerial structure and tenure may influence the degree of earnings
management which affects the financial statements. Corporate governance relates to
the structures, both within a company and imposed by society, which control how
companies are governed.
In this thesis, I am limited in my ability to control for corporate governance
measures by data availability. Chapter 3 does not control for corporate governance
measures which may differ across the sample of firms, although stock exchange
listing is controlled for and may proxy for improved governance in general
(recommended governance provisions under the Combined Code in the UK generally
apply only to listed companies). Chapters 4 and 5 only analyse listed companies, and
include the proportion of non-executive directors on the Board as an explanatory
variable relating to audit finn choice, but do not directly control for otherdifferences
in corporate governance across firms which may affect corporate reporting. This
section summarises corporate governance provisions in the UK which are most likely
to influence auditing and financial reporting quality.
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4.1 The Combined Code
The Cadbury Committee Report (1992) set out a voluntary Code of Best Practice,
which was later modified by the Greenbury Report (1995) and the Hampel Report
(1998) to become the Combined Code. Compliance with Section 1 of both parts of
the Combined Code, which are applicable to listed companies, is enforceable by the
London Stock Exchange. Listed companies must present their statement of
compliance with the code. They are required to report both on how they apply the
principles set out in the code, and to confirm that they comply with the provisions of
the code, or to explain where they have not complied. Part 1 of the Code sets out the
Principles of Good Governance, and Part 2 sets out the Codes of Best Practice, which
suggest procedures that should be in force ofthe principles are to be upheld.
The Principles relate to directors and their remuneration, relations with
shareholders, accountability and audit, and institutional investors. Important
recommendations include:
1. Principles of good governance applicable to directors, including the division
of duties at the head of the company (in particular, the separation of the
chairman and CEO) so that no one individual has unfettered powers of
decision, the inclusion on the board of directors of independent non-executive
directors comprising at least one third, and a restriction of three years on the
term of service of directors before re-election. In the context of the thesis,
high proportions of non-executives may indicate that good governance is high
priority and therefore auditor choice and audit reports become more important.
2. Principles of good governance applicable to directors' remuneration, including
that a proportion of executive directors' remuneration should be linked to
corporate and individual performance, and that remuneration committees
76
should comprise non-executive directors. Details of directors' remuneration
should also be contained in the annual report. In the context of this thesis,
note that performance-linked pay may provide incentives for earnings
management (agency costs).
3. Principles of good governance applicable to relations with shareholders and to
institutional investors, including measures to encourage communication with
andparticipation of shareholders at AGMs. In the context of this thesis, large
institutional investors with long-term shareholding commitments may be
expected to exercise greater participation in governance decisions. Audit
reports may either become more important as a tool for decision-making, or
may become less important as ownership becomes closer to control.
Managers wishing to avoid 'interference' by institutional shareholders may
face greater incentives to manage their financial statements (political costs).
4. Principles of good governance applicable to accountability and audit,
concerned with financial reporting, internal control, the audit committee and
the external auditors. These principles relate to directors' and auditors'
statements of responsibilities, including that the directors' responsibilities
extend to reporting that the company is a going concern; that the board should
maintain a sound system of internal control, including conducting annual
reviews of the effectiveness of internal controls; that the board should
establish an audit committee of at least three non-executive directors to review
the scope and results of the external audit, its cost effectiveness, the
independence andobjectivity of the external auditors, and to review the nature
and extent of provision of non-audit services by the auditors. In the context of
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this thesis, proper operation of an audit committee should improve auditor
independence and hence audit quality.
4.2 Other Governance Provisions in the UK - Disclosure ofAuditors •Fees
The Companies Act (1985) requires that the fees paid to audit firms for both audit and
non-audit work be disclosed in the financial statements. The purpose is to enable
readers to form a view on the auditor's financial interest in the company, and hence
on the auditor's independence. In the context of this thesis, audit fees have first been
used in Chapter 2 as an indicator of audit quality - the presence of a large audit finn
fee premiumbeing taken as a return to higher quality. However, in Chapter 3, which
analyses audit reports, audit (and non-audit) fees are subsequentlyused as proxies for
auditor independence.
Total audit fees reflect the value of the audit finn's audit services, which in
Chapter2 are assumed to depend on the level of assurance (audit quality) provided (a
function both of the cost to the auditor of performing the work, and the auditor's
ability and independence). Increased auditor independence, in so far as this increases
audit quality, is therefore assumed to increase audit fees. In contrast, Chapter 3
allows that high audit (and non-audit) fees may reduce independence, after controlling
for other observable factors affecting audit reporting. In reality, the relationship
between fees and auditor independence is unlikely to be straightforward and factors
such as the effectiveness of audit committees should also be considered. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, Chapter 3 finds no relationship between auditors' fees and audit
reporting.
5. CONCLUSION
Audit quality is essentially unobservable. In order to truly measure audit quality,
access to underlying accounting records and to confidential audit records for
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identified companies is required, in order to gauge the level of audit effort expended,
and to match audit findings to audit reports so as to determine whether reporting is
truthful. Increased transparency of published audit reports could go some way
towards achieving this, for example if audit reports contained more information on the
quantity and nature of evidence collected, and details of any misstatements detected
that were either adjusted by the client or deemed immaterial.
Audits maybe demanded to resolve agency situations of moral hazard and to
signal manager's private information to users. Audit reports mayalso signal auditors'
private information. There is evidence that audits are demanded where agency costs
are high, but existing research has failed to provide convincing evidence that audit
reports contain information for users. Chapter 3 confirms the importance of
persistence in audit reporting, which is likely to reduce the ability of modified audit
reports to signal information to users. However, there is evidence of a quality
differential between large (i.e. Big 5) and small audit firms. Chapter 2 confirms the
existence of a large audit firm fee premium when the influence of characteristics
driving auditor selection are controlled for. Similarly, Chapters 4 and 5 confirm that
large audit firms are associated with lower levels of earnings management in financial
statements. Chapter 4 also provides some evidence that auditors may use their
professional judgement to signal private information about their clients.
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CHAPTER 2
THE LARGE AUDIT FIRM FEE PREMIUM: A CASE OF
SELECTIVITY BIAS?
1. INTRODUCTION
There have been several empirical studies of the determinants of audit fees, many of
which include among the explanatory variables a dummy for audit finn size (see
Moizer (1997) for a review of the audit fee literature). In a competitive audit market,
a fee differential between audit firms represents a return to higher quality. It is
therefore important to determine the size of the premium charged by large audit firms
in order to assess the quality differential between large and small audit firms. This
chapter is joint work with my supervisor Clive Lennox, and we find that the approach
of previous audit fee studies significantly underestimates the size of the large audit
firm fee premium.
As Moizer (1997) notes, audit fee studies reach different conclusions about the
existence and size ofpremia. Fee premia have been found in Australia, New Zealand,
UK, Hong Kong, Singapore and India, with estimates ranging from 16.5%-36.0%
(Francis, 1984; Craswell et al., 1995; Firth, 1985, 1993; Johnson et al., 1995; Chan et
al., 1993; Pong and Whittington, 1994; Simon et al., 1992; Simon et aI., 1986). Audit
fee studies in other countries find conflicting results. In the US, Simunic (1980) finds
no premium whereas Palmrose (1986) and Simon and Francis (1988) find premia of
16-17%. In Canada, Chung and Lindsay (1988) find no premium while Anderson and
Zeghal (1994) find premia for small clients only. Other studies find no premia in
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Malaysia (Simon et al., 1992), Norway (Firth, 1997), the Netherlands (Langendijk,
1997) and South Africa (Simon, 1995). All the above studies test for a fee premium
by including among the explanatory variables a dummy for audit firm size. However,
it is invalid to treat an audit firm size dummy as exogenous because companies are not
randomly assigned to audit firms. In this case, although it is possible to observe the
fees companies pay to their chosen audit firms, it is not possible to observe the fees
they would have paid to audit firms of alternative size.
As the focus of this chapter is to determine the size of the quality differential
between large (in this case Big 5) and small audit firms, it is vital to control for the
effects of auditor selection. This is done using a two-stage model. The first stage
models companies' selection of audit firms. The second stage estimates audit fee
models in order to determine the effects of selectivity on the estimated fee premium.
The estimated fee premium before controlling for selectivity is 19.2%, similar to the
24% estimate of Pong and Whittington (1994). However, the estimated premium is
more than twice as large (53.4%) when auditor selection is accounted for. If
selectivity effects are ignored the estimated premium is biased downwards because
large audit firms' clients pay lower fees than randomly selected clients would pay to
large audit firms. This is consistent with high quality companies selecting large audit
firms and paying lower fees because they require less audit work (Titman and
Trueman, 1986; Thornton and Moore, 1993). It is also consistent with the finding in
Chapter 3, that companies choosing large audit firms are less likely to receive non
going-concern related audit report modifications than other companies.
Extant theory and empirical research suggest it is appropriate to treat auditor
choice as endogenous, as is done in this chapter. Titman and Trueman (1986) and
Datar et at. (1991) present signalling models in which high quality companies prefer
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more accurate auditors. Empirical studies of auditor choice start from the premise
that companies choose whether to hire large or small audit firms (Francis and Wilson,
1988; Johnson and Lys, 1990; DeFond, 1992; Firth and Smith, 1992). The
endogenous treatment of auditor choice in these papers contrasts with its exogenous
treatment in extant audit fee research.
In addition to estimating the effects of auditor selection bias, this research
differs from prior research in two respects. First, some variables are included in the
auditor choice model but excluded from the audit fee model in order to provide power
for the selectivity tests. The variables used are the proportion of board members who
are non-executives and board members' affiliations with audit firms. Although
previous auditor choice studies do not include these variables, this chapter shows that
they are significantly associated with audit firm size. In particular, a company is more
likelyto select a large audit firm when the board consists of a high proportion of non-
executives and when boardmembers are affiliated with large audit firms. Second, the
selectivity adjustment is sensitive to departures from the assumption that audit fee
residuals are normally distributed (Maddala, 1983). Log transformations do not result
in normally distributed residuals whereas rank transformations do. Therefore rank
transformations are used in this chapter whereas most audit fee studies (which do not
rely so heavily on the normality assumption), and the research in Chapter 3, use log
transformations.
Section 2 details the economic intuition underlying the selectivity bias and
describes the auditor selection and audit fee models estimated in the chapter. Section




2.1 Estimating the large audit firm fee premium
Ignoring auditor selection effects
Previous studies examine the determinants of audit fees (AF) by assuming a model of
the following form:
AFt = Po + P'lXt+ P'2Zi + P3BIGt + Ui (3.1)
The Xt variables capture the effects of client characteristics on audit fees, while the Z,
variables capture the effects of auditor characteristics other than size. The effects of
audit firm size are captured using a dummy variable (BIG;), which equals one if
company i selects a Big 5 audit firm and equals zero if company i selects a non Big 5
audit firm. Studies often find positive and statistically significant coefficients on audit
firm size (P3 > 0) and conclude there is therefore a large audit firm premium.
However, P3 maybe a biased estimate of the premium since BIG; is endogenous. In
particular, clients choose whether to hire large or small audit firms. This chapter
shows that P3 in equation (3.1) significantly understates the true size of the large
audit firm fee premium (P3 < P3)'
Equation (3.1) hypothesises that audit firms of different sizes charge different
fees. Under laboratory conditions, one would test this hypothesis by comparing the
fees that all companies would pay to both large and small audit firms. In practice
however, we only observe the fees companies are charged by their selected audit
firms. We do not observe the fees companies would pay if they selected audit firms
of different size classes.
In order to understand the economic intuition for why auditor selection biases
the estimated premium, it is important to understand that client characteristics affect
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audit finn choice. Some client characteristics are readily observable and can be
directly controlled for. For example, large companies tend to hire large audit firms
and also tend to pay high audit fees. If observable factors such as client size are
included in the set ofX, variables (equation (3.1», theywill not cause P3 to be biased.
However, although many client characteristics can be directly controlled for,
characteristics that are not observable to the academic researcher may affect both fees
and auditor choice and thereby cause bias.
In order to see how auditor selection biases the estimated premium, consider
equation (3.2) which is an auditor choice probitmodel."
BIG,· = Yo + Y1Xt + Y1Yi + v,
where
BIG, = 1 ifBIG/ > 0
BIG, =0 otherwise
(3.2)
In equations (3.1) and (3.2), the Xt variables affect both audit fees and auditor
selection. In contrast, the Z; and Y, variables affect only audit fees and auditor
selection, respectively. If unobservable factors affect both auditor choice (Vi) and
audit fees (u,) then E(ujvj) ;t: O. This implies E(ujBIG,) *' 0 and so P3 *' P3' In other
words, the fee premium in equation (3.1) is estimated withbias ifBIG, is endogenous.
The expected direction of the bias can be predicted by making assumptions
about how unobserved client characteristics affect auditor choice (VI) and audit fees
(Ui)' For example, the quality of internal accounting controls and management
integrity are both potentially important characteristics that are unobservable to the
researcher. These quality characteristics bias the estimated premium if they
16A probit modelis used rather than a logit model as the use of rank transformations results in
normally distributed error terms, a key assumption of the probitmodel.
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simultaneously affect auditor choice and audit fees. Analytical studies indicate high
quality companies are more likely to hire large audit firms and are more likely to pay
low audit fees. Titman and Trueman (1986) show high quality companies are more
likely to hire large audit firms for signalling reasons. Similarly Thornton and Moore
(1993) argue that companies with weak internal controls are more likely to choose
low quality auditors. Thornton and Moore (1993) predict that audit fees are
negatively associated with internal control strength, which is consistent with auditors
doing less substantive testing when internal controls are strong. Statement of
Auditing Standard (SAS) 400 states 'where tests of control provide satisfactory
evidence as to the effectiveness of accounting and internal control systems, the extent
of relevant substantive procedures may be reduced' (Auditing Practices Board, 1995).
According to these arguments, high quality companies are simultaneously
more likely to both hire large audit firms, and pay lower audit fees (E(ujvj) < 0). From
equations (3.1) and (3.2), E(ujvj) < 0 implies E(ujBIGj) < 0 and so /33 < P3' In this
case, a comparison of fees paid by large and small audit firms' clients biases
downwards the estimated fee premium in equation (3.1).
Controlling/or auditor selection effects
This chapter employs the two-step procedure of Heckman (1979) to control for
selection effects. First, a probit auditor selection model is estimated. The results are
then used to generate inverse Mills ratios (these are discussed later in the chapter).
Next, the inverse Mills ratios are included in audit fee regressions for large and small
audit firms' clients in order to correct for selectivity bias. The results show that the
estimated fee premium is significantly biased downwards if the inverse Mills ratios
are omitted from the regressions.
To simplify notation, the auditor selection model (equation (3.2» is written as:
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BIG,· = Yo + Y1JCt + Y2Yi + v, a y'fVt+ VI
where y'a [Yo: Y'J : Yl] and Wi == [1 : JCt : Yi [.




where AFu and AFo, are the fees company i would pay to large or small audit firms,
respectively. Recall that only one of AFu and AFo, is observed for each company i,
depending on whether the company chooses a large or small audit finn. The
selectivity corrections (discussed below) control for the fact that the fees companies
would have paid if they had chosen audit firms of alternative size are not observed.
From equations (3.4) and (3.5), the estimate of the large audit finn fee premium is
PIO - r: If. large audit firms earn higher fees than small audit firms, the intercept
term in equation (3.4) will be bigger than the intercept in equation (3.5) (i.e.
Note that, unlike equation (3.1) and most previous studies, equations (3.4) and
(3.5) do not impose the restriction that the coefficients on the JCt and Z, variables are
the same for large and small audit firms (i.e. this approach does not impose the
restriction that P:I = P~I and P:2 = P~2 ).17 The error terms in equations (3.4), (3.5)
and (3.3) (uJj, UOi and Vi) are assumed to have a trivariate normal distribution, with
mean vector zero and covariance matrix:
17An exception is Pongand Whittington (1994)who control for coefficient differences by including
interaction termsbetweenthe auditorsize dummyand the other explanatory variables. However, Pong
and Whittington (1994)do not control for auditorselection effects.
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Simple regressions of equations (3.4) and (3.5) can be shown to result in
selectivity bias by takingconditional expectations:
E[AFJi IBIGi = 1] =/310 + P'JIXt +P'J2Zi + E[uJi IBIGi = 1]
E[AFoi IBIGi = 0] =1300 + P'olXt +!3'o2Zi + E[UOi IBIGi = 0]
If auditor choice is systematically correlated with audit fees, the conditional
means for audit fees and error terms are not equal to their unconditional means:
E[AFJi IBIGi = 1];t:E[AFli] ee E[uJi IBIGi = 1] ;t: E[uJj]
E[AFoi IBIGi = 0] ;t: E[AFod <:> E[UOi IBIGi =0] ;t: E[uo;l
In this case, large (small) audit firms' clients pay different fees on average than
randomly selected companies would pay to large (small) audit firms, Estimating
equations (3.4) and (3.5) results in a biased estimate of the large audit finn fee
premium (PIO - Poo )if:
E[AFJi IBIGi =1]• E[AFoi IBIGi =0] ;t: E[AFJil • E[AFo;l
or equivalently if:
E[ulIl BIGi = 1]. E[uO{ IBIGi =0] ;t: O.
The effects of selection bias are controlled for by estimating the following fee
models for large and small audit firms:
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The functions ¢ and <l> are the standard normal probability density function and the
cumulative distribution function, respectively. The key difference between equations
(3.4)-(3.5) and equations (3.6)-(3.7) is the latter include inverse Mills ratios (A.li and
Aoi) in order to control for the effects of auditor selection.
In the first stage, inverse Mills ratios (Ali and Ao,) are constructed using the
results from the auditor choice model (equation (3.3». In the second stage, the audit
fee models are estimated by including the inverse Mills ratios in equations (3.6) and
(3.7). As a result, the conditional and unconditional expected error terms in equations
(3.6) and (3.7) equal zero:
E[elil BIG, =1]=E[eJi] =E[eoi IBIG, =0] =E[eod =O.
The estimated large audit firm fee premium (PIO - Poo) in equations (3.6) and (3.7) is
unbiased since:
E[eJi IBIGi =1]• E[eOi IBIG, =0] =O.
The economic intuition underlying the signs of the coefficients on the Mills
ratios comes from the hypothesis that large audit firms' clients are of higher than
average quality and therefore pay lower than average fees (Titman and Trueman,
1986; Thornton and Moore, 1993). If large audit firms' clients pay lower fees than
randomly selected companies would pay to large audit firms:
E[AFlil BIG, = 1] < E[AFJi] ~ 0'1uA,li =E[Ulil BIG, =1]< E[e/l] = 0
Similarly, if small audit firms' clients are of lower than average quality they
are expected to pay higher than average fees. If small audit firms' clients pay higher
fees than randomly selected companies wouldpay to small audit firms:
E[AFOi IBIG, =0] < E[AFod <=> O'ouAoi =E[uOII BIG, = 0] < E[eod =0
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Since the inverse Mills ratios (Ali and AOi) are both positive by definition, the
two conditions above can be re-stated as at« < 0 and O"Ou > 0, respectively. This
means the coefficients on the inverse Mills ratios should be negative for large audit
firms' clients and positive for small audit firms' clients.
2.2 The Explanatory Variables tx, Y{ and ZJ
Table 1 defines the explanatory variables (~, Yi and Zi) that are used in the auditor
choice and audit fee models. The i subscript is dropped from the variable names to
simplify notation.
Variables (XJ included in both the Auditor Choice and Audit Fee Models
From prior research, auditee size, complexity and risk are expected to affect both fees
and auditor selection (e.g., Pong and Whittington, 1994). Previous studies use either
assets (e.g., Craswell et al., 1995) or sales turnover (e.g., Chan et al., 1993) or both
(Pong and Whittington, 1994) to control for client size. This study uses both assets
(ASSE) and sales (REV), as each represents a different dimension of size (pong and
Whittington, 1994). Fees likely reflect both turnover and assets, as audit work
involves the examination of both transactions during the year (reported in the profit
and loss account and cash flow statement) and year-end balances (reported in the
balance sheet). Large companies are expected to hire large audit firms more often















Number of SIC codes
Number of domestic (UK) subsidiaries
Number of overseas subsidiaries
=1 if the company made a lossduring the past3 years;
= 0 otherwise.
Preference capital+ subordinated debt+ loancapital + short-term borrowings
Capitalemployed + short-term borrowing. intangibles
= 1 if the year-end is between the 1st December and 31 st March;
= 0 otherwise.
NEX
Variables (YJ in the Auditor Selection Models only.
Numberof non-executive directors
Numberof directors
LAF =1 ifthe influential director is affiliated witha largeaudit firm;
=0 otherwise.
SAF = 1 if the influential director is affiliated witha smallaudit firm;
=0 otherwise.
Variable (ZJ in the Audit Fee Models only.
LON =1 if the audit office is located in London;
= 0 otherwise.
A more complex or more risky auditee requires more audit work. Risk and
complexity are in some ways closely linked as a more complex auditee poses higher
risk, although risk may also arise from other sources." Again, there are several
dimensions of complexity and risk that may be measured. One complexity measure is
the number of business areas in which the auditee operates. This is captured by the
number of different main SIC (Standard Industry Classification) codes reported for
18 Oneexample wouldbe the integrity ofmanagement.
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eachclient (SIC). The existence of subsidiary companies also increases complexity as
consolidated accounts must be audited. Hence, the explanatory variables include the
number of subsidiary companies located in the UK (DS) and overseas (OS).
Gearing (GEAR) is included as a risk measure, as companies often fail through
cash flow problems and binding bond covenants. Profitability is another measure of
auditee risk. As in previous studies, a loss dummy (LOSS) is defined equal to one if
the company makes a loss in any of the past three years. These risk variables are
expected to be positively associated with audit fees. On the other hand, the
hypothesized relation between client risk and audit firm size is ambiguous. More
risky companies may prefer to hire large audit firms in order to reduce agency costs
(Francis and Wilson, 1988; DeFond, 1992). On the other hand, large audit firms may
be reluctant to accept high-risk clients because of the potential damage to their
reputations or because of the threatof litigation (Krishnan andKrishnan, 1997).
A dummy (BUSY) is also included for the so-called 'busy period' of
accounting firms, namely client year-ends falling between 1st December and 31st
March inclusive.
Variables (YJ included in theAuditorSelection Models only
In order to identify the effects of selectivity bias (as captured by the CJ'JuAli and CJ'ouAOi
terms), it is necessary to include some variables in the auditor choice model, but to
exclude them from the audit fee models. The Yt variables that fulfil this role are
defined in Table 1.
Audit firm size is expected to be positively associated with the proportion of
directors who are non-executives (NEX) for at least two reasons. First, non-executive
directors may have strongerpreferences than executives for high quality (large) audit
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firms. Second, companies with high demand for monitoring may have greater
incentives to appoint non-executive directors and hire large audit firms.
Auditor choice is also hypothesised to depend on directors' personal
affiliations with audit firms. Companies are expected to hire large (small) audit firms
moreoften when directors disclose that theypreviously workedfor large (small) audit
firms. 19 The affiliation variables equal one if the company is affiliated with a large
(LA}) or small (SA}) audit firm, respectively; otherwise they equal zero. Corporate
affiliations with audit firms are discussed in more detail in Section 3.1.
Variable (ZJ included in the Audit Fee Models only
An auditoffice location variable is included in the audit fee models but excluded from
the auditor choice models. The location variable (LON) equals one if the auditoffice
is located in London and zero otherwise. Prior research shows London offices charge
higher audit fees compared to offices located outside of London (Chan et al., 1993).
This controls for the effects ofauditoffice location on audit fees.2o
3. DATA
3.1 Data sources
The initial cross-sectional sample analysed in the chapter consists of 1,543 companies
registered with a UK stock exchange. Data are taken from annual reports with year-
ends between 1st March 1997 and 28th February 1998, and each company appears
only once in the sample. The PricewaterhouseCoopers Corporate Register (peR) is
used to identify company auditors, audit office locations, company directors and
corporate affiliations with audit firms. The PCR provides information on directors'
careerhistories and their professional qualifications.
19This maybe because directors feelmost comfortable hiringan audit fum with whichtheyare
familiar, but it may also be because clients recruitdirectors from their auditflrrns.
20 In order to estimate the effects of auditorselection bias, it is not necessary to includea variable in the
audit fee modelbut exclude it fromthe auditorchoicemodel. Not surprisingly therefore, our selectivity
results are robustto dropping audit location.
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In deciding whether companies are affiliated with audit firms, we attempt to
identify for each company the director who has the strongest boardroom influence
overaudit appointments. We generally assume finance directors are most influential
as they have closest contact with audit firms. If a finance director discloses that
he/she previously worked for a large (small) audit finn, we expect the company will
be more likely to hire a large (small) audit finn. When a director discloses past
employments with both large and small audit firms, we assume the affiliation is with
the most recent audit firm.
In approximately 10% of sample companies, finance directors are not
identified. In such cases we adopt the following rules for choosing the most
influential directors:
(a) We choose the company secretary, if (i) the company secretary is a
qualified accountant, or (ii) neither the company secretary nor the CEO nor the
Chairman are qualified accountants. We rank the company secretary above the CEO
and Chairman in terms of influence, because the posts of company secretary and
finance director areoften carried out by the same person.
(b) We choose the CEO, if (i) the CEO is a qualified accountant and the
company secretary is either not qualified or not identified, or (ii) neither the CEO nor
Chairman arequalified accountants andthe company secretary is not identified.
(c) We choose the company chairman, if (i) the chairman is a qualified
accountant and neither the CEO nor company secretary are qualified, or (ii) neither
the CEO nor company secretary are identified.
These rules enable us to identify an influential director for each company.
Since directors frequently do not disclose full career histories in the PCR, it is likely
that some directors previously worked for audit firms but do not disclose this, perhaps
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because the employment was a long time ago or because it was for a relatively short
period. We do not believe this lack of disclosure presents a serious problem since
directors may disclose past audit employments more readily when personal
affiliations are particularly strong.21
Information on SIC codes and subsidiaries is collected from Extel. Data on
audit fees, assets, sales, profits, gearing and directors (executive or non-executive) are
collected from Datastream. Because of missing Datastream data for 217 companies,
the final sample consists of 1326 observations.
3.2 Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics for the dependent and explanatory variables are reported in
Table 2. Audit fees (AF) range from a minimum of £2,000 to a maximum of £9.6m,
with mean and median values of £243,000 and £73,000 respectively. Large audit
firms (BIG) are chosen by 76% of sample companies and 43% of companies are
audited by offices located in London (LON).
The mean values for assets (ASS£) and sales (REV) are £343m and £519m,
respectively. The means for these size variables are much larger than their medians
(£28m and £61m, respectively) as there are relatively few very large companies. The
number of main SIC codes (SIC) ranges from one to ten and there is also a
considerable range in the number ofdomestic (DS) and overseas subsidiaries (OS).
21 Sincethere is no reason to believethat measurement error is correlated withauditorchoice, bias is
unlikely to be a problem. A potentially more important problemis thatmeasurement errormay increase
coefficient standard errors. However, the affiliation variables havestatistically significant effectson




Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum
AF 243 73 2 9~600
BIG 0.76 1 0 1
ASSE 343~585 28,431 -13~579 42~400,000
REV 519,499 60,647 0 56,666,666
SIC 2.96 2 1 10
DS 5.73 4 0 53
OS 4.25 1 0 96
LOSS 0.22 0 0 1
GEAR 33.38 27.15 -4,552 3,020
BUSY 0.48 0 0 1
NEX 0.30 0.3 0 0.8
LAF 0.25 0 0 1
SAF 0.05 0 0 I
LON 0.43 0 0 I
Notes:
SecTable 1 for variable definitions. TheAF~ ASSEandREVvariables are in £'OOOs.
Only 22% of companies make accounting losses (LOSS) in one or more of the past
three years and there is considerable variation in gearing levels (GEAR). Nearly half
of the companies (48%) have year-ends in the four-month busy period (BUSY). The
average proportion of directors who arc non-executives (NEX) is 30% and ranges
from zero to 80%.
Affiliations with large audit firms (LAF) are disclosed by 25% of influential
directors and affiliations with small audit firms (SAF) are disclosed by a further 5%.
9S
The remaining 70% either did not previously work for audit firms or do not disclose
past audit employments. As explained above, these directors arc categorised as
having noaffiliations with audit firms.
J.J Rank Transformations
The means and medians reported in Table 2 reveal skewness in the distribution of the
audit fee (AF), company size (ASSE and REV), complexity (SIC, DS and OS) and
gearing (GEAR) variables. Two statistical problems faced by previous audit fcc
studies are skewness and outlying observations. Some researchers control for the
former problem using log transformations (e.g., Francis and Simon, 1987; Simon and
Francis, 1988; Chan et al., 1993; CrasweJ1 et al., 1995). Outlying observations have
generally been confronted by trimming or truncating sample distributions. This is the
approach adopted in Chapter 3. However, because the estimation of the selection
model relies upon the assumptions concerning the behaviour of the residuals in
equations (3.4) and (3.5), rank transformations arcused here instead.
Kane and Meade (1998) show rank transformations perform better in resolving
skewness and outlier problems, by retaining information that is obfuscated by
untransformed or alternative transformations such as log or square root
transformations. The procedure involves replacing each observation with its rank
within thesample and then dividing each observation by N+1(where N is the number
of observations). Thus, the ranked variables nrc uniformly distributed between zero
and one.
Simulation studies indicate little loss of efficiency when rank transformations
arc applied to (already) normally distributed variables (Conover and lman, 1980;
Irnan and Conover, 1979). Rank transformations have previously been used in event
studies (Beaver et al., 1979; Cheng et al., 1992) and accounting disclosure studies
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(Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Wallace et al., 1994; Wallace and Naser, 1995). I test
whether two alternative specifications result in betteraudit fee models in Appendix B,
namely using untransformed variables (Specification 1)or log-transformed dependent,
size, complexity and gearing variables (Specification 2).
I find logtransformations do not satisfactorily remove the estimation problems
associated withhighly skewed variables. In addition, sample trimming and truncation
to deal with outliers is associated with loss ,ofinformation. Consistent with Kane and
Meade (1998), I find rank transformations result in residuals which conform more
closely to OLS assumptions. The residuals are normally distributed, spherical and
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. Maddala (1983) discusses the
importance of thenormality of the distribution of the disturbances in the second-stage
regression equations of a selection model.
The audit fee (AF), company size (ASSE and REV), complexity (SIC, DS and
OS) and gearing (GEAR) variables are replaced with their rank-transformed
equivalents (R(AF), R(ASSE), R(REV), R(SIC), R(DS), R(OS) andR(GEAR». Table 3
partitions the sample into 1013 clients of large audit firms and 313 clients of small
audit firms and reports descriptive statistics for the rank-transformed and other
variables (LOSS, BUSY, NEX, LAF,LAF,LON).
The audit fcc (R(AF) variable confirms that large audit firms' clients pay
significantly higher fees than small audit firms' clients. The company size (R(ASSE)
and R(REV» and complexity (R(SIC) , R(DS), R(OS» variables show large audit
firms' clients are significantly larger and more complex than small audit firms'
clients. The loss dummy (LOSS) and gearing (R(GEAR» show large audit firms'
clients are more profitable andmore highly-geared than small audit firms' clients.
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics for the Clients of Large and Small AuditFirms.
Large audit firms Small audit firms
(BIG = 1) (BIG =0)
Variable Mean Median Mean Median
R(AF) 0.5692 "'''' 0.6059 "'''' 0.2994 0.2495
R(ASSE) 0.5411 .",. 0.5588 "'. 0.3081 0.2723
R(REV) 0.5789 "'. 0.6058 "'. 0.3430 0.2997
R(SIC) 0.5302
'"
0.6243 "'''' 0.4838 0.4057
R(DS) 0.5049 "'. 0.4915 "'. 0.4083 0.3969
R(OS) 0.5455 "'. 0.5678 "'. 0.4029 0.2567
LOSS 0.2024 "'. 0 0.2716 0
R(GEAR) 0.5042 "'. 0.4993 "'. 0.4449 0.4269
BUSY 0.4985 "'* 0 0.4026 0
NEX 0.3061 "'* 0.3077 "'* 0.2702 0.2857
LAF 0.2774 ** 0 0.1565 0
SAF 0.0306 "'* 0 0.1022 0
LON 0.4087 "'* 0 0.5144 1
Observations 1013 313
Notes:
The R(AF), R(ASSE), R(REV), R(SIC), R(DS), R(OS), and R(GEAR) variables are
rank-transformations of AF, ASSE, REV, SIC, DS, OS and GEAR. See Table 1 for
variable definitions.
"'* (*) Significant difference between large and small audit firms' clients at the 1%
(5%) levels.
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The association between large audit firms and the proportion of directors who are
non-executives (NEX) is positive and significant. This is consistent with audit and
board quality being complementary and with non-executives preferring large audit
firms. Companies hire large audit firms more often when influential directors are
affiliated with large audit firms (LAp). Similarly, companies hire large audit firms
less often when directors are affiliated withsmall audit£inns (SAP).
4. ESTIMATION RESULTS
4. J An overview
Thissection evaluates the effects of auditor selection biason the sizeof the largeaudit
finn fee premium. First, the approach of previous studies is replicated by treating
auditor choice as exogenous as in the following model:
AFI = Po + PiXt +P'2ZI + P;A UDj + u,
Consistent with extant research, we find a significant positive coefficient on the audit
finn sizedummy (P3 >0).
Next, the auditor selection model
AUD/ = Yo + y'/Xt + y'2YI +VIE y'Wj+ Vi
Is estimated. Theresults are usedto construct inverse Mills ratios (~I and i oi ) :
.. B ¢(y~) and i a ¢(y'fv,)
11,1 cI>(y'fV,) 01 1- cI>(y'fV,) •
Next, audit fee models for the clients of large and small audit firms are estimated in
order to evaluate theeffects of selection bias.
..
R(AFoi) = Poo +P~JXt+P~2Zi + crOuA.OI + eOi
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Allowing for selectivity effects, the estimated fee premium is significantly
.. .. ..
larger than when selectivity is ignored (i.e., PIO > Poo > P3 > 0). Moreover, the
coefficients on the inverse Mills ratios are significantly negative for large audit firms'
clients (atu < 0) and weakly positive for small audit firms' clients (a011 ~ 0). These
results are consistent with selectivity effects being caused by unobserved quality
differences between large andsmall audit firms' clients.
4.2 The Large Audit Firm Fee Premium Ignoring Selectivity
Table 4 reports the results from audit fee regressions when the effects of auditor
selection are ignored. Column 1 replicates the approach of previous studies by
including audit finn size (AUDi ) as an exogenous predictor of audit fees (equation
(3.1». Columns (2)-(3) estimate audit fee regressions separately for large and small
audit firms' clients (equations (3.4) and (3.5» but do not control for selectivity.
The results in Column 1 are consistent with those reported in prior audit fee
studies. The coefficient on audit finn size is positive (PJ = 0.05) and statistically
significant. Therefore, large audit firms' clients pay higher fees than small audit
firms' clients after controlling for observed client characteristics (Xi) and audit office
location (Zi). The estimated premium (PIO - Poo) in Columns 2 and 3 is 0.06 (= -0.12
- (-0.18», which is not significantly different from the 0.05 estimate in Column 1.
The insignificant difference is unsurprising as the fee regressions in Table 4 treat
auditor choice as exogenous.
The 0.06 estimate is used to calculate the median premium when selectivity
effects are ignored. Since the median finn lies in the 50th centile and ranked audit
fees are uniformly distributed between zero and one, the median premium is simply
the difference in fees paid by companies in the 47th (= 0.5 - 0.03) and 53rd (= 0.5 +
100
0.03) centiles. Companies in the 47th and 53rd centiles pay fees of £65,000 and
£79,000 respectively, giving a median premium of £14,000. As a percentage of
median fees (£73,000) the premium is 19.2%, similar to the 24% premium estimated
by Pong and Whittington (1994).
Table 4
Audit Fee Models Ignoring Selectivity Effects.
Expectedsign R(AF) R(AF}) R(AFo)
R(ASSE) + 0.16 0.15 0.17
(6.28)*· (5.35)·* (3.25)*·
R(REV) + 0.59 0.60 0.57
(21.93) ...... (19.79)·· (9.33)......
R(SIC) + 0.06 0.05 0.05
(4.96)*'" (4.02)...... (2.22)'"
R(DS) + 0.09 0.07 0.18
(6.97)... • (4.69)...... (5.95)......
R(OS) + 0.23 0.24 0.19
(17.76)·· (17.02)...... (5.99)... • .
LOSS. + 0.04 0.05 0.02
(5.22)...... (5.11)*'" (1.59)
R(GEAR) + 0.05 0.06 0.05
(4.76)...... (4.03)...• (2.60)......
BUSY + 0.01 0.02 0.01
(2.33)· (2.39)* (0.37)




CONSTANT ? -0.18 -0.12 -0.18
(-18.45)** (-9.69)*· (-9,77)·*
Observations 1326 1013 313
R2 86.6% 84.7% 82.4%
Notes:
Column 1 includes audit firm size as a dummy variable (Eq. (3.1». Columns 2 and 3
are estimated separately for large and small audit firms' clients (Eqs. (3.4) and (3.5».
The t subscripts have beendropped from variable names. -
t-statistics are given in parentheses.
*. (*) Significant at the 1% (5%) levels.
SeeTables 1and 3 forvariable definitions.
In Columns 2 and 3, the coefficient signs are the same for large and small audit firms
and, in general, there are no significant differences between coefficient estimates (j3'J}
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= P~l and P'l1 = P~l). The only exception is the domestic subsidiaries variable
(R(DS), which has a significantly smaller impact on the fees of large audit firms'
clients (0.07) than on the fees of small audit firms' clients (0.18). This is possiblydue
to large audit firms having more offices and therefore lower transport costs compared
to small audit firms,
As expected, there is a significant positive relation between company size
(R(ASSE) and R(REV) and audit fees. In addition, audit fees arc positivelyassociated
with client complexity as measured by the number of SIC codes (R(S/C) and the
numberof domestic (R(DS) and overseas (R(OS) subsidiaries. High-risk companies
are charged higher fees, as shown by the significant positive coefficients on the loss
dummy (LOSS) and gearing (R(GEAR». Audit fees are also higher during the busy
season (BUSY) and when audit officesare located in London(LON).
4.3 Evaluatingthe Effects ofSelection Bias on Audit Fees
Table 5 reports the effects of selectivity using the two-stage approach. In the first
stage, the auditor selection models are estimated (Columns 1 and 2). In the second
stage, the audit fee regressions are estimated for large and small audit firms' clients
taking into account selectivity effects (Columns 3 and 4).22 Columns 1 and 2
correspond to equation (3.3) while Columns 3 and 4 correspond to equations (3.6) and
(3.7).
In Columns 1 and 2, the coefficient estimatesfor the auditor choicemodels are
consistent with prior expectations.r' The coefficients on the company size variables
(R(ASSE) and R(REV) show large companies hire large audit firms more often than
small audit firms. Companies also hire large audit firms more often when they have
22To assess the validity of the auditorchoicemodels, simulated residuals arc generated. No evidence
ofheteroscedasticity or omitted variables problems (Gourieroux et al., 1987)is found.
23 TheRZs in Columns (1)-(2) are the pseudo RZs that one obtains from probit models.
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SeeTables 1 and 3 for variable definitions.
Finally, audit finn size is also positively associated with the proportion of directors
who are non-executives (N£%). This suggests either non-executives have stronger
preferences for large audit firms or board and audit monitoring are complementary
activities. The remaining explanatory variables (R(SIC), R(DS), R(GEAR) and BUSY)
do not significantly affect auditor choice and are omitted from Column 2.
The results in Column 2 are, used to construct the inverse Mills ratios (~ and
10 ) , which are included in Columns 3 and 4 in order to control for selectivity effects.
Column 3 (equation (3.6» is estimated for large audit firms' clients while column 4
(equation (3.7» is estimated for small audit firms' clients. After controlling for
selectivity, the estimated fee premium (PIO - Poo) is 0.16 (= -0.03 - (-0.19». The
difference between the estimated premia in Tables 4 and 5 (0.06 and 0.16) is
statistically significant at the 1% level. The effectof selectivity on the fee premium is
also significant from an economic point of view. The 0.16 estimate is used to
calculate the median premium taking into account selectivity effects. Companies in
the 42nd (= 0.5 - 0.08) and 58th (= 0.5 + 0.08) centiles pay fees of £52,000 and
£91,000 respectively, giving a median premium of £39,000. As a percentage of
median fees (£73,000) the premium is 53.4%. The large audit finn fee premium is
therefore more than twice as large when one controls for auditor selection bias (53.4%
compared to 19.2%).
The effects of selectivity can also be seen from the coefficients on the inverse
Mills ratios (~and 10 ) , The coefficient for large audit firms' clients in Column 3 is
negative and statistically significant (alII < 0). This means large audit firms' clients
pay lower fees thanrandomly selected companies would pay to large audit firms (i.e.,
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utllit == E[uJ IBIG =1] < 0 <=> E[AFJ IBIG =1] < E[AFJ]). The coefficient for small
audit firms' clients in Column 4 is positive but not statistically significant (cTtu ~ 0).
This means small audit firms' clients pay fees that are at least as high as randomly
selected companies would pay to small audit firms (i.e., uoul o =E[uo IBIG = 0] ~ 0
<=> E(AFo IBIG =0] ~ E[AFoD. These results are consistent with selectivity effects
being caused by unobserved quality differences between large and small audit firms'
clients. In particular, high quality companies tend to hire large audit firms and pay
lower audit fees.
5. CONCLUSIONS
After controlling for client characteristics, studies often find large audit firms earn
significantly higher fees than small audit firms. However, extant research on audit
fees treats auditor choice as exogenous. In contrast, this chapter takes into account
that companies are not randomly assigned to audit firms. This chapter examines the
large audit firm fee premium whenauditor choice is treated as endogenous.
The effects of audit firm selection on audit fees are found to be statistically
and economically significant. The premium earned by large audit firms is more than
twice as large when selectivity bias is taken into account (53.4% compared to 19.2%).
The importance of selectivity effects should not be too surprising given the
predictions of analytical studies. Theory suggests high quality companies are more
likely to hire large audit firms and are more likely to pay low fees (Titman and
Trueman, 1986; Thornton and Moore, 1993). These results suggest large audit firms
attract clients that are of higher than average quality and require less than average
audit effort. Previous fee studies significantly underestimate the returns attributable
to higher audit quality, because they ignore the advantageous (adverse) selection
effects experienced by large (small) audit firms. A task for future research is to
lOS
estimate the effects of selectivity on audit fees in countries where large audit firm




DOES ONE SIZEFIT ALL? EVIDENCE FROM A MULTINOMIAL
LOGIT MODEL FOR PREDICTING AUDIT REPORTS IN THE UK
1. INTRODUCTION
This chapterprovides evidence of the association between published audit reports and
observable company characteristics in the UK, including chosen audit firm size. It is
the first study to do so comprehensively for a wide range ofUK companies and audit
report types.
Prior studies of audit reporting in the UK focus on either the 'small company'
audit qualification (Keasey et a1., 1988), or going-concern related audit modifications
(e.g, Lennox, 1999a; Citron and Taffler, 1992, 2000). The 'small company'
qualification is no longer relevant since the introduction of small company audit
exemptions in 1994. However, there are several other possible audit report
modifications that may be issued in addition to those related to going-concern. Other
modified audit reports are issued for reasons including disagreements (for example,
over accuracy, accounting treatment or disclosure) and limitations on scope (lack of
audit evidence).24
This chapter is the first studyto analyse the choices ofboth going-concern and
non going-concern related audit modifications in the UK. Furthermore, it is the first
such study internationally to distinguish different modification types which is not
24 Modified auditreports are defined as anyaudit report other thana cleanaudit report. They include
reports where the auditor has qualified her opinionas to the truth and fairness of theaccounts, and
reports where the opinion is unqualified but which includeadditional explanatory material.
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limited to uncertainty modifications (of which going-concern related modifications
are a subset). In this study, the non going-concern related auditmodifications include
disagreements and limitations on scope, and are treated separately from going-concern
modifications. Most prior studies of audit reporting outside the UK. focus on
uncertainty modifications. In contrast, DeFond et a1. (2000) analyse audit
modifications in China which include uncertainties, limitations on scope and GAAP
violations (disagreements), but do not distinguish between types of modification.
Prior UK. studies are also limited by the type of companies analysed. Keasey
et al, (1988) examine audit qualifications on single plant, independently owned UK
manufacturing companies. These are very small companies. Lennox (1999a) and
Citron and Tamer (1992 and 2000) analyse going-concern related audit modifications
on listed UK companies. These are very large, publicly owned companies. In
contrast, this paper is the first study to examine audit reporting outcomes on both
public and private UK. companies. The public companies analysed here include both
listed andnon-listed companies.
Prior studies undertaken in other countries also analyse only listed companies.
Dopuch et al, (1987), Bell and Tabor (1991) and Louwers (1998) estimate models of
audit qualifications related to uncertainties in companies listed on the New York' and
American Stock Exchange. Monroe and Teh (1993) estimate a model of uncertainty
audit qualifications on listed Australian companies. DeFond et a1. (2000) analyse
modifications on companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stockexchanges. It
is possible that audit reporting on private or public but not listed companies differs
from reporting on listed companies, because of greater separation of ownership from
control, closerpublic scrutiny, or tighter regulations for listed companies. Therefore,
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the results of these studies do not necessarily apply to non-listed companies in the
UK.
This chapter extends the literature in several ways. Prior studies of audit
reporting in the UK focus on either small, private companies, or large, listed
companies. Priorstudies outside the UK focus only on listed companies. In contrast,
thischapter analyses bothpublic andprivate, listed andnon-listed, companies.
The second way in which this chapter extends the literature, is through the
analysis of non going-concern related modifications such as disagreements and
limitations on scope. Importantly, these modifications are treated separately from
going-concern related modifications. Prior studies either do not examine these
modifications, or do not distinguish themfrom going-concern related modifications.
In addition, this chapter assesses the ability of the model estimated to
successfully predict audit report type. Models which predict audit reporting have
several uses, proposed by Dopuch et a1. (1987). Auditors may use the models to
screen potential clients, or to provide a benchmark representing the probability that a
'typical' auditor would issue a modified audit report on a given company. Screening
would enable auditors to reject potential clients which are likely to require
modification. These 'low quality' clients represent high litigation risk for auditors
who fail to issue modifications when required. Benchmarks would be of use in peer
review and court cases dealing with auditor negligence. Researchers would be able to
usea model which predicted audit reports to assess the extent to which markets expect
a modified audit report to be issued. This would be of use in tests of market
efficiency or the information content of auditreports.
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1.1 Outline ofChapter
The empirical results reported here are obtained from the estimation of a multinomial
logit model. The discrete dependent variable in this model takes the value 2 if the
company receives a going-concern related modification, 1 if the company receives a
non going-concern related audit modification, and 0 otherwise. These are categories
andthe coding is chosen merely for convenience, giving neithera ranking nor a count.
The explanatory variables included in the multinomial model relate to audit
firm size and fees, and observable company characteristics. Auditor characteristics
such as audit quality and independence are expected to have similar effects on both
types of audit modifications, but are not directly observable and are proxied by audit
firm size and fees. Company characteristics are expected to influence going-concern
andnon going-concern related auditmodifications in different ways.
For example, going-concern related modifications will be issued when the
auditor feels that there is a significant chance that the company will not continue in
operation for the foreseeable future. Hence, company characteristics that are known
to be important in predicting bankruptcy will also be 'important in determining going-
concern audit modifications. However, characteristics which are important in
bankruptcy may not influence or may differently influence non going-concern related
audit modifications. For example, financial statements that indicate poor liquidity are
likely to increase the probability of a going-concern audit modification, but may
reduce the probability of a non-going concern audit modification as the financial
statements are more likely to be correctly stated.2'
25 Companies which are Ilnancially stressed mayface increased incentives to engage in earnings
management to overstate their assets and/or income, forexample, to avoid debtcovenant violation
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Christie, 1990; Holthausen andLeftwich, 1983). Suchoverstatements
would increase thelikelihood of a nongoing-concern related audit modification. However, wecannot
observe earnings management attempts, onlythepublished financial statements which are inclusive of
anysuch attempts. Financial statements which report anunfavourable position are therefore less likely
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The model is estimated over both public and private companies. The
frequency of modified audit reports may differ between public (listed or not) and
private companies. In particular, public companies are generally subject to a greater
separation of ownership from control, and face different legislative requirements.
Section 2 outlines the major differences between public unlisted, listed, and private
companies in the UK. Importantly, external financial audits are mandatory for all
public companies in the UK, no matter how large or small, whereas sufficiently small
private companies may be exempt." This suggests that audit reports may serve
differing degrees of usefulness in different types ofcompanies.
Section 3 describes the multinomial logit model and motivates its choice.
Section 4 motivates the choice of dependent and explanatory variables included in the
model. Section 5 describes the data collection and provides some descriptive
statistics. Public companies are generally larger and, on average, pay higher fees,
have higher gearing and liquidity, and are more likely to pay dividends. There is
strong persistence in audit reporting. Outof a total of 9,304 companies analysed, 662
receive first-time modifications, whereas 1,517 receive repeated modifications.
Section 6 contains the results of the estimations. Company size is positively
related to non going-concern related modifications, but negatively related to going-
concern modifications. Variables reflecting company financial health, such as gearing
and liquidity, are found to be important for going-concern modifications only. In
contrast, companies hiring large audit firms are significantly less likely to receive non
to have beeninfluenced by earnings management that financial statements which report favourable
~ositions.
6 For thedateof thecompany year-ends used iIithis study, the general requirements thata private
company musthave metin orderto qualify for an auditexemption were: that thecompany must
qualify as 'small' for thepurposes of filing abbreviated accounts, must have turnover of no more than
£350,000, andtotal assets of no more than£1.4million, although additional restrictions apply to certain
types of company where there is deemed to be a public interest. At the timeof writing, the turnover
limit hasbeenincreased to £1 million and there are indications thatit maybe further raised to the
maximum currently allowed under EU law, namely £4.8million.
112
going-concern related modifications. Audit and non-audit fees are not found to be
significant in determining either modification type. The presence of prior-year audit
report modifications of either type are positively related to both modification types in
the current year.
Section 7 discusses the predictive power ofthe model, and concluding remarks
are presented in Section 8. The improvement in the predictive power of the
multinomial logit model over both a standard dichotomous logit model and a naive
prediction strategy is found to be marginal. I suggest that this is due to the strong
pattern of persistence in audit reporting.
The remainder of this section discusses the relevant prior research in more
detail.
1.2 Prior Research
Research on non going-concern related audit modifications is limited. The 'small
company' UK audit qualifications examined by Keasey et al. (1988) no longer apply
since Statement of Auditing Standards (SAS) 600 (APB, 1993) came into force in the
UK in September 1993, and small company audit exemptions were introduced.
DeFond et al, (2000) include both going-concern andnon going-concern related audit
modifications in their study, but do not distinguish the different types, so it is not
,possible to determine which factors are important for uncertainty modifications
relating to going-concern, and which arc important for audit modifications related to
disagreements or limitations on scope (of which disclaimers of opinion are a subset).
Other studies of audit reporting focus on going-concern related audit modifications, or
themore general class of uncertainty modifications, and do not consider modifications
related to disagreements or limitations on scope.
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Of the studies focusing on uncertainty modifications, Monroe and Tell (1993)
include a good summary of audit reporting studies prior to 1993. Monroe and Teh
note that these studies can be divided into those which predict going-concern related
modifications (Mutchler, 1984, 1985, 1986; Levitan and Knoblett, 1985; and Menon
and Schwarz, 1987) and those which predict uncertainty modifications in general
(Bell and Tabor, 1991; and Dopuch et al., 1987). Monroe and Teh examine the
general class of uncertainty modifications. These 'subject to' audit modifications,
which include material uncertainties affecting asset realisation or litigation against the
client, no longer exist in the UKor the US. Suchitems, ifmaterial, would be reported
instead as fundamental uncertainties not related to going-concern, and are included us
nongoing-concern related audit modifications for thepurposes ofthis study.
More recently, Krishnan (1994) models uncertainty audit opinions in a study
of auditor switching by US companies. Lennox (1999a) and Citron and Tamer
(2000) study going-concern related audit modifications on listed UK companies, but
theirgoals are, respectively, to compare the accuracy or audit reporting to bankruptcy
prediction models, and to determine the impact of the introduction of SAS 600 on
audit reporting. Louwers (1998) studies going-concern related audit modifications on
the subset of financially stressed, listed US companies.
These priorstudies use discrete choice models where the dependent variable is
dichotomous, taking only two values (0 and 1). Dopuch et al, (1987) and Lennox use
probit models withbinary dependent variables; Keasey et al., Bell and Tabor (l991),
Monroe andTeh, Louwers, DeFond et al, andCitron andTaffler use legitmodels with
binary dependent variables.
In contrast, Krishnan (1994) uses an ordered probit model. In such a model,
the dependent variable takes more than two values, and the order or ranking of these
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values is important. Instead, I use a multinomiallogit model. In mymodel, although
the dependent variable also takes more than two values, the order or ranking of these
values is meaningless and is chosen for convenience only. This has the advantage that
the model does not impose that a particular outcome (modification) type is more or
less important than any other. Themotivation for the choice of the multinomiallogit
model used in this chapter is discussed in more detail inSection 3.
2. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE COMPANIES INTHE UK
Limited companies in the UK may be either 'public' or 'private', as indicated in the
company's name ('pIc' or 'Ltd' respectively) and memorandum of association.
Public companies must comply with stricter legislation under the Companies Acts
governing such matters as the minimum numbers of directors and members, minimum
amounts of issued and authorised share capital, and filing deadlines. However, they
have more ready access to finance as they are allowed to issues shares to the public
through a recognised stock exchange. Public companies may also advertise anyof the
company's securities for sale to the public. In contrast, private companies may not
sell shares or advertise the sale of securities to the public, but may be eligible to audit
exemptions. The main differences between public and private companies are
summarised inTable 1.
It can be seen from Table 1 that, although some large private companies may
share features such as closer public scrutiny with some public or listed companies,
and some small public companies may share features such as owner-managers with
some private companies, public companies arc generally larger than private
companies due to the existence of minimum restrictions on issued share capital. They
arealso in general more widely held, and have shorter filing deadlines.
l1S
Table 1
Public andPrivate Companies in the UK
May not sell shares to May sell shares to the




~ of nominal value of
each allotted share, plus















Filing deadline for annual 10 months
accounts
Audit exemption available for Yes
companies meeting certain
requirements?
Access to capital markets
Minimum authorised share
capital
Minimum issued share capital
Minimum paid-up share capital
Company type:
Minimum number of members
Minimum number of directors
Company secretary
2.1 Listed Companies
Public companies may be listed on (registered with) a recognised stock exchange.
Private companies may not be listed because they arc not permitted to sell shares to
the general public. Recognised stock exchanges in the UK include the main market
on the London Stock Exchange (LSE), and the Alternative Investments Market
(AIM). In order to become a member of the LSE a company must, among other
requirements, have a total market capitalisation of at least £700.000 and, after the
listing, have at least 25% of its share capital in public hands. AI~1 has no such
minimum requirements as it is a market for young. expanding businesses.
Once a company has become a member of eitherstock exchange it must meet
obligations concerning the timely and accurate disclosure of any price-sensitive
information, greater disclosure of directors' activities, and restrictions on directors'
share dealing. Significant changes in substantial shareholdings must also be
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disclosed. Price-sensitive information relates to significant changes in the company's
financial position or outlook.
2.2 The Influence ofCompany Type on Audit Reporting
Auditors' decisions to issue modified audit reports depend partly upon detection of
material errors and omissions, and partly upon the incentives that they face to report
their audit findings truthfully. Auditors face legal and reputational incentives to
report truthfully (e.g, DeAngelo, 1981; Dye, 1993), but also face client switch threats
which may prevent truthful reporting where their independence has been
compromised. Fanner ct a1. (1987) find that auditors are more likely to accept
controversial accounting treatments when the riskof client loss is high and the risk of
litigation is low. However, Louwers (1998) finds no evidence that factors related to
litigation or loss of client revenues influence the auditor's decision to disclose going-
concern uncertainties. Nevertheless, companies have been shown to switch auditor
more frequently after receiving modified audit reports (Chow and Rice, 1982;
Croswell, 1988; and Citron and Tamer, 1992).
Both switch threats and litigation/reputation effects are likely to be more
important where clients are more publicly visible, i.e. listed versus unlisted
companies, or public versus private companies. This is because clients are more
prestigious, hence auditors will be reluctant to lose their business, but equally the
auditors may be more likely to be sued or suffer adverse publicity in the event of an
audit failure (a failure to issue a modified audit report when one is required). If
switch threats dominate, then auditors can be expected to be less willing to issue audit
report modifications. However, if litigation/reputation threats dominate, then auditors
canbe expected to be more likely to issue modifications.
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These effects will be investigated by including, in the multinomiallogit model
of audit reporting, explanatory variables indicating whethercompanies arc public, and
whether they are listed.
3. THEMULTINOMIAL LOGIT MODEL












where 'Q/ indicates the type of audit report on the current financial statements of
company i. X is a vector of explanatory variables, and Pi are the coefficients to be
estimated relating to outcome j. Two different modified audit report outcomes (QI ::
1, 2) will be considered relative to the base outcome of a clean audit report (QI :: 0),
but note that (3.2) can easily be extended to the case of more than three alternative
outcomes (i, k = 1, 2, ... , J). However, due to limitations of the audit report data
(discussed later in this section), only three outcome categories are specified in my
model. These are the base outcome clean audit report, and two types of modification
- those related to going-concern, and those not related.
In addition, a 'standard' dichotomous logit model of audit reporting is
estimated for comparative purposes. This version of the model does not distinguish
between different modification types. Its dependent variable is therefore binary. It is
equal to 1 ifa(ny) modified report is received, and 0 otherwise.
Multinomial logit models are part of the general class of discrete choice, or
'qualitative response', models. These models are those in which the dependent
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variable takes values 0, 1,2 and so on. In some cases, for example Krishnan's (1994)
ordered probit model, the values themselves are meaningful. However, in this
chapter, they arc merely a coding for some qualitative outcome. Here, the three
different audit report outcomes are coded 0, 1, or 2, but these codings are meaningless
in themselves. The codings serve merely to identify thedifferent outcomes anddo not
imply anyranking or ordering in the multinomial model.
Discrete choice models in the literature are most often used where the
dependent variable is dichotomous; in other words, where there are only two possible
outcomes, such as would be the case in a model of labour force participation. There
arc two main forms that these models can take, namely 'logit' (logistic) models, and
'probit' models. These models are constructed by modelling the probability that
outcome j occurs, and differ only in that the logit model assumes the logistic
distribution and the probit model assumes the normal distribution. Maddala (1991)
discusses theuse of dichotomous discrete choice models in accounting research.
In most cases logit and probit models give qualitatively identical results,
although one might expect the results to differ if there were either very few
observations of one outcome type, or verywide variation in an important independent
variable. It is however difficult to justify the choice of one model or the other on
theoretical grounds, therefore the choice of one or other model is usually based on
computational convenience (Greene, 1997; Maddala, 1991).
The maximum likelihood estimation of these two models is based on the
iterative Newton-Raphson technique, This technique is relatively straightforward for
the legit model, but less so for the probit model. In particular, multinomial probit
models become so computationally difficult to estimate that logit models are usually
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required for models with more than two alternative outcomes. 1 used multinomial
logit rather than probit because of these computational difficulties.
Krishnan (1994) employs an ordered probit model using three outcomes in a
study of auditor switching and uncertainty modifications. This is computationally
easier than a multinomial probit model, but imposes on the model that certain audit
modifications are more 'serious' than others. In Krishnan's case, he uses three
categories of uncertainty-related modified audit reports: clean, non going-concern
related, and going-concern related. Coding these various outcomes 0, I, and 2
becomes meaningful in an ordered probit model - the outcome coded 2 is ranked as
more serious than those coded 1 andO.
Krishnan notes that the ordered probit approach has the advantage of
distinguishing these different types of reports (as docs the multinomial logit
approach), and that it allows for a measure of auditor conservatism in terms of the
relative threshold values for issuing each type of report. However, when considering
audit modifications other than uncertainty modifications, as in this study, it would be
unclear whether going-concern related modifications were indeed always more
serious than a disagreement or a limitation on scope. A multinomial model is more
appropriate in this case, as it does not impose any rankings, and therefore is used in
this study.
To be valid, it is necessary that multinomiallogit models satisfy the condition
known as 'independence of irrelevant alternatives' (lIA). I use multinomial legit
rather than probit because of thecomputational difficulties, despite the restrictiveness
of the (IIA) assumption.
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The model implies that In(pr(Q, = j)J = PjX1, or, in other words, that thePr(Q, = 0)
odds ratio for outcome j relative to the base choice (outcome 0) is independent of the
otheralternative choices available. This IIAproperty maynot be satisfied in practice.
For example, it would not be satisfied if the choices analysed were travelling to work
by train, by bus, in a mercedes, or in any other car. The property would however be
satisfied if the choice were simply between train, bus,and (any) car.
I can illustrate the importance of this condition when using the model for
prediction as follows. Suppose that,when the choices analysed are between train, bus
and car, the model predicts that 60% of the population will travel by car, and 20% by
bus. Theodds ratio between cars andbuses is 3:1. If cars are divided evenly between
mercedes and other makes, by distinguishing the choices in this way, if the odds ratio
remains constant we would now expect the model to predict that 30% of people
travelled by mercedes, and 30% in other cars. But the actual odds ratio between each
car type, and buses, is reduced to 1.5:1. The choice of 'mercedes' is no longer
independent from the choice of either irrelevant alternative 'train' or 'bus' although
the model will assume that they arc. In order to maintain the odds ratio, half of the
people travelling by bus would have to switch to using trains.
In this study, the outcomes are audit reports (not travel choices) which are
categorised as clean reports, non going-concern related modified reports (relating to
disagreements and limitations on scope), and going-concern related modifications.
Going-concern and non going-concern related audit modifications are
generally issued for very different reasons and on these grounds there is no reason to
believe that they would not be independent decisions; going-concern related
modifications will be issued when the auditor feels that there is a significant chance
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that the company will not continue in operation for the foreseeable future, whereas
non going-concern related modifications generally arisewhere evidence is unavailable
(limitations on scope qualifications) or where auditors and management disagree over
accuracy, accounting treatment or disclosure (disagreement qualifications).
The exception is that non going-concern audit modifications may also be
issued for uncertainties which are not deemed to affect going-concern. These
uncertainties may be related to those which are deemed to affect going-concern, in all
but magnitude. It is possible that the presence of these modifications may violate the
IIAcondition. The data includes 462 such audit reports, withunqualified opinions but
which feature additional explanatory paragraphs not related to goingconcern.
The requirement of satisfying the lIA condition is important for the
categorisation of outcomes for the study. Limitation on scope and disagreement
qualifications may be either 'mild' or 'serious'. 'Serious' disagreement
modifications, where the misstatement is so material as to affect the financial
statements as a whole, are termed 'adverse opinions'. 'Mild' disagreement
modifications, where the misstatement is material but does not affect the financial
statements as a whole, are termed 'except for' disagreements. Similarly, 'serious'
limitation on scope modifications are termed 'disclaimers of opinion' whereas 'mild'
limitation on scope modifications include the phrase 'except for'.
In order to satisfy the IIA condition, like opinions should be classified
together. Adverse opinions should be grouped with 'except for' disagreement
opinions, and disclaimers of opinion shouldbe grouped with 'except for' limitation on
scope opinions. Hence, although audit modifications relating to, say, disagreements
may be either serious 'adverse opinions' or relatively mild 'except for' opinions, thcy
should not be treated as separate outcomes in the multinomial logit model. This
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would be similar to distinguishing mercedes from other cars in the travel-to-work
model.
Finally, although it is unlikely to violate lIA, it is not possible to use the data
in this study to treat disagreement modifications separately from limitation on scope
modifications. This is because the data source (see Section 5) classifies audit reports
into either clean reports, or modification type as follows: fundamental uncertainties
relating to going concern, 'mild' 'except for' disagreements, 'except for' limitations
on scope, 'severe' adverse or disclaimer opinions, and reports featuring unqualified
opinions but with additional explanatory paragraphs not related to going concern.
Because there is only a single category of 'severe' opinions it is not possible to
analyse limitations on scope separately from disagreements, due to the requirement
for the independence of irrelevant alternatives. There are222 observations in the data
with audit reports classified as 'severe'.
It must also be noted that it is possible forcompanies to receive multiple audit
modifications. However, the data source does not provide information explaining the
categorisation of multiple modifications. I have assumed that any modified audit
report which concerns going-concern, even in part, is classified as going-concern
related.
4. VARIABLES
4. J Choice ofDependent Variable
In themultinomiallogit model, the categorical dependent variable Qtakes the value 0
if the report is not modified in any way, i.e. a clean report; 1 if the report contains a
non going-concern related modification, and 2 if the report contains a going-concern
related modification.
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In the 'standard' dichotomous logit model estimated for comparative purposes,
the categorical dependent variable takes the value 1 if the report contains any
modification, and0 otherwise.
Theclassification of audit report outcomes is summarised in Table 2.
Table 2
Classification of Audit Report Outcomes
Audit Report Number of Classification in Classification in
Observations Standard Logit Multinomial Legit
(data described Model Model
in Section 5)
Clean 7,125 0 0
'Except for' 602 1 1
Disagreement
'Except for' Limitation 462 1 1
on Scope
'Severe' Disagreement 222 1 1
or Limitation on Scope
Going-concern related 431 1 2
modification
'Other' non-qualified 462 1 1
modification
Total 9,304
4.2 Choice ofExplanatory Variables
A full listofthe explanatory variables included in the models is given inTable 3.
Explanatory variables relating to auditor characteristics are discussed first.
Secondly, explanatory variables relating to company characteristics are discussed.








In(ASSE) the natural log of total assets ? ?
SUBSID (= 1 if subsidiary company, 0
otherwise)
QUICK ratio of currentassets excluding +
stock, to current liabilities
GEAR ratioof long-term debt to net ? +
worth
LOSS (= 1 if company made a loss in the +
current or prior year, 0 otherwise)
CONT contingent liabilities, scaled by +
total assets
BIG (= 1 if auditoris a Big 6 finn, 0 ? ?
otherwise)
In(AF) the natural log ofaudit fee ? ?
In(NAF) the natural log ofnon-audit fee
LAG number of daysbetween the year + +
end and the filing of accounts
GC prior year audit report (= 1 if + +
going-concern modification, 0
otherwise)
NGC Prioryearaudit report (= 1 ifnon + +
going-concern modification, 0
otherwise)
DIV (=1 ifthe companypays a ?
dividend, 0 otherwise)
PUBLIC (=1 if the companyis public and ? ?
non-listed, 0 otherwise)
LIST (=1 ifthe companyis listedon a ? ?
UK stock exchange, 0 otherwise)
Notes.'
Untransfonned financial variables arc in £OOOs.
... I: relative to the choiceof clean audit report
4.3 Variables Associated with AuditorCharacteristics
Auditors' ability to detect misstatements is one component of audit quality, which is
controlled for in this study by the inclusion of a dummy variable 'BIG' indicating
whether the company is audited by a Big 6 audit finn. As discussed in Chapter 1,
there exists both theoretical and empirical evidence that large audit firms provide
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higher quality audits (for example, DeAngelo, 1981; Balvers ct al., 1988; Dentty,
1989; Menon and Williams, 1991; Dye, 1993; Pong and Whittington, 1994; Craswell
et al., 1995; Ireland and Lennox, 2002). Large audit firms have incentives to provide
higher quality as theyhave more wealth (Dye, 1993) and reputation (DeAngelo, 1981)
at risk. Higher audit quality is expected, ceteris paribus, to increase the likelihood of
audit report modification in theabsence ofselection effects.
However, it is likely that selection effects will be present. High quality
auditors are likely to attract high quality clients. Titman and Trueman (1986) and
Datar et a1. (1991) both present signalling models in which high quality companies
prefer more accurate auditors. We cannot observe the audit reports companies would
have received from audit firms of the alternative size - we only observe the reports
that theydid receive from theirchose audit firms. If high quality clients arc precisely
those which are less likely to require audit report modifications, then large (Big 6)
audit firms may in fact be associated with a lower likelihood of audit report
modifications in the sample. This is most likely to be the case with non going-
concern related modifications as these will be reduced by high quality internal
controls and high management integrity, under client control, whereas going-concern
modifications depend upon the prediction of bankruptcy, an event which is at least
partly outside the control ofmanagement.
It would be possible to control for the effects of auditor self-selection using a
two-stage selection model, as is employed elsewhere in this thesis (Chapters 2 and 4).
However, the majority of the companies included in the data arc unlisted, so that data
important in explaining the auditor choice is not available. Hence this is left for
future research.
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In addition to litigation/reputation threats, switch threats are also important
influences on auditors. Switch threats are expected, ceteris paribus, to reduce the
likelihood of audit report modification. As switch threats are likely to be most
credible where the auditor stands to lose high audit or non-audit fees, the natural
logarithm of both audit and non-audit fees, 'In(NAF)' and 'In(AF)', are included as
explanatory variables.27 In the UK, fees for bothaudit andnon-audit services must be
disclosed in the financial statements. High non-audit fees are expected to reduce
audit modifications by impairing auditor independence (increasing the credibility of
switch threats). However, high audit fees may simply indicate a high audit risk
assessment (implying high audit effort) by the auditors rather than compromised
independence, so the direction of influence of these fees is unclear.
4.4 VariablesAssociated with Company Characteristics
Company characteristics such as company type may also influence auditor
independence by increasing switch threats, or on the other hand, by increasing
litigation and reputation threats. In particular, listed (public) companies are under
closer public scrutiny than other companies, which may increase the risk that an
auditor will be sued, or that their reputation will suffer, if the auditor fails to issue a
modified audit report when required. This would be expected to increase the
frequency of modified audit reports as auditors may be more conservative in their
reporting (more likely to modify their report on the basis of the same evidence) and
may increase the audit work performed (improving the quantity or quality of audit
evidence). Alternately, listed (public) companies are likely to have greater financial
resources to pay fees, and greater prestige as clients, which may compromise auditor
independence by increasing switch threats, and thus reduce the frequency of modified
21 Prior to performing the logtransformation on non-audit fees 'NAP', 1 was added to all observations
of the non-audit fees, as in 6,581 observations the reported value is 0, precluding the log
transformation.
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audit reports. Dummy variables indicating whether a company is publicor is listed on
a UK stock exchange, are included to control for these effects, which arc expected to
have.similar influences on both audit report modification types.
Other company characteristics are expected to have different influences on
different audit modifications. Recall that going-concern related modifications nrc
issued when the auditor feels that there is a significant chance that the company will
not continue in operation for the foreseeable future. Hence company characteristics
such as poor financial health, known to be important in predicting bankruptcy, will
also be important in determining going-concern audit modifications. This effect may
be compounded as poor financial health may increase the credibility ofswitch threats
by increasing company reliance on receiving clean audit reports. In contrast, non
going-concern related modifications are disagreements over the accuracy, accounting
treatment or disclosure of items in the financial statements, limitations on scope (lack
of audit evidence), and fundamental uncertainties that do not mention going-concern.
Companies which incorrectly report good financial health will be more likely to
receive modifications for disagreement.
4.5 Going-concern related audit modifications
The variables hypothesised to be important for going-concern related audit
modifications are those which indicate financial health and therefore bankruptcy risk.
Company size is measured by the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets,
'In(ASSE)', and is expected to be negatively related to golng-ccncem related
modifications. Larger companies have greater asset bases on which to secure loans,
and greater market power, which may reduce the need for going·concern related
modifications by representing good financial health. Size may also increase litigation
or reputation threats to auditors as the company will be more visible.
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Measures of liquidity and financial risk have been found significant in
predicting bankruptcy (e.g., Lennox, 1999; and Hopwood et al., 1989). Liquidity is
measured by the ratio of current assets excluding stock to current liabilities, 'QUICK',
and a dummy variable 'LOSS' indicating losses in either the current or prior-year.
The 'LOSS' variable is included in addition to 'QUICK' because cash flow and
accounting profits differ. 'Loss' is a profitability measure and it is expected that
companies making losses (with negative profitability) are more likely to receive
going-concern audit modifications thancompanies in profit, because losses may affect
future liquidity. Financial risk is measured by the ratio of long-term debt to net worth,
'GEAR'.
Although Dopuch et al. (1987) and Lennox (1999) found high gearing to be
significant in influencing audit report modifications, Citron and Taffler (2000),
DeFond et a1. (2000) and Keasey et al, (1988) do not find gearing ratios to be
significant although the signs of the coefficients are positive. Poor liquidity and high
gearing arc both expected to increase the likelihood of going-concern related audit
modifications.
Reported contingent liabilities in the accounts (scaled by total assets,
'CONT'), whether the company pays a dividend in the current year ('DIY'), and
company type ('LIST' and 'PUBLIC'), are also expected to influence going-concern
modifications. Contingent liabilities maygive rise to fundamental uncertainties which
affect going-concern. The presence of contingent liabilities is therefore expected to
increase the likelihood of a going-concern related modification. Because companies
in severe financial distress often do not pay dividends, companies which do pay
dividends are expected to be less likely to receive going-concern related audit
modifications. Listed (public) companies are also expected to be less likelyto receive
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going-concern related modifications than other companies, as thcyhavegreater access
to finance via the financial markets.
4.6 Non going-concern related audit modifications
Recall that thedifferent types of nongoing-concern related modifications arc analysed
together due to the limitations of the data source, This complicates the theoretical
underpinning of the analysis. Disagreements are expected to be most likely to occur
where the financial statements that are presented are overly favourable, or wherc
management integrity or experience is poor. Limitations on scope are expected to be
most likely to occurwhere internal controls and accounting systems are poor. These
characteristics areunobservable therefore suitable proxies mustbe found.
The explanatory variables hypothesised to be important for non going-concern
audit modifications are company size Cln(ASSE)'), the subsidiary indicator dummy
variable ('SUBSID'), liquidity ('QUICK' and 'LOSS') and financial risk ('GEAR'),
the presence of contingent liabilities ('CONT'), and company type ('LIST' and
'PUBLIC').
The expected sign of the coefficient of company size in non going-concern
related modifications is unclear. Largercompanies may be more likely to havc good
accounting systems and internal controls, thus reducing disagreements and limitations
on scope, but alternately reported size may reflect overstated asset and understated
liability values, increasing the likelihood of disagreements. Larger companies may
also be more complex, increasing the likelihood ofmisstatements in theaccounts.
The 'SUBSID' dummy variable is included because subsidiary companies arc
expected to be less likelyto receive going-concern related auditmodifications, as they
may receive financial support from the parent company or from other group
companies. Subsidiary companies arc also expected to be less likely to suffer from
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problems of limitations on scope as, being part of a group, they may share an
accounting function which is therefore larger and likely to be higher quality. Hence,
subsidiary companies arc expected to be less likely to receive non going-concern
related audit modifications.
With respect to non going-concern related modifications, good liquidity is
expected to increase disagreement-type modifications as assets and/or profits may be
overstated. Although poor quick ratios and losses may be associated with
disagreement-type modifications as financially stressed companies may be more
likely to attempt to overstate their financial position, this cannot be tested by
including variables derived from the reported financial statements. Reported figures
will incorporate any misstatements and hence may not reveal the 'true' underlying
financial position of the businesses. Understatements of assets and income are less
likely to be the result of earnings management attempts thanoverstatements, therefore
theyarc less likelyto be associated withdisagreement type audit modifications.
The influence of financial risk ('GEAR') on non going-concern related audit
modifications is unclear. High gearing is on one hand expected to decrease the
likelihood of non going-concern related modifications, as high gearing may indicate
correctly stated values of (low) assets and (high) liabilities, but on the other hand it
may increase incentives for earnings management. Managers in highly geared
companies are more likely to make income increasing accounting choices, for
example to avoid debt covenant violations (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Christie,
1990; Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983). Such accounting choices may result in
misleading financial statements, thus increasing disagreement typemodifications.P
21 Further discussion of earnings management is leftto Chapter 4 of this thesis.
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The disclosure of material contingent liabilities is expected to reduce non
going-concern related audit modifications by reducing disagreements.
Listed (public) companies are expected to be less likely to receive non going-
concern related modifications than other companies, as they arc likely to have higher
quality internal controls and corporate governance, reducing disagreements and
limitations on scope. However, as discussed earlier in the chapter, theyarc also more
prestigious clients which may, as already noted, increase both switch threats and
litigation/reputation threats.
4.7 The Audit Lag and Prior Year Audit Report
A proxy for the audit lag ('LAG'), and dummy variables representing prioryear audit
reports ('GC' and 'NGC'), are also included as explanatory variables. These
variables areexpected to influence all types ofauditmodification.
The audit lag is normally defined as the length of time between theaccounting
yearend and the date the audit report is signed. Instead, it is proxied in this study by
the number of days between the accounting year end and the date the accounts nrc
filed at Companies House ('LAG'), as the actual date that the audit report is signed is
not reported in the data. This is reasonable as the audit report is usually signed
immediately priorto filing.
Audit lag has been found significant in earlier studies - the longer the lag, the
more likely a company is to receive a modified audit report. This has several
explanations. Firstly, the length of the lag may capture lengthy negotiations between
the auditor and the client over the form of the final accounts and the associated audit
report, particularly if they are in disagreement - if the auditors wish to modify their
report such negotiations are likely to take longer. Secondly, a long lag may result if
the auditors have identified problems and need to perform additional audit work.
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Thirdly, a long lag may simply reflect that the company has high inherent and/or
control risk and therefore requires more audit work in the first place. Finally, and
especially with regard to going-concern, auditors may seek to delay expressing an
audit opinion or finalising their report, in the hope that a problem which has been
identified will be resolved anda modification canthereby be avoided.
Prior year audit report dummies have been included as there is evidence that
audit report types are persistent over time (see e.g. Monroe and Teh, 1993; Krishnan
et al., 1996). In other words, companies receiving a modified audit report one year
are more likely to receive a modified audit report in the following year than
companies receiving a clean report, andvice versa. Keasey et al, (1988), Monroe and
Teh (1993) and Citron and Taffler (2000) all include prior audit report variables in
theiranalyses of audit opinions. The dummy 'Ge' is equal to 1 if theprioryearaudit
report is a going-concern related modification, and 0 otherwise. The dummy 'NGC'
is equal to 1 if theprioryear audit report is a non going-concern related modification,
and 0 otherwise.
Modified audit reports may persist for several reasons. Firstly, there may
simply be continuing, unobserved problems in the companies concerned, although
Lennox (1999b) showed that lagged audit reports do not capture unobserved
information relating to financial distress, because they do not help to identify failing
companies. If continuing problems are causing repeated audit modifications, one
would expect persistence to be modification-specific. For example, a going-concern
related modification in the current year would be more likely following a prior-year
going-concern related modification, but no more likely following a non going-concern
related modification.
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Alternately, persistent modifications may result from auditor litigation or
reputation threats. Auditors may continue to modify their reports on companies in
subsequent years even if the problem(s) resulting in the original modification have
been resolved, particularly if there is an absence of a credible switch threat from the
client companies. If an auditor has modified the audit report once, and the client has
not switched to a new auditor, then a switch threat may no longer be credible. If
modifications persist because auditors face litigation/reputation threats but not switch
threats, then any current-year modification will be more likely following any prior-
yearmodification.
In many cases, persistent cleanreports maysimply indicate that companies are
indeed reporting correctly and face no fundamental uncertainties. However, clean
reports may persist even if there is a problem withthe financial statements. Thismay
be due to auditor negligence, strong switch threats, or the 'growing problem' effect.
The growing problem effect occurs when a problem is identified by an auditor at an
early stage, when its (potential) impact on the financial statements is deemed
insufficient to warrant a modified report. The problem may become more significant
with time, but in subsequent years the auditors maycontinue to ignore it, either out of
embarrassment because it hasbecome apparent that it should have been reported on in
an earlier year, or simply because it was allowed to pass without comment on every
previous occasion.
Clean audit reports maytherefore persist as auditors are reluctant to issue first-
time modifications; however, once a modification has been issued further
modifications (of any type) may become more likely even if the original problem has
been resolved.
134
Theprior year audit report dummy variables have been included in each model
to test the significance of persistence in audit reporting. Prior researchers sometimes
limit their analysis of audit report modifications to first time modifications (e.g,
Dopuch et al., 1987; DeFond et al., 2000), precluding theuse of prioryearaudit report
explanatory variables. This is not necessary if the goal is to successfully predict audit
modifications using observable data.
5. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
The cross-sectional data for the study is taken from OneSource UK Companies
Volume One, July 1998.29 As well as company type (e.g. public limited by share
capital, private limited by share capital), OneSource contains historical data taken
from published financial statements, accounting ratios, data on company listings,
company ownership (i.e. whether a company is a subsidiary), the name of the
company's cu~ent auditor, the industry in which the company operates, and the audit
reports on the financial statements.
Recall that the dependent variable in the multinomial logit estimations takes
the value 0 if the current audit report is clean, 1 if the audit report contains a non
going-concern audit modification (a 'non-GC' modification), and 2 if the audit report
contains a modification related to going-concern (a 'GC' modification).
To reduce data collection costs, andbecause modified audit reports have a low
rate of occurrence, a choice-based sample is used.3o Estimation of discrete choice
models, such as multinomial logit models, can be problematic when there are few
29OneSource is a commercially available database of financial information relating to UKcompanies.
TheInformation is held on two CD·ROMs, Volume 1andVolume 2. Volume 1 holds data on 110,001
UKcompanies, including all public limited companies and all companies with more thanSO
employees, theremainder of thesample comprising the largest UK companies notalready included,
selected on thebasis of turnover, total assets, networth, or shareholder funds, whichever figure is the
highest. Volume 2 holds data onthenext 250,000 UKcompanies, selected on thesame basis, with the
lowest cut-offvalue at approximately £38,000.
)0 Dopuch et a1. (1987) estimate the probability of a first-time audit modification to bejust lessthan
S%.
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observations of a particular outcome; the estimations become overly sensitive to the
characteristics of those observations, and different results may be obtained from the
use of either logit or probit distributions. A choice-based sampling technique is
therefore used to increase thesampling rateof modified companies. To correct for the
choice-based sampling, weighted exogenous sample maximum likelihood (\VESML)
is used to perform the estimations, as in Monroe and Teh (1993). The weights correct
for the oversampling of modified companies relative to the population, by attaching
less importance to those observations.
OneSource UK Companies Volume One contains data on 77,894 companies
with at least two years of accounting data, and audit reports for the most recent
(current) year. Of these, 5,229 companies have modified audit reports in the current
yearand non-missing audit reports in the prior year, and are all included in the initial
sample. Modified companies therefore comprise 6.7% of the population (non going-
concern related modifications comprise 2.23% and going-concern related
modifications comprise 4.49%). However, from the original total of 5,229 modified
companies, 2,123 have missing gearing and/or quick ratios, and a further 887 have
missing audit fees, resulting in a total of2,219 modified companies.
Of the 72,665 companies receiving clean audit reports, 49,727 have non-
missing audit fees, prior year audit reports and quick and gearing ratios. Of these,
7,267 (one tenth of the total clean companies) were sampled at random, by selecting
approximately every seventh company record. These sample weights are taken into
account in the subsequent WESML estimations, which areconducted using the survey
estimation commands in the software package STATA.31
31 Themultinomiallogit models areestimated using pseudo-maximum-likelihood methods; thepoint
estimates are obtained froma weighted maximum-likelihood estimator. The final sample of7;267
cleancompanies was selected from72,665 companies, giving a weight of 10to eachcleancompany
observation. Modified company observations had a weight of 1. Themodels in thischapter were also
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Values for contingent liabilities are missing from a further 308 modified and
937 clean companies. As contingent liabilities are disclosed only when necessary,
missing values for contingent liabilities are assumed to be zero. Finally, the top 1%
assumed outlying gearing and quick ratios are trimmed as follows: 94 outlying
observations with reported gearing ratios ('GEAR') greater than 56.3086, and a
further 88 observations with reported quick ratios ('QUICK') greater than 12.206.32
These observations are assumed outlying as theirvalues seem unrealistically high, and
maypossibly indicate errors in the data.
The final sample consists of9,304 companies of which 7,125 received a clean
report on the current financial statements, 431 received going-concern related
modifications, and 1,748 received non going-concern related modifications. 8,289
companies are private, and 1,015 companies are public, of which 374 (4% ofthe total)
are listed. This sample is then divided at random into the estimation sample and the
holdout sample, by selecting every fourth observation of each modification and
company type (Public/private) into the holdout sample. The composition of the final
estimation and holdout samples are summarised in Table 4.
re-estimated using weights oC6.84 Cor clean companies (the sample of clean companies was taken from
the sub-population of49,727 clean companies with non-missing audit fees, prior-year audit opinions,
quick and gearing ratios) and 1 for modified companies; theresults were qualitatively identical andare
notreported here.
n Analternative to thelogarithmic transformations ofskewed variables (total assets 'ASSE', audit fees
'AFt, and non-audit fees 'NAFt) andsample trimming of observations with outlying quick andgearing
ratios performed here, would be to perform rank transformations. Rank transformations have been
shown to result in residuals which conform more closely to OLS assumptions (Kane andMeade, 1998),
being normally distributed, spherical, anduncorrelated with explanatory variables. Normality is
especially important for thesecond-stage regression equations in a selection model (Maddala, 1983)
such as employed elsewhere in this thesis (Chapters 2 and4). However, themodels estimated in this
chapter aremultinomial anddichotomous legitmodels, themaximum likelihood estimators of which
remain consistent despite non-normality (Maddala, 1983). Nevertheless, sample trimming andlog
transformations have been used in this chapter. Sample trimming was employed here as the
observations deleted appeared to have unrealistically high values of thequick andgearing ratios. Log
transformations were used to retain consistency with prior studies of audit reporting. Inparticular,
Monroe and Teh(1993), Dopuch et a1. (1987), DeFond et al. (2000), andKrishnan (1994) allpeform
log transformations of'total assets.
137
Table 4
Final Estimation andHoldout Sample
Private companies Public companies Total
Panel A: Estimation Sample
Observations
'Except for' disagreement






Panel B: Holdout Sample
Observations
'Except for' disagreement























































A 'GC' modification is onewhich relates to going-concern.
Table 4 shows there are many more private companies than public companies in the
sample. In the sample, 24% of private companies, and 17% of public companies
receive modified audit reports. This is a significant difference, as measured by a two-
sample r-test, However, this difference only applies for non going-concern related
modifications, as the proportions of public and private companies receiving going-
concern related modifications (4.2% and 4.7% respectively) are not significantly
different.
Descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables defined in Table 3 arc
reported in Table 5 for the estimation sample. Of particular interest is thedistribution
of large (Big 6) audit firms between different company types. Public companies nrc
significantly more likely to hire Big 6 audit firms than private companies, as
measured by a two-sample r-test of the mean.
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Table 5
Estimation Sample Descriptive Statistics
Privatecompanies Publiccompanies
Variable Mean Median Mean Median
In(ASSE) 8.130 7.900 9.604 9.284
SUBSID 0.489 0.247
QUICK 1.094 0.900 1.232 0.930
GEAR 1.265 0.130 1.362 0.270
LOSS 0.180 0.191
CONT 0.272 0.000 0.021 0.000
BIG 0.363 0.522
In(AF) 2.136 2.079 3.105 2.833
In(NAF) 0.620 0.000 2.052 1.609




LIST nla N/a 0.379
Notes:
Variables aredefined in Table 3
From Table 5 it can also be seen that public companies are generally larger and pay
generally higher fees, aremore likely to pay dividends, and have on average higher
gearing and liquidity.
The pattern of persistence in audit reporting in the data is revealed by the
bunching of observations along the leading diagonals in Table 6. Although it is clear
there is strong persistence within particular types of audit modification, some
companies that receive modified audit reports related to going concern also
subsequently receive non going-concern modifications, and vice versa. 41 companies
in the estimation sample receive non going-concern related audit modifications
following a going-concern related modification, and 11 companies in the holdout
sample. 36 companies in the estimation sample receive going-concern related audit
modifications following a non going-concern related audit modification, and 10
companies in theholdout sample.
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Table 6
Persistence in Audit Reporting
Prior YearAudit Report
Current YearAudit Report Clean Non-GC GC Total
Estimation sample
Clean 5,264 51 29 5,344
non-GC modification 366 904 41 1,311
GC modification 128 36 159 323
Total 5,758 991 229 6,978
Holdout Sample
Clean 1,754 16 11 1,781
non-GC modification 120 306 11 437
GC modification 48 10 50 108
Total 1,922 332 72 2,326
There are 366 first time modifications which are non going-concern related, and 128
which are going-concern related, in the estimation sample. In the holdout sample,
there are 120 non going-concern related, and 48 going-concern related, first time
modifications.
Persistence in audit modifications appears to be less strong for going-concern
related modifications than it is for non going-concern related modifications. This is
possibly because some going-concern difficulties will be 'resolved' by bankruptcy,
resulting in sample attrition, or by companies trading out of theirdifficulties (Monroe
andTeh, 1993).
6. ESTIMATION RESULTS
The model is estimated twice. The first estimation is a 'standard' dichotomous legit
model with binardependent variable equal to 1 if the audit report is modified in any
way, and 0 otherwise. The second estimation is a multinomial legit model with
dependent variable equal to 1 if the audit report contains a non going-concern related
audit modification, 2 if it contains a going-concern related audit modification, and 0
otherwise.
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The explanatory variables included in the models are identical, and described
in Table 3. Note that time subscripts for the financial statements to which the
variables relate have not been included as all variables relate to the most recent set of
accounts, except for the variables describing prior year audit reports, and the LOSS
dummy whichrelates to both the currentand prior year.
The results of the estimation of both the 'standard' dichotomous and
multinomial legit models of audit reporting, on the estimation sample, are reported in
Table 7. It is clear that the significant determinants of audit modifications differ
across modification types, with the exception of the audit lag ('LAG') and the prior
year audit report dummy variables ('GC' and 'NGC'), which positively increase the
likelihood ofbothmodification types.
Large companies are more likely to receive non going-concern related
modifications than other companies, and less likely to receive non going-concern
related modifications than other companies. This is consistent both with overstated
assets increasing the chance of disagreement-type modifications, and reduced
financial risk reducing the likelihood of bankruptcy.
Subsidiary companies are significantly less likely to receive non going-
concern related audit modifications than other companies, as expected. However,
whether a company is public but non-listed ('PUBLIC'), or listed ('LIST'), does not




Panel A: Logit Model Panel B: MultlnomJaI Loglt Modd
Variable Any Modification Non-GCmodification GC modification
In(ASSE) 0.101 • 0.153 •• -0.180 •
(0.048) (0.053) (0.076)
SUBSID -0.299 • -0.303 • .Q.186
(0.139) (0.149) (0.216)
QUICK -0.057 0.045 ·1.135 ••
(0.057) (0.054) (0.223)
GEAR 0.019 0.017 0.023 •
(0.010) (0.011) (0.012)
LOSS 0.158 -0.070 0.830 ••
(0.183) (0.207) (0.208)
CONT 0.018 • -O.OOS 0.072 ••
(0.008) (O.OIS) (0.015)
BIG -0.227 -0.439 •• 0.429
(0.144) (0.160) (0.224)
In(AF) -0.063 -0.112 0.230
(0.081) (0.092) (0.128)
In(NAF) -0.049 -0.045 0.011
(0.065) (0.071) (0.086)
LAG 0.002 •• 0.002 •• 0.003 ••
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
GC 4.225 •• 3.046 •• 5.054 ••
(0.225) (0.270) (0.255)
NGC 5.190 •• 5.468 •• 3.042 ••
(0.157) (0.IS7) (0.264)
DIV -0.186 -0.112 -0.560 ••
(0.127) (0.141) (0.208)
PUBLIC 0.243 0.153 0.426
(0.2(9) (0.252) (0.258)
LIST -0.419 -0.469 -0.564
(OAIO) (0.411) (0.63S)
Constant -5.604 •• -6.140 •• -5.067 ••
(0.411) (0.447) (0.629)
Observations 6,978 6,978
Pseudo R2 00457 0.456
F(15, 6963) ... 98.02 •• F(30, 6,948) - 67.38 ••
Notes:
• .. statistically significant at the S% level.
•• - statistically significant at the 1% level.
Standard errorsare reported in (parentheses).
Coefficients are relative to thebase choice of cleanreport.
Dependent variable is auditreporttype. Explanatory variables aredefined inTable3.
A 'GC t modification is one which relates to going-concern.
Companies choosing Big 6 audit firms are significantly less likely to receive non
going-concern modifications than other private companies, but this should not be
taken to suggest thatBig6 audit firms are lower quality thanotheraudit firms.
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In practice, it is often company management that chooses the auditors (rather
than the shareholders, who may merely 'rubber stamp' management's decision).
Auditors have therefore not been randomly assigned to companies, but chosen by
them. This may result in a self-selection bias. Companies choosing Big 6 audit firms
may share other unobserved characteristics that reduce the likelihood of such
modifications (for example, management integrity). Companies choosing large audit
firms may therefore be precisely those that are less likely to require audit
modifications.
As expected, companies with high financial risk ('GEAR'), poor liquidity
('QUICK' and 'LOSS'), that report material contingent liabilities ('CONT') or which
do not pay dividends ('DIV'), are more likely to receive going-concern modifications
than other companies. Audit and non-audit fees ('In(AF)' and 'In(NAF)') do not
significantly affect audit modifications.
Of most interest when comparing the results of the standard logit estimation
(Panel A of Table 7) with those of the multinomial estimation (Panel B of Table 7),
arc the significant coefficients on company size ('In(ASSE)'). These are positive for
non going-concern related modifications (perhaps due to overstatements of assets),
but negative for going-concern related modifications (large companies are less likely
to become bankrupt). Thissuggests that the multinomiallogit model may outperform
the standard legit model in correctly predicting modified audit reports. However, the
coefficients on the lagged audit report dummy variables ('Ge' and 'NGC') are many
times larger in magnitude than those on company size, or indeed any other
explanatory variable, suggesting that there may be little improvement possible over a
naive model of audit report prediction, suchas to predict the current year audit report
to be equal to the' prioryearaudit report.
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6.1 Testing the IIA Condition
Recall that the IIA condition must hold for the multinomiallogit analysis to be valid.
For the IIA condition to hold, the ratio of the probability of choosing a going-concern
related modification in the current year, to that of choosing a clean audit report,
should be independent of the non going-concern related modification choice.
Hausman and McFadden (1984) suggest that if a subset of the choice set truly is
irrelevant, omitting it from the model altogether will not change parameter estimates
systematically. This is the basis for a Hausman specification test to sec whether the
IIA conditions does not hold. The null hypothesis is that the parameter estimates do
not change systematically when one choice subset (and the observations with those
outcomes) is eliminated from the model.
The statistic is distributed as ,.l with, for this model, IS degrees of freedom.
The software package STATA computes a 1.2 value of 0.52, and therefore the null
hypothesis cannot be rejected. Therefore there is no evidence that the IIA condition
does not hold.
This may seem counter-intuitive given that prior year audit report
modifications of one type are significant in determining current yearmodifications of
the other type. In the multinomial logit model, prior year going-concern related
modifications are not only important for current year going-concern modifications,
but are also important for current year non going-concern related modifications.
Similarly, prior year non going-concern related modifications arc important for both
current year non going-concern modifications, and current year going-concern related
modifications. However, what is important for the IIA condition is that the current
yearchoices are independent of each other. It does not matter that some explanatory
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variables arc important forboth choices, even if those variables relate to choices made
in theprioryear.
The predictive power of the multinomiallogit model is now compared to both
the standard logit model, and a naive prediction model of this type, in Section 7.
7. PREDICTIVE POWER
The coefficient estimates from the multinomial model (reported in Table 7) are now
used to predict audit report types for the holdout sample. Table 8 summarises the
predicted probabilities of audit report modifications. Panel A reports predicted
probabilities for the estimation sample, andPanelB reports predicted probabilities for
theholdout sample.
The predicted probabilities of non going-concern related modifications are on
average significantly greater for companies actually receiving audit report
modifications than for those receiving clean audit reports. This is especially true for
companies actually receiving non going-concern related modifications. For these
companies in the estimation sample, the mean predicted probability is 0.443 and the
median is 0.590, compared to 0.111 and 0.048 forcompanies receiving going-concern
related modifications, and 0.013 and 0.006 for companies receiving clean audit
reports. For companies in the holdout sample, the mean predicted probability of
receiving a non going-concern related modification is 0.454 and the median is 0.604,
compared to 0.098 and 0.033 for companies receiving going-concern related
modifications, and 0.013 and 0.006 for companies receiving clean audit reports.
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Table 8
Estimated Probabilities ofAudit Report Modifications from Multinomial Legit Model
Actual AuditReport
Clean Non-GC modification GC modification
Panel A: Estimation Sample
Probability ofNon-GC Modification
Estimated Probability: Mean 0.013 0.443 o.n 1
Median 0.006 0.590 0.048
Std.Dey. 0.059 0.295 0.190
r-Statistic 98.848 23,454
P-Value (one-tailed) 0.000 0.000
X%-Statistic 967.455 143.487
P-Value (one-tailed) 0.000 0.000
Number 5.344 1.311 323
Minimum 0.001 0.002 0.000
Maximum 0.808 0.866 0.847
Probability ofGCModification
Estimated Probability: Mean 0.004 0.028 0.208
Median 0.002 0.011 0.075
Std.Dey. 0.023 0.075 0.238
r-Statistic 19.920 58.275
P-Value (one-tailed) 0.000 0.000
X%-Statistic 665.785 278.125
P-Value (one-tailed) 0.000 0.000
Number 5.344 1.311 323
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000
Maximum 0.695 0.878 1.000
Panel B: Holdout Sample
Probability ofNon-GCModification
Estimated Probability: Mean 0.013 0.454 0.098
Median 0.006 0.604 0.033
Std.Dey. 0.056 0.296 0.173
t-Statistic 58.914 12.712
P-Value (one-tailed) 0.000 0.000
X2-Statistic 304.728 24.608
P-Value (one-tailed) 0.000 0.000
Number 1.781 437 108
Minimum 0.001 0.003 0.000
Maximum 0.764 0.840 0.737
Probability ofGeModification
Estimated Probability: Mean 0.004 0.024 0.200
Median 0.002 0.010 0.047
Std.Dev. 0.022 0.061 0.243
t-Statistic 11.196 31.873
P-Value (one-tailed) 0.000 0.000
X2-Statistic 218.663 66.126
P-Value (one-tailed) 0.000 0.000
Number 1,781 437 108
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000
Maximum 0.394 0.630 1.000
Notes:
A 'Ge'modification is one whichrelates to going-concern.
t- (X2_) statistics test differences between means (medians) of modified and cleanreport samples.
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Thepredicted probabilities ofgoing-concern related modifications are also on average
significantly greater for companies actually receiving audit report modifications than
for those receiving clean audit reports. In particular. for companies actually receiving
going-concern related modifications in the estimation sample. the mean predicted
probability is 0.208 and the median is 0.075, compared to 0.028 and 0.011 for
companies receiving non going-concern related modifications, and 0.004 and 0.002
for companies receiving clean audit reports. Forcompanies in the holdout sample, the
mean predicted probability of receiving a going-concern related modification is 0.200
and the median is 0.047, compared to 0.024 and 0.010 for companies receiving non
going-concern related modifications, and 0.004 and 0.002 for companies receiving
clean audit reports.
The predicted probabilities can be used to predict audit report outcomes in the
holdout sample. The simplest method of doing this is to assign the outcome with the
highest predicted probability as the predicted outcome.
A summary of outcomes predicted in this way from the multinomial logit
model, versus actual outcomes, is reported in Panel A of Table 9 for companies in the
estimation sample, and in the holdout sample.
Panel A in Table 9 shows that in both the estimation and the holdout sample,
using the simple prediction rule based on the predicted probabilities of the different
audit report outcomes Can result in considerable misspecification of the outcomes,
particularly in going-concern audit modifications. For example, we can see that only
52 of the 323 companies in the estimation sample that receive going-concern related
modifications arc successfully predicted, and only 20 of the 108 companies in the
holdout sample.
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The predictive power of the model can be improved by using cut-off
probabilities, as in Dopuch et al, (1987) and Monroe and Teh (1993). A company is
now predicted to receive a certain type of modified audit report if the predicted
probability of its receiving that audit report type is greater than both some specified
cut-offprobability, and the probability of its receiving the alternative type ofmodificd
audit report. Otherwise, the company is predicted to receive a cleanaudit report.
Panel B in Table 9 reports the percentages of audit report types correctly
predicted, for a range of different cut-off probabilities. Reducing the cut-off
probability increases the percentage of modified audit reports that are correctly
predicted for both the estimation and holdout samples, but reduces that of clean audit
reports.
This is acceptable only if the cost of failing to correctly predict an audit
modification (a Type I error) sufficiently exceeds that of failing to correctly predict a
clean audit report (a Type II error). Panel B in Table 9 reports Type I and Type II
error rates for the same range of cut-off probabilities. Note that Type I and Typc II
errors do not distinguish between different types ofaudit modification, so that a Type
I error corresponds to predicting that a modified audit report is clean, and a Typc Il
error corresponds to predicting that a clean audit report is modified, regardless of the
type of modification. In other words, predicting that a company receives a going-
concern related modification when it actually receives a non going-concern related
modification, does not constitute an error. Type I errors decrease as the cut-off
probability is reduced; Type II errors increase.
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Table 9
Predictive Power of Multinomial Logit Model
Panel A Predicted Audit Report
Actual Audit Report Clean Non-GC GC Total
Estimation sample
Clean 5,295 46 3 5,344
non-GC modification 438 860 13 1,311
GC modification 237 34 52 323
Total 5,970 940 68 6,978
Holdout Sample
Clean 1,765 16 0 1,781
non-GC modification 139 296 2 437
GC modification 78 10 20 108
Total 1,982 322 22 2,326
Panel D % Correctly Classified Type I Type II
Cut-OffProbability clean Non-GC GC overall error rate errorrate
Estimation sample
0.2 98.7 70.0 42.4 90.5 0.317 0.013
0.1 98.6 69.0 47.4 90.6 0.305 0.014
0.05 98.4 69.0 48.0 90.6 0.302 0.016
0.025 98.2 69.0 49.2 90.5 0.298 0.018
0.01 86.4 75.4 55.1 82.9 0.211 0.136
Holdout sample
0.2 98.7 70.0 40.7 90.6 0.321 0.013
0.1 98.5 70.3 44.4 90.7 0.310 0.015
0.05 98.4 70.3 44.4 90.6 0.308 0.016
0.025 98.1 70.5 45.4 90.5 0.303 0.019
0.01 86.7 75.7 53.7 83.1 0.226 0.133
Panel C % Correctly Classified Type I TypeII
Natve Prediction Rule clean Non-GC GC overall errorrate error rate
Estimation sample 98.5 69.0 49.2 90.7 0.302 0.015
Holdout sample 98.5 70.0 46.3 90.7 0.308 0.015
Notes:
Panel A reports predicted audit report outcomes equal to the audit report outcome
withhighest predicted probability.
Panel B reports error rates, and the percentage of audit report outcomes correctly
predicted in the estimation sample, where the predicted outcome is a non-GC (GC)
modification if the predicted probability of a non-GC (GC) modification exceeds both
the cut-offprobability and the predicted probability of a GC (non-GC) modification,
and is a clean report otherwise. A Type I error is defined as classifying a modified
audit report as clean, and a Type II error is defined as classifying a clean audit report
as modified.
Panel C reports comparative figures to Panel B, based on the alternative naive
prediction rule 'predicted audit report outcome is equal to prioryearaudit report'.
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The predictive power of the multinomial logit model may be usefully compared to
both a naive prediction rule, and to that of a standard dichotomous logit model. The
naive alternative rule is to predict that all companies receive the same audit report as
in the prioryear.
Comparative figures for the naive prediction rule arc reported in Panel C of
Table 9. With a cut-offprobability of 0.01, the multinomial model correctly predicts
substantially more audit modifications in both the estimation and holdout samples.
However, the multinomial model correctly predicts fewer cleanauditreports.
Themodel's predictive powermay additionally be compared to thepredictions
obtained from the estimated coefficients of the standard dichotomous logit model
(reported in Column 1 of Table 7). Recall that the 'standard' logit model contains the
same explanatory variables as the multinomial logit model, and is estimated over the
same sample, but the dependent variable is coded simply 0 for a clean audit report,
and 1 for anymodification,
Before doing this, it is necessary to determine the basis on which the models
are to be compared. Following Dopuch et al. (1987). and Monroe and Teh (1993), I
compute the cost of prediction errors from the model, relative to the cost of errors
from the naive alternative strategy and to those from the standard logit model. The
relative costs for the holdout sample are reported in Table 10, for a range of relative
costs of Type I andType II errors. Prediction error costs are calculated as ax(Type I
error rate)x(Relative Type I errorcost) +(l • a)x(Type II error rate)x 1 where a is the
proportion of modified audit reports in the population, 0.067. In linewith Dopuch et
al. and Monroe and Teh, Type I errors are believed to be more costly than Type II
errors, as for example auditors face lawsuits only for failing to issue audit report
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modifications, not for issuing unnecessary modifications. Relative error costs are the
ratio of the error costs for the multinomial legitmodel to those for the alternatives.
For each level of relative TypeI andTypeII errorcosts, the cut-offprobability
is chosen so as to minimise error costs in the estimation sample. Columns 5 and 6 of
Table 10 report the relative misclassification (prediction error) costs of the
multinomial logit model compared to the naive model and the standard logit model,
respectively. Type I and Type II error rates and relative misclassification costs are
reported for each cut-offprobability, for theholdout sample only.
For sufficiently high relative error costs, the multinomial model of audit
reporting results in lowermisclassification costs than either the naive strategy, or the
standard logit model. However, the improvements are marginal. Even at the high
relative cost of Type I to Type II errors of 20:1 and the corresponding cut-off
probability of 0.0118, the misclassification costs generated by the multinomial model
arc 95.7% of those generated by the nalve model and 94.9% ofthose generated by the
standard logit model. Furthermore, at the relative cost of 5:1, and corresponding cut.
off probability of 0.0536, the multinomial model performs worse than both the
dichotomous logit model and the naive prediction rule.
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Table 10
Misclassification Costsand Errors in the Holdout Sample
Relative Costs ofType Cut-Off Type I Type II Costof Model Costof Model
I andType II Errors Probability Error Error Errors Relative Errors Relative
which Rate in Rate in to Cost of to Cost of
Minimises Holdout Holdout Errors from Errors from
Model Error Sample Sample Nalve Dichotomous
Costs in Prediction LegitModel"
Estimation Rule·
Sample
1:1 0.3145 0.351 0.011 0.965 0.973
5:1 0.0536 0.308 0.016 1.011 1.008
10:1 0.0263 0.303 0.018 0.997 0.968
15:1 0.0179 0.288 0.030 0.982 0.984










... = the alternative naive prediction rule is to predict audit reports equal to the prior
yearauditreport. Errorrates are reported in Table 9.
...... = error rates, using the coefficients from a dichotomous logit model of audit
reporting estimated over the estimation sample to predict modified audit reports in the






















A Type I error is defined as classifying a modified audit report as clean, and a Type II
error is defined as classifying a clean audit report as modified. Different modification
types are not distinguished for the purposes of Type I andII errors.
Error costs are calculated assuming the proportion of modified audit reports a in the
population is 0.067. Errorcosts are ax(Type I error rate)x(Relative Type I errorcost)
+ (1 - a)x(Type II errorrate)x 1.
Relative error costs are the ratio of the error costs for the multinomial logit model to




This chapter provides evidence that a multinomial logit model using publicly
observable characteristics can be used to predictwhether an auditorwill issue a going-
concern related or non going-concern related modified audit report, in the current
year, for UK companies. In most cases error costs generated by the model are lower
than those generated by either a standard dichotomous logit model or a naive
prediction strategy, when the relative cost of Type I errors to Type II errors is taken
into consideration. However, the improvement is very marginal. This suggests that a
multinomial model of audit reporting may not be cost beneficial to these alternatives
whenpredicting modified audit reports per se.
The estimation results reveal the determinants of audit reports in the UK.
Prior studies of audit reporting in the UK. focus on either very small, private
companies and the 'small company' audit qualification (Keaseyet al., 1988)or going-
concern audit modifications on large, listed companies (e.g. Lennox, 1999a; Citron
and Taffler, 1992 and 2000). However, the 'small company' audit qualification
examined by Keasey et al. is no longer relevant in the UK. as eligible companies are
now able to claim exemptions from audit. Furthermore, audit modifications may be
issued for a range of reasons, in addition to going-concern issues, and on a range of
companies from privately owned to listed. In contrast to these prior studies, this
chapter analyses both going-concern and non going-concern related audit
modifications, over a wide range of private and public (listed and non-listed) UK
companies.
Most prior studies outside the UK. analyse only going-concern or general
uncertainty modifications (e.g, Dopuch et al., 1987; Bell and Tabor, 1991; Monroe
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and Teh, 1993). Therefore there is a general lack of investigation of audit
modifications related to disagreements or limitations on scope. This chapter
contributes to the literature by showing, in a multivariate analysis, that large
companies and companies receiving prior year audit modifications (of any kind), nrc
more likely to receive such modifications. It also shows that subsidiary companies,
andcompanies hiring large audit firms, are less likely to receive such modifications.
The determinants of going-concern and non going-concern related audit
modifications differ. This chapter shows that large companies, those with good
liquidity, and those paying dividends, are less likely to receive going-concern
modifications, whereas those with high gearing, contingent liabilities, making recent
losses, and receiving prior year audit modifications (of any kind), are more likely to
receive such modifications. Thus, company size has opposite effects on going-
concern and non going-concern modifications, whereas subsidiary status is only
important for non going-concern reports, and liquidity, losses, contingent liabilities
anddividends areonly important for going-concern reporting. As the determinants of
modified audit reports differ, care should be taken when predicting or analysing audit
reports, to distinguish between different forms ofaudit modifications.
By analysing both public and private companies, it was possible to test
whether public or listed company status affected audit report outcomes. In univariate
tests, public companies were significantly less likely to receive non going-concern
related audit modifications thanprivate companies. However, in multivariate tests, no
evidence was found that stock exchange listing or public status influenced audit
reporting in any way. In contrast, subsidiary companies were found to be
significantly less likely to receive non going-concern related audit modifications than
independent companies.
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The significant negative coefficient on the audit firm size dummy for non
going-concern modifications should not be assumed to imply that large audit firms are
lower quality in respect of detecting suchproblems. The negative coefficient may be
due to selection bias, as high quality companies (less likely to require modifications
for disagreements and/or limitations on scope) are more likely to hire large audit
firms. Further research is required to control for the determinants of auditor choice in
non-listed companies. This research would entail estimating a selection model,
similar to those featured in Chapters 2 and4 of this thesis.
In addition to these findings, by including audit and non-audit fees as
explanatory variables and controlling for observable characteristics, no evidence is
provided that high audit or non-audit fees compromise auditor independence by
reducing the likelihood of audit modifications.
8.2 Limitations ofAnalysis
The results of the analysis reported in this chapter must be viewed in the light of
several important limitations of the dataset.
Firstly, I have assumed that multiple modifications which include matters
relating to going-concern have been classified as going-concern related. If this is not
so, then some of the observations classified as non going-concern related may share
poor financial health characteristics with those classified as going-concern related.
Including these observations mayresult in biased parameter estimates.
Secondly, the class of non going-concern related audit modifications includes
disparate modification types. This class includes qualifications for both
disagreements and limitations on scope, and I have also included audit report
modifications regarding uncertainties which don't relate to going-concern. Separating
these modification choices in such a way as to preserve IIA would provide additional
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ARE LARGE AUDITORS MORE CONSERVATIVE? EARNINGS
MANAGEMENT AND AUDITOR CHOICE IN THE UK
1. INTRODUCTION
In Chapter 1 I outline prior research that suggests large audit firms provide higher
quality audits (in particular, see Sections 2.6 and 3 of Chapter 1). To summarise,
theoretical studies (e.g. Dye, 1993; DeAngelo, 1981b) predict that large audit firms
will provide higher quality because they have more wealth or reputation at risk from
litigation. Supporting empirical evidence includes the audit fee studies showing the
existence of large audit finn fee premiums which are discussed in Chapter 2 (e.g,
Pong and Whittington, 1994; Craswell et al., 1995). Other empirical studies are
discussed in Chapter 1. These examine the impact of auditor reputation on initial
public offerings (Menon and Williams, 1991; Balvers et aI., 1988), and auditor
accuracy in bankruptcy or litigation prediction (e.g. Lennox, 199901; Raghunandan,
1993). I also describe studies which find that hiring large auditors significantly
increases the likelihood of audit modifications (e.g, DeFond et al., 2000; Keascy et
al., 1988), although the evidence presented in Chapter 3 docs not support this
(possibly due to selectivity bias). Finally, the earnings management literature
suggests that large audit firms may constrain their clients' discretionary accounting
choices. Extending this literature, in this chapter I test whether the clients of large
auditors are more conservative in their financial reporting than those of small
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auditors. As auditors are not randomly assigned to clients, I control for the auditor
choice, as in Chapter 2.
Academic attempts to measure audit report accuracy can compare reports
concerning going-concern uncertainties and the subsequent incidence of bankruptcies
(e.g. Lennox, 1999a), or litigation uncertainties and the subsequent incidence of
litigation (Raghunandan, 1993). But it is usually impossible to observe whether a
clean audit report should have been modified, or vice versa. Unless we conduct our
own audit, we cannot observe the accuracy of the accounting numbers reported, nor
the appropriateness of estimates or accounting treatments, in order to determine
whether disagreement qualifications are required. It is similarly impossible to observe
the evidence available to the auditors, to determine whether limitation on scope
qualifications are required.33 Therefore, comparisons of the accuracy of reports from
large auditors with those of small auditors are not possible in these respects.
However, there is more scope for comparisons of conservatism in financial or audit
reporting.
Both conservatism and accuracy have been used to represent audit quality in
the audit reporting literature. For example, Palmrose (1988) defines audit quality in a
manner consistent with conservatism in the Francis and Krishnan (1999) audit
reporting sense (see below), whereas Balachandran and Nagarajan (1987) and Nelson
et at. (1988) consider auditquality in a manner consistent with accuracy.
Francis and Krishnan (1999) compare audit report modifications issued by
large and small auditors. They find that large auditors are more conservative in the
U Recall that theauditreport expresses an opinion on the truthandfairness of the financial statements,
andwhether they have beenproperly prepared. Qualified opinions in the UKmayrelate to either
disagreements (overaccuracy, accounting choice or disclosure) or to limitations on scope (lackof
access to audit evidence). Audit reports mayalsocontain explanatory paragraphs detailing
fundamental uncertainties in theaccounts, particularly withrespect to going concern. Modified audit
reports are those thatcontain explanatory paragraphs or qualified audit opinions. Allother audit
reports areclean.
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sense that they are more likely to issue modifications, when reporting on companies
with high values of income-increasing accounting accruals. Similarly, DeFond et at.
(2000) and Keasey et al. (1988) find that large auditors arc more likely to issue audit
report modifications. In this sense, a conservative auditor may not be an accurate
auditor, as shemayissue unwarranted audit modifications.
This chapter uses a different concept of auditor conservatism. Under this
definition, a more conservative auditor is one who requires more conservative
financial statement content. To be precise, I define a conservative auditor as one
whose clients' financial statements do not contain high levels of abnormal income..
increasing (positive) accounting accruals. I motivate this below.
Because this chapter examines auditor conservatism in relation to the content
of their clients' published financial statements, I take account of the influence of the
audit on the behaviour of management. This is suggested by Hatherly, Nadeau and
Thomas (1996). Auditors may influence the content of financial statements either by
influencing management's pre-audit reporting, or through audit adjustments.'" It is a
more subtle definition of conservatism than that of Francis and Krishnan (1999).
However, it is related to the Francis and Krishnan study by the work of Bartov et al.
(2001), which shows a positive association between discretionary accruals (OA) and
audit report qualifications.
Francis and Krishnan (1999) investigate audit reporting on high-accrual
companies because such companies are more likely to be engaging in earnings
34 Audit adjustments fordiscovered misstatements are non-trivial (Kinney and Martin. 1994), and
represent a less costly means forauditors to reduce theirexposure than issuing audit modifications
(because companies aremore likely to switch auditors following a modification - see, for example,
Chow andRice, 1982; Craswell, 1988; andCitron andTamer, 1992). Companies may be prepared to
accept auditadjustments to avoid auditmodifications, as there is some evidence to suggest the market
reacts unfavourably to modified auditopinions (e.g, Chenet a1.,.2oo0; Choi andJeter, 1992; and
Dopuch et aI., 1986), although otherstudies reportno significant market reactions (Chow and Rice,
1982; Doddet al., 1984).
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management. Managers have incentives to manipulate earnings to maximise finn
and/or personal wealth (forexample, managers mayreceive performance bonuses and
shares or share options as compensation). Deliberate manipulations of earnings, or
'earnings management', is receiving considerable public attention in the UK at
present. In June 2001, the Auditing Practices Board issued a consultation paper
Aggressive Earnings Management that alerts users and preparers of financial
statements to the 'potential threat' that opportunistic earnings management presents.
Less than a month later, the Accounting Standards Board issued a related discussion
paper on revenue recognition, one of the areas which may commonly be manipulated
to achieve earnings management.
Earnings management is of concern to auditors as they may face litigation or
reputation losses if they fail to identify or correct resulting misstatements in the
accounts. Because large auditors have more wealth and reputation at risk, they are
expected to be more concerned over financial statement content. However, the
direction of misstatement is important as auditors have asymmetric loss functions
(Antle and Nalebuff, 1991). St. Pierre and Anderson (1984) provide evidence that
auditors are routinely sued for failing to modify their reports when earnings
management by clients overstates earnings. Understatements of earnings do not have
the same effect. Kinney and Martin (1994) conclude that auditing reduces positive
bias in financial statements. Auditors are expected to be more concerned with
overstatements than understatements, so auditor conservatism is a more appropriate
quality concept to test than auditor accuracy.
In focusing on signed accruals andnot absolute accruals, my definition reflects
that auditors prefer understatements to overstatements. This is related to Basu's
(1997) interpretation of conservatism, which captures accountants' tendency to
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require a higher degree of verification for recognising good news than bad news
(prudence), so that earnings reflect bad news morequickly thangood news.
I define opportunistic earnings management as that whieh is undertaken for
managers' personal benefit. Although opportunistic earnings management seems
more likely to result in overstatements, Perry and Williams (1994) find evidence that
management understates earnings in the year preceding the public announcement of
their intention to initiate a management buyout, presumably in the hope of reducing
the share price. I expect high quality auditors to constrain opportunistic earnings
management, but I do not expect them to constrain understatements of income or
assets to the same degree as overstatements.
It is also possible that other incentives for earnings management, such as
attempts to influence external parties, may result in understatements. For example,
Guenther et a1. (1997) find that there is an increase in income deferrals, reducing
earnings, when firms face additional incentives to report low income to tax
authorities. Nelson et al. (2000) find that 60% of earnings management attempts by
managers are income-increasing; therefore 40% must be income-decreasing. I do not
expect auditors to constrain understatements as much as overstatements in any of
these situations.
Because manipulations of earnings may occur for reasons other than
opportunism on the part of self-interested management, auditors may react differently
according to (their assessment of) managerial motivation. However, these motives
are hard to distinguish. For example, an opportunistic motive for earnings
management would exist where managerial compensation is linked to company
performance. Managers may receive bonuses according to profitability, or hold
shares (or share options) in the firm theymanage. Theymay therefore wish to choose
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accounting methods which increase profits and/or the company share price to improve
their compensation. But Fields et al. (2001) review the literature on the determinants
and consequences of accounting choice, and note that the same accounting choices
may be motivated by managers' objective assessment that the current share price" is
undervalued relative to theirprivate information, Thus management may use earnings
management techniques as a signal to lesswell-informed investors.
In fact, Fields et al. (2001) specify three categories of goalsor motivations for
accounting choice. These are contracting, asset pricing, and influencing external
parties. Contracting results in earnings management to, for example, increase
compensation or avoid debt covenant violation. The second category concerns
attempts to influence asset prices, either as a mechanism by which better informed
insiders can signal their information, or for self-interested reasons contributing to
compensation or reputation. The third category concerns attempts to influence the
decisions of third parties suchas the Inland Revenue, for example by reducing taxable
income.
Earnings management for purely self-interested reasons is assumed to be
undesirable, whereas earnings management arising from other motives, such as
information signalling, may be beneficial for users of accounts. However, purely
opportunistic earnings management may be rare. Earnings management to increase
managerial compensation or reputation may frequently have benefits for otherparties,
if contracts have successfully aligned management's interests with those of owners or
lenders. Auditors may be less concerned, and therefore less conservative, over
earnings management which is in shareholders' benefit, even when there is also an
opportunistic motive. This will limit researchers' ability to detect auditor
conservatism, unless opportunistic earnings management canbe isolated for study.
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Prior research on the relation between earnings management and auditor size
assumes that earnings management is opportunistic (e.g. Francis et al., 1999; Decker
et al., 1998). Fields et al. (2001) criticise accounting choice research in general for its
failure to distinguish between different motives for earnings management. For
example, they conclude that the evidence with respect to the stock market effects of
earnings management actions is mixed, and that one reason for this may be that
investors' perceptions of these actions vary across motives. Fields et a1. argue that it
is not clearwhether the conclusions of existing studies are attributable to the specific
motivations they profess to analyse, because results arc generally consistent with
many motivations. Christie and Zimmerman (1994) similarly argue that 'many of the
empirical regularities interpreted as evidence of opportunism can also be interpreted
as occurring for efficiency reasons'. The same accounting choices that maximise
managerial compensation may also increase asset valuations and be desirable from a
shareholder's perspective.
If this problem is viewed as one of correlated omitted variables. then the
solution would be to add control variables to proxy for the omitted determinants. For
example, if firms with earnings-related compensation contracts also have high
political costs, then a relationship may be observed between accounting choice and
compensation contracts when in fact they are driven by the political costs. However.
this would require the identification of a suitable proxy variable (for political costs).
andthat theproxy could be measured with a reasonable degree ofaccuracy.
Unfortunately, the proxies used in this chapter arc likely to be too coarse to
fully capture the different motivations for earnings management. For example. one
reason whycompany size is included as a regressor. is as a possible proxy forpolitical
costs. Similarly, gearing (leverage) is included to proxy for debt-covenant effects.
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Because of these difficulties, I can not claim to be able to distinguish fully between
different (possibly conflicting) motives for earnings management in this Chapter.
The main focus of the Chapter is to examine the relationship between auditor
size and discretionary accounting accruals (DA), after controlling for the auditor
selection. On doing so, I find no evidence that large audit firms constrain income-
increasing (positive) DA, whereas there is evidence that they encourage negativeDA.
The overall impact is to reduce reported earnings. Whilst this is consistent with
increased conservatism in large auditors, it is surprising that they do not appear to
constrain income-increasing accruals. One possible explanation is that by failing to
properly focus only on opportunistic earnings management, any conservative auditor
effect on opportunistic income-increasing accruals is masked or diluted by
(favourable) auditor reaction to other explanations for income-increasing earnings
management (assuming auditors can distinguish them). Other possible explanations
for this result are discussed later in the text. As the precise reason remains
unanswered, these issues are left for future research. However, auditors are unlikely
to apply exactly the same benchmark model for over or understatement as applied in
this chapter, therefore the distinction between these two sets of auditorbehaviourmay
be spurious.
The remainder of this section motivates the use of discretionary accruals as a
measure of earnings management, and discusses prior evidence of the relation
between auditor size and earnings management. Section 2 describes the cross-
sectional modified Jones model used to estimate the OA, and Section 3 the self-
selection methodology (which is identical to that used in Chapter 2). Section 4
describes the hypothesis tested and motivates the explanatory variables included in
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the models. Section 5 describes the data and Section 6 presents the results. The final
sectionconcludes.
1.1 Earnings Management and DA
Earnings management may be achieved in many ways. Some accounting standards
allow choices. For example, in the UK stocks may be costed using a choice of either
unit cost, average cost or FIFO (first-in, first-out).35 Which method is chosen will
affect both profits and asset values. Other standards allow transactions to be
deliberately structured so as to qualify for a certain accounting treatment. For
example, leases may be treatedas eitheroperating or finance leases,depending on the
terms of the contract, which affects both charges to the profit and loss account, and
balance sheet asset values.i'' At the extreme, 'real' operating decisionsmay be made,
for example to increase production (and hence closing stocks) so that cost of sales is
reduced and profits increase. There are also choices concerning the level of
disclosure, .or timing of adoption of new standards, that affect reported results or the
impression that they' leave. I do not consider all the methods by which earnings
management takesplace, simplythe net effect as measured by DA.
Earnings management is closely linked to accruals because published
accounting earnings are required to be prepared using the accruals concept," In other
words, income and expenditure are recognised in the financial statements in the
period to which they relate, regardless of the actual timing of the associated
cashflows. A simple illustration would be the cash purchaseof an asset that is used to
generate income over several years. The cash outflow occurs immediately, but the
35 In theUSt the relevant standard also allows theuse of LIFO (last-in, first-out), which is forbidden by
SSAP 9 in theUK.
36 Thecurrent accounting treatment is governed by SSAP 21, however theASD discussion paper
'Leases: Implementation ofa NewApproach' proposes a change in theaccounting treatment to prevent
suchtransaction structuring.
31 Thealternative, cashflow accounting, leaves little scope for manipulation.
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cost is recognised in the profit and loss account in instalments (depreciation) spread
over the life of the asset, in a pattern which reflects its consumption. Accruals playa
major role in normal, day-to-day accounting. In contrast, choices over accounting
policy, transaction structuring or the timing of adoption of new accounting standards
are infrequent and may be limited to particular transactions, industries or windows of
time.
Application of the accruals concept usually requires judgement on the part of
managers. Examples include the length of fixed assets' useful economic lives, the
timing of revenue recognition, and the creation or classification of provisions
(including stock obsolescence and doubtful debts) and contingent liabilities. Because
judgement is involved, accruals are open to manipulation. They are therefore likely to
present important opportunities for earnings management. Accruals are also
relatively cheap to manipulate (compared to making changes in accounting policy),
and opaque in nature (Young, 1999). Studying accruals rather than individual
accounting choices enables the net effectof earnings management to be examined, in
so far as this is captured by the modelused. The models predict the non-discretionary
component of accruals due to genuine changes ·in operating activity. An academic
literature has developed in which the extent to which managers deliberately
manipulate reported earnings is measured in terms of the discretionary component of
total accruals (sec e.g, Jones, 1991; Healy, 1985; DeAngelo, 1986). These studies
find that high values ofDA indicate earnings manipulations.
An alternative literature seeks to identify earnings management by considering
earnings benchmarks. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Degeorge et a1. (1999)
observe discontinuities in the distribution of earnings just belowthe thresholds ofzero
camings, zero change in earnings (from prior year), and meeting forecast earnings.
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Too few companies report small losses and decreases in earnings, whereas too many
companies report small profits and increases in earnings. This literature does not
depend upon the estimation of levels of DA to infer the presence of earnings
management, although as discussed above theyare likely to be an important means by
which it is achieved. Thisalternative approach is adopted in Chapter S.
1.2 Previous Research
Most prior studies (as this one) only examine reported DA, or in other words,
instances of actual earnings management in the financial statements. It is not
generally possible to observe earnings management attempts in the form of pre-audit
financial statements. However, Nelson et a1. (2000) survey auditors working for an
(anonymous) Big Five audit firm. They examine managers' attempts at earnings
management, and auditors' decisions to waive or reject such attempts. They find that
60% of earnings management attempts (EMAs) are income increasing, and that in
43% of EMAs, the auditors require adjustment. Auditors are found to be most likely
to waive adjustment of an EMA when it decreases current-year income, is governed
by an imprecise accounting standard or is structured to meet a precise standard, is
considered immaterial, or is attempted by a large client.
Several studies examine the relationship between auditor size and earnings
management. Francis et a1. (1999) perform univariate tests of differences in reported
DA between US clients of large (Big 6) and small auditors. They find that clients of
large audit firms have lower levels of absolute DA than those of small audit firms.
They also have, when tested separately, lower levels of both positive and negative
DA. Therefore, Francis et a1. present evidence that large auditors are both more
conservative (less likely to be associated with high values of income-increasing DA)
andmore accurate (less likely to be associated withhigh values ofabsolute DA).
168
Decker et at. (1998) find similar results with respect to signed and absolute
OA using US data. They perform a univariate analysis with respect to absolute OA,
and a multivariate analysis with respect to signed DA. After controlling for client
characteristics in the multivariate analysis, theyfind that clients of non-Big 6 auditors
report DAthat are, on average, I.S ·2.1% of total assets higher than those reported by
clients of Dig 6 auditors. Gul et at. (2002) also report a significant negative
association between large audit firms andreported DA.
In the UK, Gore et al, (2001) examine the relationship between the provision
of non-audit services, auditor size, and earnings management. They find that large
(Big S) auditors arc more effective in constraining earnings management to avoid
losses and earnings decreases, when fees for non-audit services are high. Peasnell et
al, (2000) include an auditor size dummy variable as a control in a study of DA and
board monitoring by outside board members and audit committees. Theyalso report a
negative association between auditor size and earnings management to avoid losses,
but it is not significant in theirstudy. In addition, theyfind no significant association
between auditor size and earnings management to avoid earnings decreases.
Therefore the evidence of a quality differential for earnings management in the UK is
less convincing.
Prior studies may suffer from self-selection bias. Both Francis et al. and
Becker ct nl, qualify their findings by acknowledging that firms self select into large-
and small- audited companies. Indeed, this process is two-way, as auditors may also
screen theirclients. Decker et n1. note that 'it is possible that non-Big 6 auditors are
preventing n higher proportion of unwarranted accruals [than the Big 6], but their
clients have relatively higher levels of pre-audit earnings management'. Francis et a1.




may differ from each other in ways that systematically affect the estimation of
expected accruals'. In particular, Francis et al. argue that companies with greater
propensity to generate accruals are more likely to hire large auditors (to enhance the
credibility of the results which theydo report).
Consider the possibility that companies which choose large audit Ilrms share
characteristics which are also associated with lower (absolute or signed) DA (Becker
et al., 1998). This implies that even if large auditors were no more conservative or
accurate than small auditors, their clients may still report lower DA than small
auditors' clients. Alternately, large auditors' clients mayshare characteristics that nrc
also associated with high DA (Francis et al., 1999). This would imply that, if their
clients report lower DAthansmall firms' clients, large auditors are more conservative
than previously found. If high quality clients choose high quality auditors, then the
relationship between auditor choice and DA will depend upon the underlying motives
for earnings management and the definition of 'high quality' clients. This is
discussed further in Section 1.3.
This chapter differs from prior studies by explicitly controlling for the
endogenous nature of the auditor choice within a two-stage self-selection model. This
corrects for the incidental truncation of the sample due to companies' auditor choices.
First, a probit model ofauditor choice is estimated. Then, the (signed) DA (estimated
using a cross-sectional version of the modified Jones model) arc regressed against
control variables and the 'inverse Mills ratios' which are generated from the auditor
choice model. This methodology is described in detail later in thechapter; however it
is identical to that employed in Chapter 2.
After controlling for auditor choice in this way, I find that although large
auditors' clients report higher signed DA with large auditors than other companies
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would, companies hiring large auditors report significantly lower signed OA overall.
The former is the selectivity effect, the latter is due to auditor characteristics. These
results arcconsistent with large audit firms being more conservative, as expected.
By finding significant selectivity effects, I show that Big 6 and non-Big 6
audited companies differ from each other in ways that systematically affect accruals,
as suggested by Francis et al, (1999). After partitioning the sample, I find that clients
of small auditors report significantly less positive OA with small auditors than other
companies would. I also find that clients of large auditors report significantly less
negative OAwith large auditors than other companies would.
Finally, I find no evidence that large auditors in theUK aremore accurate than
other auditors (in terms of bias to accounting numbers in anydirection), as univariate
tests find no significant difference between the absolute level of OA reported by
clients of large and small auditors.
1.3 The Endogenous Auditor Choice
In common with prior studies, I suggest that companies hiring certain auditors may
share characteristics which also influence OA. This section discusses the
determinants of auditor choice, and draws some inferences for the likely direction of
influence on OA. I propose that the direction will depend upon the motives for
engaging in OA. However, thisdirection is notalways easyto determine.
Recall that, in a non-mandatory audit setting, Melumad and Thoman (1990)
show theoretically that a company's decision whether or not to hire an auditor can
have signalling value. A company with favourable private information has a greater
incentive to hire an auditor to attest to this information, than a company with
unfavourable private information. Theory also suggests that the type of auditor hired




Thoman show that the signalling value of choosing whether to hire an auditor is lost.
However, Titman and Trueman (1986) and Datar et al, (1991) show that managers
with favourable private information prefer to hire more accurate auditors, where
accurate auditors aremore costly to hire.
Managers with favourable private information may also attempt to signal this
using earnings management. Subramanyam (1996) finds that both non-discretionary
accruals (NDA) and DA are positively associated with firm valuation. Signalling
motivations for earnings management are also suggested by Fields et al. (2001).
Therefore, managers with favourable private information may use DA as a means to
communicate this information to outsiders. Managers with favourable information
have signalling incentives both to hire large (high quality) auditors, and to engage in
(presumably) income-increasing earnings management.
If earnings management is motivated by signalling, studies of auditor choice
imply that (high quality) clients oflarge auditors would report morepositive DA with
large auditors than other companies would. In tum, this would imply that prior
studies of audit quality would underestimate the effect of large auditors on earnings
management. However, I do not find evidence of this type ofselectivity effcct when I
partition mysample into income-increasing and income-decreasing DA.
Francis et a1. (1999) show that companies with greater potential to engage in
earnings management via DA are more likely to hire large auditors. They propose
that this is to convey the credibility of the earnings which such companies do report,
where large auditors are higher quality. This is consistent with their finding that
clients of large auditors actually report lower DA than those of other auditors. Their
assumption is that earnings management is always undesirable, and they do not
control directly for selectivity effects.
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If earnings management is purely opportunistic, andhence always undesirable,
thena high quality company would be onewhich simultaneously reports low levels of
DA and hires a high quality auditor. Onewould therefore expect that clients of large
auditors would report lower levels of (both income-increasing and income-
decreasing) DA with large auditors than other companies would. This would imply
that prior studies overestimate the effect of large auditors on earnings management.
However, again I do not find evidence for this type of selectivity effect. Although I
find that clients of large auditors report significantly less negative DA with large
auditors than other companies, I find that (contrary to expectations) clients of small
auditors report significantly less positive DA with small auditors than other
companies would.
If earnings management is undertaken to avoid debt-covenant violation, to
influence external parties without recourse to auditor litigation, or to increase share
value then it may benefit both management and shareholders. However, whether a
company which engages in this type of earnings management is more or less likely to
hire a large auditor is unclear from studies of auditor choice. Similarly, if earnings
management is undertaken for a combination of reasons, then the direction of
influence on auditor choice is impossible to determine. The selectivity effects I find
arc not consistent with a simple, single-motivation story of purely opportunistic or
information-signalling earnings management. This illustrates the complexity of the
issues surrounding accounting choice, an area which requires further investigation.
2. ESTIMATING DA
I use accruals as a measure of the net effect of earnings management activity.
Because not all accrual decisions represent earnings management, total accruals (TA)
arc decomposed into discretionary and non-discretionary accruals (DA and NDA
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respectively). TA are defined as the difference between income before extraordinary
items and operating cashflows, or, equivalently, as the change in non-cash current
assets minus the change in current liabilities (excluding the current portion of long-
term debt), minus depreciation and other long-term charges. While TA arc
observable, the discretionary and non-discretionary components arc not.
Consequently, DA are estimated by imposing a model ofNDA on TA.
Several different models of NDA have been used in the literature to estimate
DA. The main models are by DeAngelo (1986), Healy (1985), and Jones (1991).
Dechow et a1. (1995) created the Modified Jones Model, and DeFond and Jiambalvo
(1994) used a cross-sectional version ofthe Jones Model. These models arc discussed
in detail by several papers which compare the different methods (e.g. Dechow et al.,
1995; Guay et aI., 1996; Young, 1999; Bartov et al., 2001).
The Healy Model simply assumes that NDA for each period arc zero. In this
model, the DA for each period equal TA, scaled by prior period total assets. The
DeAngelo Model assumes instead that NDA are constant for a steady-state firm, so
that any change in TA from one period to the next is attributable to accounting
discretion. Therefore in this model, DA equal the change in TA, again scaled by prior
period total assets."
In contrast, both the time series and cross-sectional versions of the Jones and
Modified Jones Models employ a regression-based expectation model to control for
variations in NDA. The time-series versions require several years of data prior to the
event year in order to form coefficient estimates for each finn individually. The
cross-sectional versions form coefficient estimates for industry and event-period
matched portfolios for each sample firm.
38 Friedlan (1994) modified theDeAngelo model by scalingby salesrevenue in placecf'prior period
totalassets, in orderto proxyfor operating activityand relax the steady-state assumption.
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Dcchow et al, (1995), Guay et a1. (1996) andYoung (1999) all report evidence
that existing (time-series) models of DA induce systematic measurement error (the
sign and/or magnitude of the measurement error in the estimated DA is related to the
components of theNDA models). Of the various models examined, they find that the
Jones- and DeAngelo-based procedures appear to perform best. Bartov et a1. (2001)
examine the cross-sectional Jones Models, and find that theyperform better than their
time-series counterparts in detecting earnings management in firms receiving
modified audit reports. The cross-sectional versions may also be preferred to time-
series versions as the data requirements of the latter are likely to lead to survivorship
bias, and the models have to assume that the estimated coefficients are stationary
through time (in contrast, the cross-sectional versions assume that the estimated
coefficients are constant within industry groups). As cross-sectional Jones Models
have also been used by Francis et a1. (1999) and Becker et a1. (1998), it is a cross-
sectional (Modified) Jones Model which is used to measure DAin this chapter.
The original Jones (1991) Model is a regression-based model incorporating
proxyexplanatory variables to control forvariations in NDA associated with changes
in operating activity (namely, the change in revenue) and the depreciation charge
(namely, gross property plant and equipment). Genuine changes in operating activity
will directly affect accruals by affecting levels of debtors, stock and creditors.
Similarly, expansion or reduction in a firm's fixed asset basewill directly affect total
accruals by affecting the depreciation charge, all else remaining constant. However,
using revenues to control for genuine changes in operating activity is problematic
because revenue can also be manipulated. For example, itcan be overstated by
recognising sales in a period before the one in which theyare actually made, or when
the eventual cash receipt is doubtful. Overstatements of revenue will also overstate
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receivables in the accounts (recognising a sale when no cash has been received will
create a debtor in the accounts), and hence total accruals.
To capture possible revenue manipulation, Dechow et at. modify the Jones
procedure by adjusting for the change in receivables (see Eq, 2 below). It is the
modified form ofthe Jonesmodel that is employed in this chapter.
The cross-sectional version of the Jones Model differs from the time-series
version in that the regression model parameters arc estimated across all firms in a
particular industry in, rather than for individual firms over a period of lime preceding.
the yearofinterest. The estimation of this model is described in Section2.1.
An alternative to the Jones-type models ofestimating DA exists, although it is
not employed in this thesis. The surveys discussed above indicate that although the
existing models detect earnings management, they do so with low power (e.g,
Dechow et aI., 1995). Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995) note the problems
associated with the existing models, and instead propose an instrumental variables
approach to measuring OA. However, Fields et a1. (2001) comment that this approach
has not been thoroughly tested or widely adopted by other researchers, in their view
because ofproblems designing appropriate applications for the methodology.
As the DA models suffer from measurement error, for example because they
may capture abnormal economic transactions rather than abnormal accounting
transactions (theyrelyon forming expectations ofNDA over time or industry groups),
Chapter 5 uses a different approach to studying earnings management. This approach
identifies net earnings management around earnings benchmarks without estimating
OA,and complements the results presented in this chapter.
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2.1 The Cross-Sectional Modified Jones Model
This section describes the method of estimating DA. First, total accruals are
regressed against the change in revenues and the value of property, plant and
equipment for eachindustry,39 as follows:
TAil / Ail-/ = a (1 / AU-I) +p/ (L.1REVit / Ail-I) + P2 (PPEiI / Ail -/) + l1 (1)
where TAil are total accruals for company i in period t, Ail-/ are the beginning ofperiod
total assets, liRE~t is the change in revenue from period t-l to t, and PPEil is the net
book value of property, plant and equipment (fixed assets) in period t, Eq. (1) takes
all changes in revenue into account, as whether resulting from earnings management
or not, they will still affect total accruals.
The industry-specific estimates of the coefficients are then used to estimate the
DA for each individual company:
DAlt = TA it / Au-/ - a (1 / Au-/) - PI [(MEVit / Ait-I) - (MECu / Ail-/ ) ] -
P2 (PPEit / Ait-/) (2)
where MECit is the change in receivables from period t-l to t, and all other variables
are as previously defined. By deducting the change in receivables from the change in
revenues, Eq. (2) implicitly assumes that all changes in credit sales result from
earnings management. The remaining change in sales arises from sales where cash
39Theindustries used correspond to mineral extraction, general industrials, consumer goods, services,
wholesale trade, andrealestate. Other financials andutilities areexcluded, as discussed in Section 5.
Companies areplaced into industry groups according to their 2-digit standard industry classification
(SIC) codes (these are thefirst two digits of thefull S-digit SICcodes). Thegroups are as follows:
Industry 2-digit SICcodes
Mineral extraction 10-14
General industrials 20,21,23-35, 4S
Consumer goods 1,2,5, 15-19,36,85






has been received, and is therefore assumed to represent genuine changes in operating
activity, and hence to affect only NDA.
3. SELF-SELECTION METHODOLOGY
3.1 Effects ofthe EndogeneityofAuditor Choice
Auditor choice is thought to be an endogenous variable in a model of DA, because
auditors are not assigned randomly to firms. A company choosing (and being
accepted by) a large auditor may be systematically more or less likely to report high
values of DA than a company choosing a small auditor. In particular, unobserved
firm characteristics such as managers' private information may influence both auditor
and accounting choices, as discussed in Section 1.3.
To determine whether large auditors are more or less conservative in their
attitudes to DA than other auditors, it is necessary to compare the values of DA
reported by identical firms hiring different auditors. But, whilst it is possible to
observe the accruals reported by companies hiring their chosen auditors, it is not
possible to observe the accruals they would have reported if they had hired auditors of
alternative size. The endogeneity of the auditor choice results in incidental truncation
of the sample of DA. However, this can be controlled for by modelling the auditor
choice, as described in Section 3.2 below.
This chapter controls for the effects of auditor selection on DA using a two-
stage model. In the first stage, I model UK companies' selection of auditors. In the
second stage, I model the DA reported by companies choosing large (Big 6) and small
auditors, separately, controlling for the selection effects. Finally, I compare the
intercept terms of the two fitted DA models, and test whether these are significantly
different. This indicates the association between DA and audit finn size. The
methodology is identical to that employed in Chapter 2.
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3.2 The Two-Stage Selection Model
In the first stage I estimate a probit model of auditor choice. I observe a dichotomous
variable Big, such that Big, = 1 if company i chooses a large auditor, and Big, = 0
otherwise. The model assumes that there is an underlying response variable Bigt
such that
(3)
and Big, = 1 if Bigt > 0, and Big, = 0 otherwise. ~ are company characteristics
influencing the auditor choice. The model is identified if at least one explanatory
variable is included in the auditor choice model but not in the audit reporting model.
In the second stage I estimate a regression model of DA. I first estimate the
accruals for each company i using the modified cross-sectional Jones model described
in Section 2, and secondly assume that
DA, = P'X, +oBig, +e,
where X, arecompany characteristics.
(4)
The error terms u, and &; are assumed to have a bivariate normal distribution
with zero means, standard deviations O'u and O'tJ and correlation p. Note that, if there
was no endogeneity, p would be equal to zero, and the expected values of DA,
conditional on Big, would be E[DA, IBigFl] = B'X, +0 andE[DA,I Big,-O] = P'X,.
In the presence of endogeneity, p is non-zero, and the conditional expectations ofDA,
arebiased as follows:
E[DAd Big, = 1] =p'X +8 + pa ¢(r~)
, I tI>(r~)
= p'X +8 +p 11.1, A I
E[DA, IBig, =0] - p'X - pa [ ¢(r~) ]





=px +P ,1.0I ,t I
h re A.~ = ¢(r~) and A.~ = ¢(r'W;) .
we, <I>(r~) 1- cI>(r~)
(8)
To control for this bias, the predicted values of the 'inverse mills ratios' A.~
and A~ , obtained from theestimation ofthe auditor choice model, mustbe included as
covariates in the appropriate regression models, which are estimated separately over
companies choosing large andsmall auditors as follows:
(9)
wherej = 1 if thechosen auditor is a large (Big6) auditor andj = 0 otherwise.
The two regression models (9) including the inverse Mills ratios, estimated
separately over companies choosing large and small auditors, may now be used to
obtain unbiased predictions of the DA reported by a company which hires a large or
small auditor, conditional on that company having chosen a large or small auditor
respectively. In other words, the models correctly predict the DA reported by
companies with certain characteristics (those leading them to choose large or small
auditors) with their chosen auditors. The predicted values therefore reflect a
combination of bothcompany and auditor characteristics.
The sign and significance of the coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio
determines whether there are selectivity effects. It shows us whether the value ofDA
reported by a randomly chosen company hiringa certain auditor size is likely to differ
from those of a company with (unobserved) characteristics that lead them to hire that
auditor type. For example, if companies choosing large auditors are more likely to
report high DA with largeauditors than other companies are, one would expect to see
a significantly positive coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio in the large auditor DA
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model. The coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio reflects (unobserved) company
characteristics.
Finally, and most importantly, the intercept terms from the two audit reporting
models are used to compare the (unconditional) value of DA reported by a randomly
chosen company when hiring a large or a small auditor. If there is no difference in
auditor conservatism, these intercepts will not significantly differ. If large auditors
are more conservative than small auditors, the intercept term in the large auditor
regression will be significantly lower than that in the small auditor regression. The
intercept values therefore reflect auditor characteristics.
4. HYPOTHESIS AND MODEL
4.1 The Hypothesis
I wish to test the hypothesis that large auditors are more conservative than other
auditors, against the null hypothesis that there is no difference in auditor
conservatism.
The null and alternative hypotheses can be expressed as follows:
HO: E[DA/] =E[DA/o]
HA: E[DA/] < E[DAl]
where E[DAI] IS the expected level of DA reported by company i with auditor j,
wherej =1 is a large ('Big 6') audit finn andj =0 otherwise.
4.2 The Auditor Choice Model
Theoretical studies of auditor choice show that, earnings management aside, a
company with favourable private information has a greater incentive to hire a high
quality auditor to attest to this information, than a company with unfavourable private
information. Unfortunately, managers' private information is unobservable to the
researcher (although it may be observed by the auditor) and so cannot be included in
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empirical models of auditor choice. Empirical studies of auditorchoice report instead
that Big 6 (5, or 8) audits are demanded as a function of increasing agency costs.
Proxies for agency costs have included managerial ownership, managerial
compensation schemes, gearing, and the shareholdings of large blockholders (Francis
and Wilson, 1988; Johnson and Lys, 1990; DeFond, 1992; Firth and Smith, 1992).
However, the maindeterminant of auditor choice in thesestudies is company size.
As in Chapter 2, .auditor choice is also hypothesised to depend upon losses,
complexity, the proportion of non-executive directors on the Board, and directors'
personal affiliations with audit firms. In particular, companies are expected to hire
large (small) audit firms more often when directors influential in the auditor choice
disclose that theypreviously worked for large(small) auditors.
The model of auditor choice employed in this chapter has dependent variable
BIG, such that BIG, = 1 if company i chooses a large (Big 6) auditor, and BIG, =0
otherwise. The following explanatory variables are included in the final auditor
choice model: total assets (ASSE) and sales revenue (REV) as measures of company
size, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company made losses in eitherthe current or
prior year (LOSS), the proportion of non-executive directors on the Board (NEX) as a
proxyfor demand for audit quality, the number of overseas subsidiaries owned by the
company (OS) as a proxy for auditee complexity, and director affiliation dummy
variables. The affiliation variables are LAF (equal to 1 if the influential director
discloses an affiliation with a large auditor, and 0 otherwise) and SAF (equal to 1 if
the influential director discloses an affiliation witha small auditor, and0 otherwise).40
40 Clearly, any variables basedon accounting numbers may be contaminated with earnings
management, especially regarding losses if earnings are managed to avoid losses. This is an
unfortunate problemas it is hardto findalternative accounting numbers to use which are not similarly
contaminated.
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In addition, Francis et al. (1999) argue that the demand for Big 6 audits is
based, in part, on mitigating the opportunities for earnings management, as evidenced
by the length of a company's operating cycleand capital intensity.
Therefore, I include two variables representing the propensity to generate
accruals in an alternative specification of the auditor choice model. These are the
operating cycle (CYCLE), defined as the sumof debtor months and stockmonths, and
capital intensity (CAPINT) defined as fixed assets divided by sales, after Francis et
al., However, these variables are not found to be significant and are dropped from the
final auditor choice model (see Section 6).
4.3 The DA Models
Several regressions of OA are performed. In the first case, OA are regressed against
the dummy variable representing chosen auditor size (BIG) and control variables
representing the company characteristics which are expected to influence OA. This
does not control for the endogeneity of the auditor choice, but allows comparison with
the results ofBecker et al. (1998).
Secondly, DA are regressed against the control variables alone, but the
regressions are performed separately over the clients of large and small audit firms.
This also does not control for auditor choice, but is necessary in order to compare the
difference in the intercept terms with the difference obtained when controlling for
auditor choice. Furthermore, it allows the estimated coefficients to differ between
large and small auditors' clients.
In the final case, the regressions are also performed separately over the clients
of large and small audit firms, but this time the inverse Mills ratios obtained from the
probit auditor choice regression are included. In this way, the final regressions
control for auditor choice.
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In each regression of DA, the control variables are company size (ASSE), the
proportion of non-executive directors on the Board (NEX), financial gearing (GEAR),
and a proxy for incentives to smooth earnings (SMOOTH).41 SMOOTH is defined as
the difference in pre-managed earnings and the median earnings (scaled by beginning
of period total assets) for the industry in the prior year. Pre-managed earnings are
defined as operating profit (scaled by beginning of period total assets) minus DA.
Note that estimated DA are scaled by beginning of period total assets, by
construction.
ASSE IS included as a control variable to capture underlying size and
performance effects (Becker et al., 1998; DeFond and Subramanyam, 1998; Young,
1999; and Gore et al., 2001).42 Firm size may also proxy for political costs (Hand and
Skantz, 1998). Nelson et al. (2000) find that auditors are more likely to waive
earnings management attempts by large clients, even after controlling for the
materiality of the attempt. High values of ASSE are therefore expected to be
associated with high values ofDA.
41 The absolute valueoftotal accruals (scaledby beginning of periodtotal assets), TA, is also included
by Beckeret al. (1998) to 'control for the possibility that firmswithlarger absolute valuesof total
accruals also havelargerDA'. Contrary to their expectations, they find that the coefficient on this
variable is negative (andsignificant). However, theynote that this result may be mechanically driven
as the estimation procedure for DA explicitly uses the relationship betweenTA, NDA and DA, and
NDAtend to be negative due to depreciation. This variable is included in some alternative
specifications of the model, but is not used in the main resultsof the chapter. Results for the alternative
specifications are not reportedhere,but are qualitatively identical to those reported in the chapter.
4 Controlling for operating cashflows is also potentially important as both Dechow et a1. (1995) and
Young (1999) notean important association betweenextreme financial performance, as measured by
cashflows, and accruals. Dechowet a1. document that firms withhigh (low)cash fromoperations tend
to have low(high)TA. Young(1999)argues that high valuesof operating cash flows are expectedto
be associated withmeasurement error in estimated DA. Recalling that TA is thesum ofDA and NDA,
if extreme positive (negative) cash flows in a particular period tendto result in negative (positive)
NDA(Samuels et al., 1989), thenmodels ofDA may incorrectly attribute someof the NDAto
estimated DA. Highvalues of operating cashflows are therefore expected to be associated with low
values ofDA. However, operating cashflows arehighlycorrelated with company size (ASSE). having
a correlation coefficient of 0.697for the data used in this study(noneof the othervariables have
correlation coefficients greaterin magnitude than0.1). Including (rank transfonned) operating
cashflows as an additional covariate does not changethe main results of this chapter, but the
(statistically significant) coefficient on the variable has the opposite sign to thatexpected. As this is
likely due to the correlation between companysize and cash flows, cash flows are excluded fromthe
models presented here.
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GEAR is included as a proxy for agency costs, and because the debt-equity
hypothesis predicts a positive association between leverage and income-increasing
accounting choices (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). This hypothesis is supported by
prior empirical evidence (Christie, 1990; Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983). NEX is
included as the presence of non-executives on the Board is expected to decrease
opportunities for earnings management (Peasnell et at, 2000). NEX is therefore
expected to have a negative association withDA whereas GEAR is expected to have a
positive association. SMOOTH represents incentives for earnings management to
meet target earnings figures (Young, 1999, 1998; Chaney and Lewis, 1998; and
DeFond and Park, 1997). SMOOTH is expected to be negatively associated withDA.
5. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
The initial cross-sectional sample for the analysis consists of the 1,326 companies
registered (listed) with a UK stock exchange used in Ireland and Lennox (2002)
[Chapter 2]. Accounting data are taken from the most recent annual reports filed on
OneSource UK Companies Volume One, July 1998.43 Company year ends range
from 31 May 1996 to 31 March 1998, although there is only one observation per
company,
The PriceWaterhouseCoopers Corporate Register is used to identify company
directors and corporate affiliations with audit firms. In deciding whether companies
are affiliatcd with audit firms, it is generally assumed that it is the finance director
who has the strongest boardroom influence overaudit appointments. When a director
discloses past employments with both large and small audit firms, the affiliation is
43 OneSource is a commercially available database of financial information relating to UKcompanies.
The information is heldon twoCD·ROMs, Volume 1andVolume 2. Volume 1holds data on 110,001
UKcompanies, including all public limited companies andall companies withmore than50
employees, the remainder of thesample comprising thelargest UKcompanies notalready included,
selected on thebasis of turnover, totalassets, networth, or shareholder funds, whichever figure is the
highest. Volume 2 holds dataon thenext 250,000 UKcompanies, selected on thesame basis, withthe
lowest cut-off value at approximately £38,000.
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assumed to be with the most recent finn. Where finance directors are not identified
(in approximately 10% of companies), the most influential director is assumed to be
the either the company secretary, the CEO or the company chairman, depending on
who is identified and/or is a qualified accountant. The procedure is identical to that
described more fully in Chapter 2.
Information on subsidiary companies is collected from Extel. The remaining
data for the study is taken from OneSource. As well as identifying the company's
current auditor, OneSource contains historical accounting data taken from published
financial statements, and accounting ratios.
In common with other earnings management studies, financial companies and
utilities are excluded (see e.g. Becker et aI., 1998), leaving 1,238 companies.
Financial companies are excluded because there are fundamental differences in the
nature of their accruals and cashflows. Utilities are excluded both because regulation
may make the incentives to manage earnings different from the incentives in
unregulated industries, and because there are just 20 companies in the industry group
for the purposes of estimating DA. Because of missing accounting data for a further
201 companies, the final estimation sample consists of 1,037 companies. 819 of the
companies areaudited by large audit firms, and 218by small audit firms.
Descriptive statistics for the variables of interest and the estimated DA for the
companies in the final estimation sample are summarised in Table 1 below.




Descriptive Statistics - Untransfonned Variables
Variable Mean Median Standard Min Max
Deviation
BIG 0.790 1 0.408 0 1
DA 0.175 0.045 1.987 -58.549 5.628
ABSOLUTE(DA) 0.448 0.155 1.944 0.000 58.549
PanelA
ASSE (£'OOOs) 357,349 32,129 1.76M -13,579 42.4M
NEX 0.294 0.300 0.079 0 0.462
PanelB
GEAR 31.821 26.300 163.266 -3,792 3,020
SMOOTH -0.137 -0.052 2.174 -6.423 66.173
Panel C
REV (£'OOOs) 551,779 75,803 2.30M 0 56.6M
OS 5.047 1 10.098 0 96
LOSS 0.148 0 0.355 0 1
LAP 0.261 0 0.440 0 1
SAF 0.041 0 0.200 0 1
CYCLE (months) 4.805 3.792 14.103 0.072 424.409
CAPINT 0.459 0.212 0.825 .0.002 12.182
Notes
There are 1,037 observations. Values for CYCLE and CAPINT are missing for 16
observations. Accounting figures are reported in £'OOOs.
Panel A: Variables included in both the DAandthe auditor choice models
Panel B: Variables included in the DA models only
Panel C: Variables included in the auditor choice model only
DA is estimated discretionary accruals
ASSE is total assets (netof current liabilities)
NEX is theproportion of directors who arenon-executive
GEAR is financial gearing (leverage), defined as:
Preference capital + subordinated debt+ loancapital + short-term borrowings
Capital employed + short-term borrowing - intangibles
SMOOTH is (pre-managed earnings - target earnings) where pre-managed earnings
are defined as operating profit (scaled by beginning of year total assets) - estimated
DA, and target earnings are the median value of prior-year industry earnings (scaled
by beginning of yeartotal assets)
REVis sales revenue
OS is the number of overseas subsidiaries
LOSS is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company made a loss in eitherthe current
or prioryear, and 0 otherwise
LAF(SAF) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the influential director disclosed an
affiliation with a large (small) auditor, and0 otherwise
CYCLE is the operating cycle, defined as the sum of debtor months and stockmonths.
CAPINT is capital intensity, defined as fixed assets / sales.
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The estimated DA have a mean valueof 0.175. The absolute value ofDA has a mean
of 0.448. However, there is an outlying observation with estimated DA of -58.549.
Omitting this outlier, the mean value of DA is 0.232, and the mean absolute value of
DA is 0.392.44
The average size of companies includedin the sample is assets (ASSE) of just
over £357 million and sales revenue (REV) of almost £552 million. On average,
companies have 5 overseas subsidiaries and 29% of the Board of directors are non-
executives. Approximately 15% of companies make losses in the current or prior
year, and 26% of influential company directors report affiliations with large audit
firms, compared to just 4% reporting affiliations with smallaudit firms.
5.1 Rank Transformations
The means and medians reported in Table 1 reveal skewness in the DA, ASSE,
GEAR, SMOOTH, REV,as, CYCLE and CAPINT variables.f There is also the
significant outlier in the estimated DA values,mentioned above. As in Chapter2, I
correct for theseproblems using rank transformations.
Recall that the ranking procedure involves replacing each observation with its
rank within the sample, and then dividing each observation by N+1, where N is the
number of observations. The resulting ranked variables are uniformly distributed
between zero and one.
Table 2 partitions the sample into 819 clients of large audit firms and 218
clients of small audit firms, and reports descriptive statistics for the transformed
variables.
44 All the models in this chapter werere-estimated with the outlying observation omitted. The results
(notreported here) are qualitatively identical. This is not surprising, as I userank transformations.
4S In addition, sevenobservations havenegative GEAR, as the companies concerned havenegative net
worth (= capital employed + short-term borrowing. intangibles). In unreported results, these




Descriptive Statistics - Transformed Variables
Chosen auditor size: Large (Big 6) Small
Number ofobservations: 819 218
Variable Mean Median Mean Median
DA 0.155 0.044 0.250 0.050
ABSOLUTE(DA) 0.461 0.152 0.402 0.182
R(DA) 0.500 0.497 0.498 0.508
Panel A
R(ASSE) 0.546 0.560 0.319 0.273
NEX 0.302 0.308 0.264 0.286
Panel B
R(GEAR) 0.514 0.511 0.418 0.407
R(SMOOTH) 0.505 0.514 0.489 0.454
Panel C
R(REV) 0.578 0.603 0.363 0.454
R(OS) 0.557 0.547 0.415 0.246
LOSS 0.145 0 0.156 0
LAF 0.276 0 0.206 0
SAF 0.027 0 0.096 0
R(CYCLE) 0.506 0.511 0.510 0.510
R(CAPINT) 0.488 0.496 0.494 0.505
Notes
Panel A: Variables included in both the DAand the auditor choice models
Panel B: Variables included in the DAmodels only
Panel C: Variables included in the auditor choice model only
ABSOLUTE(DA) and R(DA) are the absolute value and rank of estimated DA
respectively
R(ASSE) is the rankof total assets (netof current liabilities)
NEXis theproportion of directors who arenon-executive
R(GEAR) is the rank of financial gearing (leverage), where financial gearing is:
Preference capital+ subordinated debt+ loan capital+ short-term borrowings
Capitalemployed+ short-termborrowing - intangibles
R(SMOOTH) is the rank of (pre-managed earnings - target earnings) where pre-
managed earnings are defined as operating profit (scaled by beginning of year total
assets) - estimated DA, and target earnings are the median of prior year industry
earnings (scaled by beginning of year total assets)
R(REV) is the rank of sales revenue
R(OS) is the rank of thenumber of overseas subsidiaries
LOSS is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company made a loss in either the current
or prioryear, and0 otherwise .
LAF is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the influential director disclosed an affiliation
with a large auditor, and0 otherwise
SAF is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the influential director disclosed an affiliation
with a small auditor, and 0 otherwise
R(CYCLE) is the rankof the operating cycle
R(CAPINT) is the rank of capital intensity
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It can be seen from Table 2 that the distributions of the transformed variables arc
markedly less skewed. Companies choosing large audit firms have larger values of
ASSE and REV and have greater numbers of overseas subsidiaries (OS). They arc
also more likely to have high GEAR and have larger pre-managed earnings in relation
to target earnings (SMOOTH).
The mean value of untransformed DA is 0.155 for clients of large audit firms,
lower than the mean of 0.250 for clients of small audit firms. However, in univariate
tests, neither the untransformed DA nor the rank R(DA) differs significantly between
clients of large andsmall audit flrms."
The mean absolute value ABSOLUTE(DA) is 0.518 for clients of large audit
firms, and 0.496 for clients of small audit firms, whereas the median is 0.152 for
clients of large audit firms, and 0.182 for clients of small audit firms. Neither the
mean nor the median ABSOLUTE(DA) differs significantly between clients of large
and small audit firms, in univariate tests. The results of the multivariate tests on
R(DA) follow in Section 6.
6. RESULTS
The DA regression models are estimated first without controlling for auditor choice,
and second after controlling for auditor choice. The dependent variable in all these
models is the rank R(DA) of the signed estimated DA. Two versions of the probit
auditor choice model are estimated. The auditor choice model is used to estimate
inverse Mills ratios for inclusion in the final R(DA) regressions, which control for the
auditor choice.
The results of the estimations of the DA regression models, without
controlling for auditor choice, are reported in Table 3. The results of the estimations
46 Differences in means are tested using r-tests; differences in medians are tested using theWilcoxon
ranksum test(Mann-Whitney two-sample statistic) anda non-parametric K.sample test (X2) .
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of the probit auditor choice model, and the DA regression models including the
inverse Mills ratios, are reported in Table 4. Panel A of Table 4 contains the results
of the estimation of the auditor choice model. Panel B of Table 4 contains the results
of separate estimation of the DA models over clients of large. and small auditors,
excluding the dummy variable for chosen auditor size, but including the appropriate
inverse Mills ratios among the explanatory variables.
Table 3
Estimation Results - Without Controlling forthe Auditor Choice
R(DA)
Whole Sample LargeAuditors SmallAuditors
Predicted Obs =1,037 Obs= 819 Obs=218
R(ASSE) + 0.071 ** 0.064 ** 0.120 *
(0.022) (0.024) (0.058)
NEX -0.154 * -0.240 ** 0.023
(0.074) (0.090) (0.134)
R(GEAR) + 0.049 * 0.050 * 0.039
(0.020) (0.022) (0.046)




CONSTANT ? 0.872 ** 0.904 ** 0.801 **
(0.027) (0.033) (0.051)
Rl 61.03% 61.57% 59.86%
Notes:
Explanatory variables are defined in Table 2.
Standard errors in (parentheses). *=significant at the 5%level; ** =significant at
the 1% level.
6.1 Without Controllingfor the Auditor Choice
The results obtained from the estimation of the R(DA) model, over the whole sample
and including the chosen auditor size dummy BIG, are reported in the first column of
Table 3. The coefficient on BIG is negative as expected from theory and prior
research, but it is not statistically significant. The control variables in the regressions
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all have the expected sign, and all are statistically significant except for R(GEAR) and
NEX in the small auditor client regression.
The intercept terms in columns three and four are different to each other. The
intercept for companies choosing large audit firms is 0.904 and that for companies
choosing small audit firms is 0.801, a difference of +0.103. This is interesting as the
difference is positive, whereas the coefficient on BIG in the first column ofTable 3 is
negative (although insignificant). Prior studies ofDA assume that the coefficients on
the control company characteristics are identical for companies choosing large and
small audit firms. However, Table 3 shows that this is not so. In particular, the
changes in the coefficient values result in a positive difference in the intercept terms,
ratherthan the negative difference implied by the results in column 1.
The sign ofthe difference in the intercept terms in Table 3, and the changes in
coefficient values on the otherregressors, are consistent with the resultsof Gore et al.
(2001), who also perform separate regressions over the clients' of large and small
auditors.
Unlike earlierstudies (e.g, Beckeret al., 1998; Gore et al., 2001), these results
do not suggest that large auditors are more conservative as they are not associated
with the reporting of significantly lower levels of signed DA. However, due to the
endogeneity of the auditor choice, the influence of the auditor may be understated.
For example, clients of large auditors may have favourable private infonnation which
leads themboth to hire largeauditors and to generate highDA.
Even if the coefficient on BIG were significantly negative in column 1, I
would still be unable to draw any valid conclusion as to auditor conservatism as
companies choosing large auditors may alternately share characteristics (e.g.
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management integrity) that render them simultaneously less likely to report high
values ofDA (Becker et al., 1998).
In order to distinguish auditor characterstics (such as conservatism) from
auditor selection effects, a two-stage model is estimated. The auditor choice is
estimated first.
6.2 TheAuditor ChoiceModel
The results obtained from the estimation of the auditor choice model, over the whole
sample, are reported in Panel A of Table 4. Two versions ofthe model are estimated;
the version in column 1 includes R(CYCLE) and R(CAPINT) as covariates, after
Francis et a1. (1999). However, these variables arenot found to be significant, and are
omitted from the second version of the model, reported in column 2, which is used to
generate the inverse Mills ratios.
As expected, larger, more complex, and more risky companies are more likely
to choose large audit firms. Although the coefficient on LAP, the large auditor
affiliation, is not significant, it is positive as expected. The coefficient on SAP, the
small auditor affiliation, is significant at less than the 1% level, and negative as
expected. Thus, companies with influential directors who report a prior affiliation
with small audit firms aresignificantly less likely to hire large auditors.
6.3 Controlling/or the Auditor Choice
Without controlling for the endogeneity of auditor choice, it would appear from Table




Estimation Results - Controlling for the AuditorChoice
Auditor Choice
Whole Sample
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Panel A reports the results of the estimation of the probit auditor choice model, with
independent variable Big, = 1 if the chosen auditor is large (i.e. Big 6) and Big, = 0
otherwise.
Panel B reports the results of the separate estimations of the OLS regression model of
(rank-transformed) DA for companies choosing large (i.e. Big 6) and small auditors,
after controlling for the auditorchoice.
Explanatory variables are defined in Table 2, with the exception of R(CYCLE) and
R(CAPINT). R(CYCLE) is the rank of the operating cycle. R(CAPINT) is the rank
ofcapital intensity.
The inverse Mills ratios are obtained from the second auditorchoice model.
Standard errors in (parentheses). III =significant at the 5% level; •• =significant at
the 1% level.
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The inverse Mills ratios j} and A.0 are generated from the results reported in Table 4,
for the second version of the auditor choice model. The DA models are then
estimated separately over companies choosing large and small auditors, including the
appropriate inverse Mills ratio. These results arereported in Panel B of table 4.
The inverse Mills ratio for clients of large auditors is significant (at less than
the 1% level) and positive. The inverse Mills ratio for clients of small auditors is
negative, and significant at the 5% level.
The positive sign of the coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio for clients of
large auditors indicates that companies which choose large auditors report higher
signedvaluesofDA with large auditors than othercompanies would if they also hired
large auditors.
On the face of it, this is consistent with a signalling motive for earnings
management. Companies may choose large auditors because they have more
favourable private information, and simultaneously signal this information via higher
(more positive) DA. Companies which would not choose large auditors would not
have favourable private information to transmit, nor wouldthe auditors, therefore they
would not report as high DA with large auditors. However, I show later that this
selectivity effect is drivenby clients of large auditors reporting less negativeDA with
large auditors than other companies would; there is no evidence that clients of large
auditors reportmorepositive DAwith their auditors than othercompanies would.
The negative sign of the coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio for clients of
small auditors indicates that companies which choose small auditors report lower
values of signed DA with small auditors than other companies would. I show later
that this effect is driven by clients of small auditors reporting less positive DA with
small auditors thanothercompanies would.
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6.4 Comparison ofIntercepts
Comparing the intercept terms in the two R(DA) regressions reported in the second
and third columns of Table 3 (i.e, without controlling for the auditor choice), although
the intercept term for the large auditor regression is greater than that for the small
auditor regression, the difference is not statistically significant. Finding that the
intercept term is greater for the large auditor client regression is consistent with the
findings of Gore et a1. (2001), who alsoperform separate regressions ofDA over large
(in theircaseBig5) and small audit firms.
After controlling for the auditor choice, the sign of the difference in the
intercept terms is reversed. The intercept term in the R(DA) regression over large
auditors' clients in Panel B of Table 4 is 0.676, significantly lower than that for small
auditors' clients, 0.830.
This implies that, after controlling for company characteristics that directly
influence DA and company characteristics that influence the auditor choice, large
auditors result in lower levels of signed DA. Results at this stage are consistent with
the conclusions drawn by previous studies, that large auditors are more conservative
in financial reporting. Although large auditors' clients report higher signed DA with
large auditors than other companies would (positive coefficient on the large auditor
inverse Mills ratio), and small auditors' clients report lower DA with small auditors
than other companies would (negative coefficient on the small auditor inverse Mills
ratio), large auditors result in lower DA overall than small auditors do (significant
negative difference in the intercept terms).
The difference in the intercept terms in Table 4 is -0.154. This is larger than,
and in the opposite direction to, the difference in intercept terms in Table 3 (+0.103).
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The 0.103 (~ 0.1) estimate from Table 3 is used to calculate the median
reported DA when selectivity effects are ignored. Since the median firm lies in the
50th centile and ranked DA are uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, the median
difference in DA is simply the difference in DA reported by firms in the 45th (= 0.5 -
0.05) and 55th (= 0.5 + 0.05) centiles. Companies in the 45th and 55th centiles report
DA which are 1.9% and 7.3% of total assets respectively, giving a median difference
of 5.4%. Therefore, companies hiring large auditors report DA which are on average
5.4% of totar assets higher than those reported by companies hiring small auditors,
when selectivity effects are ignored and coefficients are allowed to differ between
large and small auditors' clients.
The ·0.154 (~ -0.15) estimate is used to calculate the median reported DA
when selectivity effects are controlled for. The median difference in DA is now the
difference in DA reported by firms in the S7~th (= 0.5 + 0.075) and 42~th (= 0.5 -
0.075) centiles. Companies in these centiles report DA which are 9.1 % and 1.0% of
total assets respectively, giving a median difference of -8.1 %. Therefore, companies
hiring large auditors report DA on average 8.1% of total assets lower than those
reported by companies hiring small auditors, after taking selectivity effects into
account.
6.5 Sensitivity of Results to Alternative Me~sures of Incentives to Meet Target
Earnings
The explanatory variable SMOOTH, included in the regressions of R(DA) as a
measure of incentives to meet target earnings, is the difference between pre-managed
earnings and the median industry earnings in the prior year. As expected, there is a
negative coefficient on R(SMOOTH) in all the R(DA) regressions reported in Tables
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3 and 4, and the effect of the variable is statistically significant in all cases. However,
thereare several different ways in whichsuch a variable couldbe constructed.
Following Peasnell et al. (2000), in this section I examine three alternative
measures: an indicator (dummy) variable equal to 1 if SMOOTH is negative (and zero
otherwise); an indicator (dummy) variable equal to 1 ifpre-managed earnings are less
than zero; and an indicator (dummy) variable equal to 1 if pre-managed earnings are
less than prior-year earnings for the same company. The expected signs of the
coefficients on all these alternative variables are positive.47
Replacing R(SMOOTH) with the first alternative does not affect the main
results reported in this chapter. Large auditors result in lower signed DA when
selectivity effects are taken into account. The signs of the coefficients on the inverse
Mills ratios remain the same as in Table 4, and both inverse Mills ratios are
statistically significant at less than the 1% level. The sign of the coefficient on the
indicator variable is positive, and its effect is statistically significant at less than the
1% level, in all R(DA) regressions, R(GEAR) becomes insignificant in all
regressions ofDA.
Replacing R(SMOOTH) with the second alternative, similarly docs not affect
the main results reported in this chapter. The sign of the coefficient on this indicator
variable is also positive as expected, and statistically significant at less than the 1%
level in all R(DA) regressions. When selectivity effects are taken into account, the
signs of the coefficients on the inverse Mills ratios remain the same as in Table 4, and
both inverse Mills ratios are statistically significant at less than the 1% level.
R(GEAR) remains significant as for Tables 3 and4.
47 All these variables are linked to the work presented in Chapter 5. concerning earnings management
to meet benchmarks. Theoriginal SMOOTH variable andthe rust alternative mentioned here represent
incentives to meet thebenchmark of prior-period industry earnings. Thesecond alternative represents
incentives to avoid losses, and the thirdrepresents incentives to avoid eamings decreases.
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Finally, replacing R(SMOOTH) with the third alternative, has a similar effect
to using the first alternative.
The results relating to the impact of auditor size on earnings management are
therefore not sensitive to alternative measures of incentives to meet earnings targets.
6.6 Partitioning Income-Increasing andIncome-Decreasing DA
Because the untransformed dependent variable in the regressions of R(DA) is signed,
the multivariate results, that large auditors are more conservative in financial
reporting than small auditors, could be consistent with more than one effect. Either
the results are driven by a constraining effect on income-increasing (positive) DA, or
an encouraging effecton income-decreasing (negative) DA, or both. All would result
in the observed increased conservatism in financial reporting. However, as auditors
are expected to be more concerned about income-increasing DA (overstatements), the
effectmost consistent with prior literature is the constraint of income-increasing DA.
In order to distinguish between the two effects, the models are re-estimated separately
over companies with income-increasing and income-decreasing DA.
Accurate auditors would be expected to constrain both income-increasing and
income-decreasing DA, resulting in lower absolute DA. This could still result in the
observed auditor conservatism if the constraining effect on income-increasing DA
outweighed the constraining effect on income-decreasing DA. Univariate tests show
no significant difference between the absolute DA in clients of large .and small
auditors, but these tests do not control for the auditor choice. It is not possible to use
the absolute value of DA as the dependent variable in the regression models because
the likely direction of influence of the control variables becomes impossible to
predict, so the models are not expected to fit well and are likelyto be hard to interpret.
199
However, splitting the sample between income-increasing and income-decreasing DA
still allows for the possibility that both types ofDA are constrained.
The results of the separate estimations are reported in Tables 5..8. Table 5
reports the results of the estimations of income-increasing (positive) R(DA) without
controlling for the auditor choice, and Table 6 reports the results after controlling for
the auditor choice. Table 7 reports the results of the estimations of income-decreasing
(negative) R(DA) without controlling for the auditor choice, and Table 8 reports the
results after controlling for the auditor choice.
Table 5
Estimation Results - Without Controlling for the Auditor Choice
R(DA) - income-increasing (positive) DA only
Whole Sample Large Auditors Small Auditors
Predicted Obs = 631 Obs=497 Obs == 134
R(ASSE) + -0.032 -0.035 -0.015
(0.026) (0.028) (0.064)
NEX -0.187 • -0.247 • -0.021
(0.091) (0.106) (0.174)
R(GEAR) + 0.074 •• 0.098 •• -0.022
(0.024) (0.027) (0.052)




CONSTANT ? 0.919 •• 0.943 •• 0.921 ••
(0.034) (0.040) (0.069)
RZ 64.10% 63.80% 66.68%
Notes:
Explanatory variables are defined in Table2.
Standard errors in (parentheses). • =significant at the 5% level; •• =significant at
the 1% level.
In Tables 5 and 7 there are no significant differences in the intercept terms in the
regressions for clients of large andsmall auditors. In Table 6, aftercontrolling for the
auditor choice, the inverse Mills ratio is significant, and negative, for clients of small
auditors but is not significant for clients of large auditors.
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Table 6
Estimation Results - Controlling for theAuditor Choice
Auditor Choice
Whole Sample





R(DA) - positive DA only
Large Auditors Small Auditors .

































































Panel A reports the results of the estimation of the probit auditor choice model, with
independent variable Big, = 1 if the chosen auditor is large (i.e. Big 6) and Big, = 0
otherwise.
Panel B reports the results ofthe separate estimations of the OLS regression model of
(rank-transformed) DA for companies choosing large (i.e. Big 6) and small auditors,
aftercontrolling for the auditor choice.
Explanatory variables are defined in Table 2, with the exception of R(CYCLE) and
R(CAPINT). R(CYCLE) is the rank of the operating cycle. R(CAPINT) is the rank
of capital intensity.
The inverse Mills ratios areobtained from the second auditor choice model.




Estimation Results - Without Controlling for the Auditor Choice
R(DA) - income-decreasing (negative) DA only
Whole Sample Large Auditors






































Explanatory variables are defined in Table 2.
Standard errors in (parentheses). • = significant at the 5% level; •• =significant at
the 1% level.
This suggests that clients ofsmall auditors report less positive DA with small auditors
than other companies would. There is no evidence of a selection effect for large
auditors' clients. There is no significant difference in the intercept terms, therefore
large auditors do not constrain positive DA as identified by the model estimated in
this chapter.
In Table 8, after controlling for the auditor choice, the inverse Mills ratio is
significant, and positive, for clients of large auditors but is not significant for clients
of small auditors. This suggests that clients of large auditors report less negative DA
with large auditors than other companies would. There is no selection effect for
clients of small auditors. For negative DA there is a significant difference in the
intercept terms. As the intercept term for clients of large auditors is lower than that
for clients of small auditors, and the dependent variable is negative, large auditors
cause clients to report more negative DA than small auditors do.
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R(DA) - negative DA only

























Panel A reports the results of the estimation of the probit auditor choice model, with
independent variable Big, = 1 if the chosen auditor is large (i.e. Big 6) and Big, = 0
otherwise.
Panel B reports the results of the separate estimations of the OLS regression model of
(rank-trnnsformed) negative DA for companies choosing large (i.e, Big 6) and small
auditors, aftercontrolling for the auditor choice.
Explanatory variables are defined in Table 2, with the exception of R(CYCLE) and
R(CAPINT). R(CYCLE) is the rank of the operating cycle. R(CAPINT) is the rank
of capital intensity.
The inverse Mills ratios areobtained from thesecond auditor choice model.
Standard errors in (parentheses). *= significant at the 5% level; ** = significant at
the 1% level.
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Therefore there is no evidence that large auditors constrain positive OA, but rather
there is evidence that they encourage negative OA. Although this is still consistent
with conservative financial reporting, it is at odds with expectations that there should
be no auditor effect on positive DA. These results are also certainly not consistent
with large auditors providing greater accuracy, as this would have resulted in the
auditors constraining both types of OA.
The lack of an observed auditor effect on positive OA may have several
explanations. Firstly, splitting the sample into positive and negative OA may have
resulted in too small a sample size to capture anyeffects. Secondly, because accruals
by nature reverse over time, and the sample analysed represents a single year, there
may be some peculiar features of the year under analysis. There may also be
additional selection effects that have not been controlled for in splitting the sample.
These possible explanations maybe investigated by obtaining and analysing a larger
sample covering multiple years. This is left to future research. Finally, the distinction
between positive andnegative DAmaybe spurious, as auditors maynot assess OAin
relation to thesame benchmark as used in this chapter.
Although these results are potentially at odds with prior US research, it is
possible that auditors and financial reporting standards in the UK differ from the US.
Perhaps the results from priorstudies conducted using US datashould notbe expected
to be borne out using UK data. Recall that Peasnell et a!' (2000) also do not find
results in line with US studies. In other words, there may be some genuine
interpretation of these unexpected results. However, I am unable to conclude
precisely as to why there should be no difference between large and small auditors in
the UK regarding positive DA when there is a difference in the US and when there is
a difference regarding negative DA in the UK. This too is left to future research.
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7. CONCLUSIONS
Aftercontrolling for client characteristics, prior US studies find that large audit firms
are associated with significantly lower reported values of DA than small audit firms,
Evidence from prior UK. studies is mixed. However, extant research on auditor
influence on DA treats auditor choice as exogenous, while noting the possible self-
selection bias that this introduces. In contrast, this chapter takes into account that
auditors are not randomly assigned to audit firms. This chapter examines the effect
on reported DAwhen auditor choice is treated as endogenous.
Univariate tests show no significant difference in DA, either signed or
absolute, between clients of large and small audit firms in the UK. However, the
effects of auditor selection bias on reported signed DA are found to be statistically
significant in multivariate tests. The difference in signed DA reported by companies
choosing large audit firms and those choosing small audit firms is negative when
controlling for self-selection, and positive without (allowing for coefficient estimates
to differbetween the two groups). The importance of selectivity effects should not be
surprising given the predictions of analytical studies of auditor choice and signalling
effects. After controlling for selectivity effects, companies hiring large auditors
report DA on average 8.1% of total assets lower than those reported by companies
hiring small auditors. Therefore, in common with prior studies, this chapter finds
some evidence that large audit firms require more conservatism in their clients'
financial reporting than otheraudit firms.
However, in contrast to previous studies, the absolute value of DA is not
found to differ significantly between clients of large and small auditors in univariate
tests. Hence, although there is evidence that large auditors in the UK are more
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conservative than other auditors, there is no evidence that they are moreaccurate than
otherauditors.
Furthermore, when the analysis is performed separately on positive (income-
increasing) and negative (income-decreasing) DA, there is evidence that the
difference in conservatism between large and small auditors is driven by large
auditors encouraging more negative DA, ratherthan constraining positive DA. This is
surprising as auditors are more likely to be sued when income is overstated, so that a
rational conservative auditor should act to constrain income-increasing earnings
management. Some possible reasons for these unexpected results arc suggested
throughout the chapter. For example, it is possible that auditors do not assess DA as
positive or negative relative to the same benchmarks as used in this paper, or that the
single yearof data analysed is unusual in someway, or that the earnings management
is performed for reasons other than pure opportunism on the part of management.
Assuming that auditors can observe the motives for managerial accounting choice,
they may react differently to earnings management for, say, signalling purposes, than
they would to opportunistic earnings management. Because I cannot distinguish
between managerial motives, auditor effects on opportunistic earnings management
may be masked. As I am unable to provide a definitive explanation for the
unexpected results, this is left for future research.
I also acknowledge that there are well-documented methodological problems
involved in estimating DA (seee.g. Kang and Sivaramakrishnan, 1995). In particular,
extant models of DA suffer from measurement error. Chapter 5 therefore explores an




EARNINGS MANAGEMENT AND AUDITOR CHOICE: FURTHER
EVIDENCE FROM EARNINGS DISCONTINUITIES
1. INTRODUCTION
In Chapter 4, estimates of discretionary accruals (DA) were used as a measure of
earnings management to examine whether firms hiring large (Big 6) audit firms
engage in less earnings management than other firms. It was shown that large audit
firms are more conservative than previous studies find, in the sense that they require
lower levels of DA in reported eamings. This chapter provides additional evidence to
support this finding, employing evidence from earnings discontinuities around
thresholds as an alternative measure of earnings management.
Although estimates of DA are widely used as a measure of earnings
management (e.g. Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995; Guay et al., 1996; Beckeret al.,
1998; Francis et al., 1999; Young, 1999; Bartov et al., 2001; Peasnell et al., 2002),
they are known to be subject to some degree of measurement error and bias (Dechow
et al., 1995; Guay et al., 1996; Young, 1999). For instance, the models used to
estimate DA rely on an assumption of finn- or industry-specific level of non-
discretionary accruals (NDA), and can therefore only classify accruals as
discretionary to the extent that they deviate from that expected for the particular firm
(over time) or its industry (in cross-section). For example, if all firms in a particular
industry are making identical DA, a cross-sectional model of DA will not identify
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those accruals as discretionary but will misclassify them as n' on-discretionary
because they are common to all.
An alternative to estimating DA in order to detect earnings management, is to
examine the cross-sectional distribution of earnings and earnings changes in firms
(e.g. Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge et al., 1999). These papers note that,
because earnings provide important information for investment decisions, managers
have strong incentives to manage reported earnings to avoid earnings decreases and
losses. Both Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Degeorge et al. (1999) provide
theoretical models that support their assertions of managerial behaviour around
earnings thresholds. Using US data, they report empirical evidence of unusually low
frequencies of small losses and small decreases in earnings (compared to the prior
year) coupled with unusually high frequencies of small positive incomes and small
increases in earnings. In addition, Degeorge et al. also present empirical evidence
showing a similar pattern of reported results around the threshold of meeting analysts'
expectations.
Concentrating on net earnings in this way avoids the problems encountered in
estimating DA. It also takes all accruals into account, not just the operating accruals
that extant models of DA focus on. However, this method does not enable the
researcher to distinguish between individual firms which are accurately reporting
small positive incomes or increases in earnings (from prior year or against analysts'
expectations) and those which have managed their earnings to fall within those
brackets. This method is also subjective in that the researcher may choose the range
ofreported positive earnings or changes in earnings over which earnings management
by the companies in that range is suspected. With these caveats in mind, if evidence
can be found to support the existence of unusual frequencies of firms in certain
209
earnings brackets, then it remains interesting to analyse the characteristics of these
firms as a group. In this chapter, I do so to determine whether they are (a) associated
with higher or lower levels of (estimated) DA than firms not falling within these
categories, and (b) more likely to be audited by large or small firms of auditors. An
association with DA suggests that companies use DA to manage earnings to meet
earnings thresholds, providing a link between the two branches of empirical earnings
management literature. An association with audit firm size provides further evidence
of differential audit firm quality in relation to earnings management.
This chapter provides evidence of a significant earnings discontinuity around
the threshold of zero earnings in the UK,48 but finds no evidence of a significant
earnings discontinuity around the threshold ofzero change in earnings. The threshold
of meeting analysts' expectations is not examined due to lack of relevant data. For
companies which fall into 'suspect' earnings brackets (reporting small positive
earnings), I go on to present evidence from univariate and multivariate tests that these
companies are significantly less likely to be audited by large audit firms than other
companies. In addition, to support the results presented in Chapter 4, I present
evidence from univariate and multivariate tests that there is a positive relationship
between signed DAand earnings management to avoid losses.
The next section describes the theoretical justifications for managers'
motivation to avoid reporting earnings decreases and losses, as presented in the
previous literature. Section 3 describes the hypotheses and data. Section 4 presents
evidence from univariate tests of the existence of earnings discontinuities, and the
associations between 'suspect' companies and audit firm size, and between 'suspect'
companies and signed DA. Section 5 presents further evidence of these associations,
48 Specifically, for the sample of companies analysed in Chapter 4.
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using multivariate tests to control for other important company characteristics.
Section 6 concludes.
2. THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATION
Both Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Degeorge et al. (1999) provide theories
motivating the avoidance of reporting earnings decreases and losses. Burgstahler and
Dichev (hereafter BD) present both a transactions costs theory, and a prospect theory.
In contrast, Degeorge et al. (hereafter DG) explore earnings management as the
manager's response to compensation that depends on meeting thresholds. Following
DG, I call this last the reward theory. The reward theory appears to be a special case
ofFields et al.'s (2001) contracting motivation for accounting choice. In contrast, the
transactions costs and prospect theories motivate why thresholds should matter in the
first place.
The transactions costs theory relies on the assumptions that firms with higher
earnings face lower costs in transactions with stakeholders (Cornell and Shapiro,
1987; and Bowen et al., 1995), and that stakeholders use heuristics to determine
transactions terms with firms (Conlisk, 1996; DeAngelo, 1988). BD argue that these
assumptions imply that a firm reporting an earnings decrease or loss bears sharply
higher transactions costs than if the firm had reported an earnings increase or profit,
and hence imply incentives to avoid earnings decreases and losses. BD also argue
that these transactions costs are likely to be more substantial for losses than for
earnings decreases, as decreases may simply represent fluctuations around some
underlying expected profit level. This may explain why I find evidence of a
discontinuity around the threshold of zero earnings, but not around the threshold of
zero change in earnings.
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The prospect theory is due to Kahneman and Tversky (1979), and postulates
that decision-makers derive value from gains and losses with respect to a reference
point, rather than in absolute value. BD note that zero earnings and zero change in
earnings are natural reference points, and that income-increasing earnings
management is therefore expected to occur around these reference points in order to
influence the firm value perceived by stakeholders.
The reward theory relies upon prospect theory in that firm managers are
predicted to manage earnings to influence the perceptions of less well-informed
stakeholders, where stakeholders rely on earnings thresholds to provide reference
points against which to form their perceptions. DH have developed this theory to
motivate the assumed form of managers' compensation packages. Managers are
assumed to reap payoffs positively related to earnings, which are augmented by a
fixed bonus if an earnings threshold is reached. In a two-period model, DG find that
whenpre-managed earnings are just below the target threshold, the optimal strategy is
to misreport earnings to meet the threshold, whereas when they are far below the
threshold, theoptimal strategy is not to do so. Moreover, when earnings arc farbelow
the threshold, managers report earnings which are lower than actually achieved.
Crucially, the nature of earnings management, in particular the reversing nature of
accruals over the life of a firm, means that earnings management to increase earnings
in the current period reduces future earnings, and vice versa. As DO put it, firms
below the earnings threshold face a trade-off between borrowing for a better today
(managing current earnings upwards), and saving for a better tomorrow (managing
current earnings downwards). If current earnings aresufficiently poor, little more will
be lostby-reporting even worse results, but thismayreap future benefits by improving
future earnings.
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The reward theory predicts that unusually low frequencies of companies will
report earnings just below the target threshold, whereas unusually high frequencies of
companies will report earnings just sufficient to meet or surpass the target threshold.
Section 4 presents evidence that the frequency of companies in the UK reporting
small positive earnings, i.e, meeting the threshold of zero earnings, is indeed
unusually high (and that of companies reporting small negative earnings is unusually
low). However, no such evidence is found for the threshold of zero change in
earnings.
3. HYPOTHESES AND DATA
I first wish to test whether earnings are managed to meet thresholds, by looking for
discontinuities in the distribution of earnings. If there are discontinuities around
thresholds, I next wish to test whether large audit firms constrain earnings
management to meet thresholds. Finally, I wish to test whether companies use DA to
manage earnings to meet thresholds. The first hypotheses to he tested are detailed
below. The hypothesis relating DA and earnings management to meet thresholds, is
detailed later in this section.
HI: Earnings are managed to avoid losses
H2: Earnings are managed to avoid earnings decreases
H3: Companies which hire large audit firms are less likely to engage in
earnings management to avoid losses
H4: Companies which hire large audit firms are less likely to engage in
earnings management to avoid earnings decreases
The null hypothesis for both HI and H2 is that earnings are not managed; the
null hypothesis for H3 and H4 is that there is no association between audit firm size
and earnings management to avoid losses or earnings decreases respectively.
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This chapter provides evidence in favour of HI and H3 but I am unable to
reject the null hypotheses in the case of H2 and H4. The theoretical justifications for
HI and H2 are described in Section 2. The reasoning behind H3 and H4 is identical to
that discussed in Chapter 4, namely that large audit firms are expected to provide
higher quality than small audit firms (e.g. Craswell et al., 1995; Menon and Williams,
1991; Dye, 1993; DeAngelo, 1981), and in particular that they arc expected to be
more conservative in relation to the level of earnings management in reported
financial statements (e.g. Francis et al., 1999; and Becker et al., 1998). I find a
significant negative association between audit finn size and earnings management to
meet the threshold of zero earnings.
The initial data sample analysed in this chapter is that used for the analysis in
Chapter 4.49 There were 1,037 listed UK companies in the final estimation sample in
Chapter 4. However, the analysis in this chapter requires additional data on earnings
per share (EPS). Thiswas collected from Datastream, but difficulties in matching this
data to the sample from Chapter 4 resulted in missing EPS data for 253 companies.
The final sample analysed in this chapter therefore consists of 784 companies.
Descriptive statistics for these 784companies areprovided in Table 1below.
618 companies in the sample are audited by large (Big 6) audit firms, and 166
are audited by small audit firms, DA are, on average, higher for companies audited
by small audit firms, in both absolute (DA) and ranked (R(DA» value. The mean
(median) value ofDA for companies with large audit firms is 0.134 (0.042) compared
to 0.251 (0.060) for companies with small audit firms, whereas the mean (median)
value of R(DA) for companies with large audit firms is 0.497 (0.489) compared to
49 Thesample analysed in Chapter 3 contains more companies. However, data on earnings pershare
(EPS), and prior-year values of accounting numbers suchas receivables, necessary to calculate OAt
were notcollected. Because companies with cleanaudit reports were sampled at random from the
population, it is toocostly to recreate theoriginal sample to collect this missing data.
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0.511 (0.531) for companies with small audit firms. However, as in Chapter4, these
differences are not statistically significant. The observations of EPS range from a loss
of 646pence to a profit of 338 pence, whereas the changes in EPS (ilEPS) range from
a decrease of 193 pence to an increase of 1,271 pence. On average, EPS are
approximately 10pence.
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics - MainVariables of Interest
Variable

















































































DA are signed discretionary accruals, estimated using the cross-sectional modified
Jones model as described in Chapter 4. R(DA) are rank-transformed discretionary
accruals. The ranking procedure has been re-perfonned (since Chapter 4) for the
reduced sample of784 companies.
EPS are earnings per share (in pence); ilEPS are the absolute change in EPS since the
prior year. There areonly 779 observations ofl\EPS due to missing prior year data.
Recall that the major difference between the results for earnings management
and auditor choice presented in Chapter 4 and those presented in this chapter, is in the
identification of earnings management. In Chapter 4, earnings management is
measured as the (estimated) level of signed DA. In contrast, in this chapter, firms
reporting smallpositive earnings Gust meeting the threshold of zero earnings) or small
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increases in earnings Gust meeting the threshold of zero change in earnings) are
postulated to be more likely to be managing earnings,
The methodology used to test H3 and H4 in this chapter is also simpler than
that used to test the association between audit firm size and earnings management in
Chapter 4, as the auditor self-selection is not controlled for here. This is because there
are too few observations around the thresholds to perform a meaningful multivariate
analysis if thesample is partitioned intoclients of large andsmall audit firms.
The results in Chapter 4 are related to the work in this chapter if DA are used
to manage earnings to meet thresholds. Therefore, the final hypothesis to be tested is
as follows:
Hs: Companies use DA to engage in earnings management to avoid losses
The results presented in the next section show support for HI, namely that
earnings are managed to avoid losses. Hs follows from HI as a resultof the arguments
presented in Chapter 4 as to why accruals are used to manipulate earnings. As the
results presented in the next section show no support for H2 (earnings are not
managed to avoid earnings decreases), the analogue of H, for earnings decreases is
not tested. If H, is true, there will be a significant positive association between signed
DA and companies just meeting the threshold of zero earnings: these companies will
report significantly morepositive(or less negative) DA than companies falling below,
or significantly above, the threshold. The null hypothesis for H, is that companies do
not manipulate DA in order to engage in earnings management (no significant
association between DA andjust meeting the threshold of zero earnings).
4. METHODOLOGY AND UNIVARIATE RESULTS
This section first describes the methodology for testing whether earnings
discontinuities exist around the thresholds of zero earnings and zero change in
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earnings (Hl and H2), then presents evidence of these discontinuities. I find evidence
of a discontinuity around the threshold of zero earnings, but no evidence of a
discontinuity around the threshold of zero change in earnings. Secondly, this section
tests whether significant associations exist between companies just meeting these
thresholds, and audit finn size, using univariate tests (H3 and Ii4). A significant
association is found between companies just meeting the threshold of zero earnings
and audit firm size, but none is found between companies just meeting the threshold
of zero change in earnings and audit finn size. Finally, this sectionpresents evidence
of an association between DA and companies meeting the zero earnings threshold,
again usingunivariate tests (Hj).
The methodology for testing whether earnings discontinuities exist is identical
to that employed by DO. Initially, I examine the distribution of EPS and ~EPS
visually by constructing a histogram. The choice of bin width for the histogram is
important as aggregation or disaggregation of observations will make the distribution
appearmore or less smooth respectively. Following DG, a bin width of2(IQR)no1/3 is
chosen, as recommended by Silverman (1986) and Scott (1992), where IQR is the
~amp\e \ntetC\uurt\\e range of the variable and n is the number of available
observations. This formula implies a bin width of 3.552 pence for EPS, and 1.387
pence for 6EPS. The histogram illustrating EPS is shown in Fig. 1, that for 6EPS is
shownin Fig. 2.
From Fig. 1 it appears visuallythat there is a bunching of the observations just
abovezero. This implies that there may indeed be a discontinuity in EPS at zero. To
test this statistically, a test statistic 't is computed for the bins around zero, which
measures the 'unusualness' of each bin in comparison to its neighbours. The
calculation of the 't test statistic is described in detail in DO; because the peak of the
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distribution is included in the neighbourhood of the zero earnings threshold, the


























Fig. 2. - Histogram of change in EPS
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From Fig. 2 it is also possible to conclude that there maybe a discontinuity around the
threshold of zero change in earnings, as there also appears to be an unusually high
frequency of observations falling into the bin just above zero. However, this is less
marked than in Fig. 1. A t test statistic is also computed to test this statistically, again
following DG. Because the conjectured discontinuity (at zero change in earnings)
coincides with the peak in the distribution, elaboration A2 is followed (described in
Section 4.2 later).
4.1 Testingfor a Discontinuity in a Univariate Distribution
The basic test consists of computing a r-like test statistic 't for a particular interval of
observations. This statistic can be thought of as a measure of the standard difference
between the observed frequency of observations in that interval, and what would be
expected if the distribution were smooth. This is estimated by reference to the
observed frequencies of observations in the surrounding intervals. For illustrative
purposes, Fig.s 1 and 2 showa fitted normal distribution, representing one possibility
of the expected frequencies if the distributions were smooth. The 't test statistic is
described in detail by DG. Its basic construction is summarised as follows:
The basic test statistic t n for the interval [xn, xn+J) of observations of the
variable of interest x is:
't
n
= 610g(p(xlI» - mean{610g(p(x{»}
s.d.{6Iog(p(x{»)} (1)
where mean and s.d. denote the sample meanand standard deviation of {.}, calculated
for i ERn, t ~ n. Observations corresponding to i = n are excluded from the
calculation of the mean and standard deviation to increase power in identifying a
discontinuity atxn• Rn is a smallsymmetric region around n of 2r + 1 points (i.e. R; =
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{Xi : i E (n - r, n + r)}. ~log(P(xn» = log(p(xn»- 10g(p(xn.J» where p(xn) is the
proportion ofthe observations that lie in the interval [xn,xn+J).
4.2 Testing/or Discontinuities in EPS and L1EPS
To test for discontinuities at zero in the distributions of EPS and L\EPS, two
elaborations of the basic test are required. These elaborations, A1 and A2, are also
described by DG.
Elaboration Al applies to the case where the symmetric neighbourhood
around theconjectured discontinuity T (= zero) includes thepeak P ofthe distribution,
but where T :t:. P. This happens in the case of EPS, where T < P. In this case the
region RT is constructed asymmetrically to be the most symmetric region possible
around T of 2r + I points such that all the points lie at or below P. 'tT = 'to is then
constructed as for the basic test statistic above. The test for existence of a
discontinuity around zero EPS (HI) is to compare the calculated 'to with 2: if 'to is
greater than 2, then the discontinuity around zero observed by inspecting Fig. 1 is
statistically significant.
The second elaboration, A2, applies to the case where the conjectured
threshold T (= zero) actually coincides with the peak P of the distribution. This
happens in the case of L\EPS. The test statistic is computed similarly, but now
consists of a test of whether the slope of the distribution immediately to the left of T
(= P) is significantly different to the corresponding slope (adjusted for sign)
immediately to the right of T. The test statistic is calculated as follows. In Eq. 1,
replace ~log(P(x» by VPj = .1log(p(xT+j» - [-I x L\log(p(xT:/»]' The test for existence
of a discontinuity around zero ~EPS (Il2) consists of examining whether VpJ is
unusual with reference to Vp) calculated for a small neighbourhood R ofT == P u> 1).
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If the corresponding test statistic 'trap is greater than 2, then the discontinuity around
zero observed by inspecting Fig. 2 is statistically significant.
The region R about T which is examined in each case consists of 10
neighbourhood values - in the notation ofEq. (1), r =5. For elaboration Al there are
11 intervals in total, and for elaboration A2 there are 5 values of 'lPi calculated,
including Vz». Each interval is 3.552 pence long for EPS, and 1.387 pence long for
~EPS.
4.3 Results ofTestsfor Discontinuities in EPS and LfEPS (HI and H]j
For the threshold ofT =zero earnings (testing Hi), 'to = 2.521. For the threshold ofT
= zero change in earnings (testing H2), tr..p = -0.074.
I conclude that there is a discontinuity around the threshold of zero earnings
(Hi), but there is no discontinuity around zero change in earnings. H2 is rejected.
Therefore, earnings are managed to avoid losses in the UK, but they are not managed
to avoid earnings decreases.
This result differs from those of BD and DG, as both of these studies do find
evidence of earnings management to avoid earnings decreases. However, this is
consistent with BD's transactions cost theory, which suggests that the threshold of
zeroearnings maybe moreimportant than thatof zero change in earnings.
4.4 The Relationship Between Auditor Size and Earnings Management to Meet
Earnings Thresholds (HJ and H4)
In orderto determine whether there is a significant association between audit finn size
and earnings management to meet either the threshold of zero earnings (H3) or zero
change in earnings (Ha), it is first necessary to identify those companies which are
suspected of engaging in such earnings management. These 'suspect' companies are
defined as those with EPS (L\EPS) in the region of [0, 5) pence, in other words,
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meeting or exceeding the threshold of zero earnings (change in earnings) by no more
than 5 pence.so
There are 166 companies in the sample hiring small audit firms, and 618
companies hiring large audit firms. 30.1% of the companies hiring small audit firms
are 'suspect' in terms of just meeting the threshold of zero earnings, compared to only
16.3% of companies hiring large audit firms. All other companies are classed as
'non-suspect'. The difference in the proportion of companies hiring different audit
finn sizes which are 'suspect' is statistically significant at less than the 0.1 % level
using a one-tailed t-test. Hence it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis for H3.
On the basis of this univariate test, companies which hire large audit finns are indeed
less likely to engage in earnings management to avoid losses.
Because of missing prior year data for EPS, there are 165 companies in the
sample hiring small audit firms, and 614 hiring large audit firms, when examining
llEPS. 43.6% of the companies hiring small audit firms are 'suspect' in terms of just
meeting the threshold of zero change in earnings, very similar to the 43.2% of
companies hiring large audit firms. This difference is not statistically significant, and
the null hypothesis for Ha cannot be rejected. As no evidence was found to support
the existence of earnings management to avoid earnings decreases (H2), it is not
surprising that there is no association found between auditor size and meeting the
threshold of zerochange in earnings.
4.5 The Relationship Between DA and Earnings Management to Meet Earnings
Thresholds (Hj)
If the arguments presented in Chapter 4 are correct with respect to earnings
management arising as a result ofDA, one would expect to see a relationship between
$0 In additional testsnot reportedhere, qualitatively identical results wereobtained if 'suspect'
companies were identified as those with EPS (£\EPS) in regions [0, 2), [0,3), [0, 4), and [0, 10)pence.
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earnings management to meet earnings thresholds, and DA. Because there is no
evidence that earnings are managed to avoid earnings decreases (H2), there is not
expected to be an association between companies just meeting the threshold of zero
change in earnings, and DA. However, because there is evidence that earnings are
managed to avoid losses (HI), there is expected to be a positive association between
companies just meeting the threshold of zero earnings, and signed DA. In particular,
companies which are 'suspect' are expected to make more income-increasing DA
(although the sameeffectmay occur through less income-decreasing DA).
DA are estimated using the modified cross-sectional Jonesmodel (describedin
Chapter4). The estimated DA calculated in Chapter 4 are used.
There are 151 'suspect' companies just meeting the threshold of zero earnings,
and 633 'non-suspect' companies. The mean signed DA for companies in the
'suspect' group is 0.310, compared to 0.123 for companies in the 'non-suspect' group.
This difference is not statistically significant using a t-test. However, because the
distribution of DA is non-normal (see Chapter 4), a t-test may not be appropriate in
this case. The mean absolute value ofDA is 0.439 for the 'suspect' group, and 0.470
for the 'non-suspect' group. This difference is also statistically insignificant using a t-
test.
As an alternative, the median signed DA for each group of companies are
compared. The median signed DA for companies in the 'suspect' group is 0.102,
compared to 0.036 for companies in the 'non-suspect' group. The Pearson X2
coefficient is 7.882, significant at less than the 1% level. Therefore, there is evidence
that companies use DA to manage earnings to avoid losses (supporting Hs), Ranking
the signed DA before using a t-test to compare the means, also supports this finding.
The mean ranked DA (R(DA» for 'suspect' companies is 0.541, whereas for 'non-
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suspect' companies it is 0.493. This difference is statistically significant at less than
the 5% level, using a one-tailed test.
5. MULTIVARIATE TESTS
5.1 Motivation, Model and Descriptive Statistics
The work reported in this Chapter does not control for the self-selection ofaudit firms
by companies. This is difficult to do because there are too few observations around
the thresholds to run a meaningful multivariate analysis of membership of the
'suspect' category when the sample is further partitioned into clients of large and
small audit firms, However, it is possible that the results in Section 4.4 are being
driven by a selection effect in that small companies may be simultaneously more
likely to select small audit firms and more likely to be at or close to the zero earnings
threshold. In Chapters 2 and 4, large companies were shown to be more likely to hire
large audit firms than small audit firms. Furthermore, in Chapters 2 and 4 companies
making losses were also shown to be more likely to hire large audit firms. This
relationship between auditor choice and profitability may also be driving the
univariate results, as 'suspect' companies, by definition, do not make losses in the
current year.
In order to address these issues, I estimate the following probitmodel of
membership of the 'suspect' group:
(2)
Where I observe SUSPECTj =1 ifSUSPECTj· > 0, and SUSPECTj = 0 otherwise.
BIGj is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the audit firm hiredby company i is large (Big
6), and 0 otherwise. EPSj is the earnings per sharereported by company i, R(DA) is
the rank ofthe signed discretionary accruals of company i, andR(ASSE)j is the rank
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of'totalassets of company i. I also include R(GEAR)j, the rank of financial gearing,
to control for the influence of gearing on earnings management, as in Chapter 4.
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics - Multivariate TestVariables
Variable Mean StdDev. Min. Median Max.
All Companies - 784
SUSPECT 0.193 0.395 0 0 1
BIG 0.788 0.409 0 1 1
DA 0.159 2.256 -58.549 0.046 5.628
R(DA) 0.500 0.288 0.001 0.500 0.999
EPS 10.070 41.519 -646.180 10.270 338.070
ASSE 311,219 1.701M -13,579 33,844 42.4M
R(ASSE) 0.500 0.288 0.001 0.500 0.999
GEAR 29.190 58.510 -1,021 26.250 770.320
R(GEAR) 0.500 0.288 0.001 0.500 0.999
Suspect Companies - 151
BIG 0.669 0.472 0 1 1
DA 0.310 0.776' -1.829 0.102 5.628
R(DA) 0.541 0.283 0.004 0.589 0.999
EPS 2.341 1.515 0 2.180 4.790
ASSE 86,650 259,880 -399.000 19,075 2.53M
R(ASSE) 0.384 0.260 0.002 0.369 0.949
GEAR 33.911 35.763 -179.530 32.230 194.730
R(GEAR) 0.548 0.306 0.004 0.605 0.991
Non-Suspect - 633
BIG 0.817 0.387 0 1 1
DA 0.123 2.481 -58.549 0.036 3.509
R(DA) 0.493 0.286 0.001 0.482 0.996
EPS 11.914 46.016 -646.180 13.460 338.070
ASSE 364,789 1.886M -13,579 39,681 42.4M
R(ASSE) 0.536 0.260 0.001 0.540 0.995
GEAR 28.063 62.699 -1,021 24.820 770.320
R(GEAR) 0.489 0.283 0.001 0.478 0.999
Notes:
DA are signed discretionary accruals, estimated using the cross-sectional modified
Jones model as described in Chapter 4. R(DA) are rank-transformed discretionary
accruals.
EPS are earnings per share (in pence); ASSE are total assets, in £'OOOs. GEAR is
financial gearing, defined in Chapter 4. R(ASSE) andR(GEAR) are rank-transformed
total assets and gearing, respectively.
The ranking procedure has been re-performed (since Chapter 4) for the reduced
sample of784 companies.
Descriptive statistics for these variables are reported in Table 2. The signed DA,
ASSE and GEAR variables are rank-transformed as the distributions of the
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untransfonned variables are skewed. As in Section 4, 'Suspect' companies are, on
average, more likely to hiresmall audit firms and have greater values of signed OA.
Theyalso have lower EPS, smaller ASSE and higher GEAR.
The estimation results arepresented and discussed in thenext Section.
5.2 Results and Discussion
The results of the estimation ofEq. 2 are reported in Table 3.
Table 3




















The dependent variable SUSPECT is a dummy variable equal to 1 if thecompany is
in the 'suspect' group (reporting EPS in the [0,5) pence range), and0 otherwise.
BIGis a dummy variable equal to 1 if thecompany hires a large audit firm, and0
otherwise.
EPS is earnings per share, in pence.
DA are signed discretionary accruals, estimated using the cross-sectional modified
Jones model as described in Chapter 4. R(DA) are rank-transformed discretionary
accruals.
ASSE are total assets, in £'OOOs. GEAR is financial gearing, defined in Chapter 4.
R(ASSE) andR(GEAR) are rank-transformed total assets and gearing, respectively.
Theranking procedure has beenre-performed (since Chapter 4) for the reduced
sample of 784 companies.
Standard errors in (parentheses).
"'''' =significant at the 1% level. • =significant at the 5% level.
Themodel does not fit verywell, having a pseudo R2 of8.14%.
After controlling for R(ASSE), EPS and R(GEAR), both BIG and R(DA) remain
significantly associated with earnings management to avoid losses, SUSPECT.
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Clients of large audit firms are less likelyto engage in earnings management to avoid
losses, and companies engaging in earnings management havehigher values of signed
DA. This is consistent withtheunivariate results reported in Sections 4.4 and 4.5.
R(ASSE) and R(GEAR) are also significantly associated with SUSPECT, but
EPS is not. Large companies are less likely to engage in earnings management to
avoid losses. Companies with high gearing are, as found in chapter 4, more likelyto
engage in earnings management to avoid losses.
6. CONCLUSION
By testing for the existence of discontinuities around zero in the distribution of EPS
and ~EPS respectively, this chapter has shown that earnings in the UK are managed
to avoid losses, but theyare not managed to avoid earnings decreases.
This chapter has also provided evidence that companies use DA, as estimated
using a cross-sectional modified Jones'model, to manage earnings to avoid losses.
Evidence is provided by both univariate and multivariate tests. This supports the
methodology of Chapter 4, in which DA are used as a measure of earnings
management in order to assess the effect of auditor choice upon earnings
management.
Further support for the findings of Chapter 4, that large (Big6) audit firms are
more conservative in terms of the level of earnings management in their clients'
financial statements, is also provided in this chapter. Univariate and multivariate tests
show that companies which hire large (Big 6) audit firms are less likely to engage in
earnings management to avoid losses than companies which hire small audit firms.
However, no attempt has been made in this chapter to control for auditor self-
selection, because there are too few 'suspect' observations to perform rigorous tests in
themanner of Chapters 2 and4.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FORFURTHER RESEARCH
1. SUMMARY
During the time that I have been working on this thesis, the worlds of auditing and
financial reporting have been shaken by a series of scandals spawned by the
bankruptcy of Enron, the US 'energy giant'. One of the Big 5 accounting finns,
Enron auditor ArthurAndersen, has collapsed having been found guiltyof obstructing
justice by shredding documents. Even the White House has been implicated for its
links between the Bush administration and Enron, while 'cash for access' claims have
been made against the Labour government in the UK. Corporate scandals involving
auditors are not new- consider BCCI,Polly Peck and the like - but important lessons
do not appear to have been learned. Against a background of faltering public
confidence, auditors are increasingly being called to account.
The case of Enron is particularly illuminating because of Arthur Andersen's
role. Enron's finance director Andrew Farstow has been accused of fraud in relation
to the web of 'special purpose entities' apparently created to help manage the
company's earnings and keep liabilities off the consolidated balance sheet. Arthur
Andersen advised Enron on setting up these special purpose entities and charged
significant fees for related work, and yet despite their knowledge and understanding
of the features of the entities failed to express their private concerns in their audit
report (Gwilliam, 2002). The audit in Enron's case is clearly flawed - it is hard to
believe that the auditors did not discover the fraud, they simply chose to ignore it.
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Until the resignation of then Enron chief executive Jeff Skilling in August 2001,
which turned the sliding share price into a plummeting fall, there was little outside
clueof thedifficulties that the business faced.
In an environment where such a spectacular collapse can occur seemingly
without warning, and where an auditor plays such an important role in the verymeans
by which a company's accounts obscure economic reality, questions over the purpose
and meaning of financial audits become paramount. Without an extreme event such
as bankruptcy, how can the 'man in the street' judgethe quality ofthe auditor's work?
What is reasonable to expect from the auditor? What do we understand from the audit
report, andwhatcomfort can we gain?
This thesis explores these questions in relation to audit quality in the UK. In
the absence of objective yardsticks of audit quality, I examine whether large (Big 6)
audit firms provide higher quality thanotheraudit firms. This is a challenging area as
audit quality is both multidimensional and impossible to observe directly. First, I
confirm the existence of large audit firm fee premiums in the UK. Fee premiums are
often cited as evidence that large audit firms provide higher quality. Second, I
identify some determinants ofmodified audit reports in the UK and test whether large
audit firms are more likely to issue audit report modifications. Taking earnings
management as an alternate measure of audit quality, I then study the impact of audit
firm size on earnings management in corporate financial statements.
I find that UK companies hiring large audit firms have lower signed
discretionary accruals (DA). By identifying discontinuities around earnings
thresholds, I also show that earnings management to avoid losses is positively related
to signed DA. Finally, I find that UK companies hiring large audit firms are less
likelyto engage in earnings management to avoid losses.
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The following sections summarise the difficulties encountered in each piece of
work, and suggest ways in which to extend or improve the research. The final section
outlinesdirections for future research.
2. AUDITOR CHOICE AND THE LARGE AUDIT FIRM FEE PREMIUM
The first chapterof research in the thesis confirms the existence of the large audit finn
fee premium in the UK. Prior audit fee researchdoes not allow for the endogeneity of
the audit firm choice when assessing the audit fees paid by client companies. In
contrast, Chapter 2, 'The Large Audit Firm Fee Premium: A Case of Selectivity
Bias?', employs a two-stage Heckman-type selection model in order to control for
audit finn choice. This is the first time that such an approach has been used when
examining the largeaudit firm fee premium."
This chapter shows that the premium estimated by prior studies is biased
downwards because large audit firms' clients pay lower fees than randomlyselected
clients would pay to large audit firms (they are 'higher quality'). High quality
companies are more likely to hire (and be accepted by) high qualityaudit firms. Such
companies may require less audit work after controlling for size, complexity and
inherent risk. For example, better quality accounting systems or high management
integritymay mean that their accounts are less likely to contain misstatements. In this
case, the premium estimated by prior studies (e.g, Pong and Whittington, 1994;
Craswell et al., 1995) will be biased downwards. Large auditors benefit from
advantageous selection bias whereas small auditors suffer from adverseselectionbins.
Although company size and complexity are of primary importance in
determining audit firm choice, affiliations between audit firms and influential
directors are also important. Companies hire large (small) audit firms more often
51 Thischapter is joint work with Clive Lennox, and is published in the Journal of Accounting Auditing
andFinance (2002).
230
when directors disclose affiliations with large (small) audit firms. Chapter 2 shows
that the effects of audit firm selection on audit fees are statistically and economically
significant. A task for future research is to estimate the effects of selectivity on audit
fees in countries where large audit firm premiums have not yetbeen found.
3. UNDERSTANDING AND PREDICTING AUDIT REPORTS
Chapter 1 introduces the thesis, and reviews the academic literature generally relevant
to the work. In this chapter I also argue that understanding the factors which lead
auditors to issue different types of audit reports will inform discussions of audit
quality and the information content of these reports. This is addressed by Chapter 3
'Does One Size Fit All? Evidence from a Multinomial Logit Model for Predicting
Audit Reports'.
Chapter 3 uses a multinomiallogit model to examine the determinants of three
different audit report outcomes on a large sample of diverse UK companies.S Prior
studies ofaudit reporting in the UK are limited by the type ofcompany, or the typeof
audit report modification, studied. In contrast, I study both public (listed and non-
listed) and private companies, and both going-concern related and non going-concern
related auditreport modifications.
Chapter 3 demonstrates the importance of persistence in auditreporting. Prior
year audit reports are significantly and positively related to current year audit reports.
Furthermore, when compared to a naive model based solely on prior year audit
reports, the multinomial logit model has little effect on prediction error costs. There
is also little improvement gained by using the multinomiallogit model in comparison
to a standard dichotomous logitmodel. This is despite variables suchas company size
having opposite effects on going-concern related and non going-concern related audit
52A paperbased on this work is forthcoming in theJournal of Business Finance andAccounting
(2003).
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modifications. Arguably, this persistence reduces the information content of audit
reports as they can only carry incremental information to the extent that they are
unpredictable. This has policy implications, as attempts to increase the
informativeness of auditreports should include measures to discourage persistence.
The main focus of the thesis is to examine whether large audit firms provide
higher quality than other audit firms. The frequency of audit report modification
represents one possible metric of audit quality. However, Chapter 3 provides no
evidence that large audit firms are more likely to issue audit report modifications than
other audit firms. In fact, audit finn size is shown to be significantly negatively
associated with nongoing-concern modifications. Thismaybe due to selection bias-
high quality companies are expected to be simultaneously more likely to hire large
audit firms, and less likely to require audit modifications for disagreements or
limitations on scope (e.g, because they have high quality accounting systems or
managers who are less likely to engage in misleading financial reporting).
To control for the effects of self-selection of audit firms by companies, it
would be necessary to employ a selection model similar to that employed in Chapters
2 and 4, modelling the auditor choice. But because the sample used in Chapter 3
includes non-listed companies, data on directors' affiliations with audit firms, which
is important for the auditor choice model, is not available. Hence the auditor choice is
not controlled for in Chapter 3. This is left to future research.
4. AUDIT FIRM CHOICE AND DISCRETIONARY ACCRUALS
Chapter 4 takes account of the influence of audit firm size on the content ofpublished
financial statements. This influence may be direct or indirect: direct because high
quality audit firms are more likely to discover misstatements and require theirclients
to correct them, and indirect because high quality companies are simultaneously both
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more likely to hire large audit firms, and less likely to make misstatements in the first
place. Accordingly, I explore whether the clients of large audit firms engage in less
income-increasing earnings management activity than theclients of small audit firms,
where the level of earnings management is measured as signed discretionary accruals
(DA). I extend the previous literature by taking into account that clients are not
randomly assigned to audit firms, in a similar manner to Chapter 2. This has not been
done previously, although prior research notes the possibility that companies which
hire large audit firms share characteristics which are also associated with lower
(Becker et al., 1998) or with higher (Francis et al., 1999) levels of reported DA.
I present evidence that large audit firms are more conservative with respect to
their clients' financial reporting, as they require lower values of signed DA.
However, in contrast to priorUS studies, myresults are not consistent with increased
accuracy in financial reporting, as there is no evidence that large audit firms are
associated with lower absolute values of DA. When testing differences in absolute
DA it is not possible to control for the auditor selection, which may explain this
difference. Alternately, there maybe a genuine difference between US and UK audit
finns which I cannot explain. Finally, I find no evidence that large audit firms
constrain positive signed DA, rather that theyencourage negative signed DA. This is
contrary to expectations. If large audit firms are more conservative, onewould expect
them to constrain positive (income increasing) DA, as audit flrms are more likely to
be sued for overstatements of earnings than forunderstatements.
There arc at least four possible explanations for these unexpected results.
Firstly, because discretionary accruals by their very nature reverse over time, it is
possible that the single year analysed in Chapter 4 is unusual in some way. To
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determine whether this is so, further years of data can be collected and the analysis
canbe re-perfonned on thepooled dataset, and on further individual years.
Secondly, it is possible that this result is due to the complicated nature of the
relationship between audit firm choice and earnings management. If earnings
management is always opportunistic (for example, motivated by management bonuses
based on company performance), a high quality audit finn would be expected to
constrain earnings management. Therefore, if large audit firms are high quality, one
would expect to see that companies hiring large audit firms engage in less earnings
management, whether income-increasing or income-decreasing, than they would
otherwise do. Prior research would therefore overestimate the influence of the large
audit finn. However, earnings management maynotalways be (purely) opportunistic.
For example, it may be undertaken to signal managers' private information to
shareholders or otherstakeholders.
If earnings management is undertaken to signal information, then high quality
companies hiring large audit firms may simultaneously engage in more earnings
management. In particular, high quality companies may make positive DA because
they have favourable private information. In this case, prior research would
underestimate the influence of the large audit firm by failing to control for the auditor
selection bias.
However, it is hard to distinguish motives for earnings management simply by
looking at DA. Different motives may have identical effects, particularly if
managerial compensation packages have aligned the interests of management and
shareholders. I do not find results consistent with anysingle source ofmotivation for
earnings management. I cannot claim to fully distinguish different motives for
earnings management in Chapter 4. Because multiple, and conflicting, motives may
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occur, useful insights may be gained by analysing the problem using a theoretical
framework. Theproblems faced by managers and auditors whenconsidering earnings
management under conflicting motives may be simplified in this way. If clear
predictions of behaviour can thenbe obtained, it maybe possible to develop empirical
methodology to test these predictions. Further investigation of these two possibilities
is leftto future research.
The third possible explanation for the unexpected results is that the models
used to estimate DAmay themselves be flawed. For example, such models havebeen
found to suffer from measurement error. Finally, the distinction between positive and
negative DA may itself be spurious, as auditors are unlikely to use exactly the same
benchmark to identify income-increasing and income-decreasing adjustments as
employed in this chapter.
An alternative approach to identifying earnings management, identifying
discontinuities in reported earnings, is adopted in Chapter 5. The relationships
between audit firm size and earnings discontinuities, and between earnings
discontinuities andDA, are examined, andare summarised in the next section.
S. AUDIT FIRM CHOICE AND EARNINGS DISCONTINUITIES
In Chapter 4, earnings management was measured with respect to DA. In Chapter 5,
'Earnings Management and Auditor Choice: Further Evidence from Earnings
Discontinuities', earnings management is identified by the presence of a discontinuity
in the univariate distribution of earnings per share, following Burgstahler and Dichev,
(1997), and Degeorge et al. (1999). When a discontinuity occurs, 'too few' firms
report earnings per share just below the threshold, whereas 'too many' report earnings
per share just above the threshold.
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Because earnings provide important information for investment decisions,
managers have strong incentives to manage reported earnings to avoid earnings
decreases and losses. In other words, firms are more likely to report small positive
earnings or changes in earnings than they are to report small negative earnings or
changes in earnings. In addition, Degeorge et a1. report empirical evidence showing a
similar pattern of reported results around the threshold of meeting analysts'
expectations.
I present evidence of a discontinuity around the threshold of zero earnings per
share in the UK. In contrast to prior research using US data, I find no evidence of a
discontinuity around the threshold of zero change in earnings. I cannot test whether
there is a discontinuity around the threshold of meeting analysts' expectations, as I do
not have data on analysts' forecasts. This is left to future research. I conclude that
UK companies may manage earnings to avoid losses, but not to avoid earnings
decreases.
Secondly, in both univariate andmultivariate tests, I show that firms reporting
'suspect' values of earnings per share Gust above the zero threshold) are significantly
less likely to be audited by large audit firms. I also present univariate and
multivariate evidence that 'suspect' firms are positively associated with signed DA, as
calculated in Chapter 4. Therefore, companies use DA to manage earnings upwards
to avoid losses. I claim that this supports the assertion in Chapter 4 that discretionary
accruals are usedto manage earnings.
6. DIRECTIONS FORFUTURE RESEARCH
As noted in the summaries above, questions remain relating to the work presented in
this thesis. Extensions and improvements are outlined below, they are left to future
research.
236
In Chapter 3, I find a negative relationship between audit firm size and non
going-concern related audit report modifications. Further work is required to
determine whether this negative relationship is a result of the endogenous audit firm
choice or whether it represents a genuine (although unexpected) quality differential.
There are two ways in which this could be done. The obstacle to estimating a two-
stage Heckman-type selection model, as used in Chapters 2 and 4, is the lack of
director affiliation data for non-listed companies. This data is publicly available for
listed companies but not for other companies. Either a larger sample of listed
companies should be collected, covering several years to obtain sufficient numbers of
modified audit reports, or a sample of non-listed companies already included in the
analysis should be written to asking them to provide the information. The former is
cheaper, and more practical. Response rates to written requests for information may
be poor, particularly as some of the companies may have become bankrupt or the
directors mayhave left.
The work in Chapter 3 could also be extended by distinguishing between
different kinds of non going-concern related audit reports in themultinomial model of
audit reporting. To do this best, copies of modified audit reports would be obtained
from financial statements held at Companies House, and read, to improve
classification.
Chapter 2 shows that the effects of auditor selection on audit fees in the UK
arc significant. This may explain why large audit finn fee premiums have not yet
been identified in some countries. Therefore, one lineof future research is to estimate
the effects of selectivity on audit fees in countries where large audit firm premiums
havenot yetbeen found.
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Chapter 4 reports a negative relationship between signed DA and audit firm
size. This is expected if large audit firms provide higher quality and their clients
engage in less income-increasing earnings management, as audit firms arc more likely
to be sued for overstatements of income than for understatements, and large audit
firms have more wealth at risk from litigation. However, Chapter 4 shows that the
observed negative relationship is driven not by a negative association between large
audit firms and income-increasing DA, but by an association between large audit
firms and income-decreasing DA. Large audit firms require significantly more
negative discretionary accruals but no less positive discretionary accruals.
This finding is contrary to expectations and cannot be understood without
further analysis, although it is consistent with other UK research (e.g, Peasnell et al.,
2000). One possibility is that the sample analysed in Chapter 4 comes from an
unrepresentative year, because it consists of a single year of cross-sectional data, but
accruals reverse over time. Therefore it is important to test whether this result also
holds for a pooled sample consisting of more than oneyearofdata.
If the results of Chapter 4 regarding negative and positive discretionary
accruals also hold for a pooled sample of years, then it is possible that the existing
theory is incomplete. The link between earnings management and audit quality is
likely to be complex as earnings management maybe entered into by management for
both opportunistic and non-opportunistic (e.g. information signalling) purposes.
Untangling the relationship between audit firm choice and earnings management is
unlikely to be straightforward, so useful insights maybe gained by theoretical analysis
which abstracts away from real-world complications. In contrast, empirical results
may be consistent with, or driven by, more than one motivation for earnings
management, but these motivations are unobserved or unverifiable. Failing to
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concentrate on opportunistic earnings management alone may also explain my
unexpected results.
Other possible explanations for the results in Chapter 4 concern the size of the
sample analysed, and measurement of earnings management using DA. First,
extending the sample to include more years of data, as proposed above, may increase
the likelihood of audit firm effects being detected; otherwise, particularly when the
sample is partitioned, audit firm effects may simply be too small to be identified.
Second, extant models of DA, including the cross-sectional Jones model used in
Chapter 4, are known to suffer from problems such as measurement error. Chapter 5
goes some wayto addressing this problem by identifying earnings management using
earnings discontinuities. An additional, alternative approach to explore in future work
could be that proposed by Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995), using instrumental
variables.
This thesis has amply illustrated Chapter l's assertion that analysing audit
quality is not straightforward. Data is extremely limited and care must be taken to
consider the self-selection bias resulting from companies' audit firm choices. Quality
maybe defined in different ways, and measurements tend to be subjective, consisting
of comparisons between different audit firms, rather than objective. Cases suchas the
recent collapse of Enron bring audit firms (and the accounting profession as a whole)
into widespread public criticism. Regulatory reforms that seek to address the
problems brought to light include the auditor independence rules now enshrined in US
law by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and proposals which include mandatory audit staff
rotation in theUK. However, the success of these policies will be hard tojudge given
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RE-ESTIM:ATION OF CHAPTER 2 RESULTS
The inclusion ofthe 'public' and 'list' explanatory indicator variables in the models of
Chapter 2 has shown that listing or public/private status does not significantly affect
the likelihood of audit report modification. However, it is possible that the
determinants of audit report modifications may differ between company types. For
example, public (listed) companies tend to have different financial structures to
private companies, so that loan finance may become more or less material to the
accounts.
In order to examine whether the determinants of audit modifications differed
between company types, the models reported in this chapter were additionally
estimated separately over public and private companies. The population of listed
companies in the data is relatively small (288 out of 6,978 in the estimation sample,
and 86 out of 2,326 in the holdout sample), hence a public/private distinction was
thought to be more appropriate to this studythana listed/non-listed distinction.
The 'standard' dichotomous logit and the multinomial logit models are
estimated twice in this Appendix. The first estimation is overprivate companies only,
and the second over public companies only. The results of these estimations arc
reported in Tables Al • A6 below. Explanatory and dependent variables and
descriptive statistics for the samples are as reported in Tables 2, 3 and4 in the bodyof
the chapter, with the exception of the 'public' indicator variable, which is excluded
entirely. With the further exception of the listed company dummy variable, which is
excluded from the private company estimations, all other explanatory variables arc
included in all models.
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Table At reports the results of the estimation of the 'standard' dichotomous
logit model over the estimation sample. Table A2 reports the results of the
multinomial model estimated overthe estimation sample. Table A3 reports the degree
of persistence in audit reporting in the estimation sample, separately for public and
private companies. This is necessary to determine the predicted outcomes for the
naive strategy.
Tables A4a and A4b report the estimated probabilities of non going-concern
and going-concern related audit modifications respectively, in both the estimation and
the holdout samples. Tables A5a and A5b report the predictive power of the
multinomiallogit model in terms of Type I and Type II error rates and thepercentages
of audit report types correctly predicted, for the estimation and holdout samples
respectively. Finally, Table A6 reports the relative misclassification costs, in the
holdout sample, of the multinomial model in comparison with the naive strategy and
thestandard dichotomous logit model.
The results of the estimation of the standard logit model are reported in Table
At. The audit lag and lagged audit report variables are all significant for both
company types, and have positive coefficients as expected. In addition, company size
and subsidiary status are significant in explaining audit reporting in private
companies, whereas listing is significant in explaining audit reporting in public
companies. Large private companies and private companies which are not
subsidiaries, are more likely to receive modified audit reports. Listed public

























0.002 •• 0.003 ••
(0.001) (0.001)
4.159 •• 5.389 ••
(0.234) (0.702)






























Estimation Results forDichotomous Logit Model ofAudit Reporting
Private companies Public companies
Any modification Anv modification
Notes:
• =statistically significant at the 5% level.
•• =statistically significant at the 1% level.
Standard errors are reported in (parentheses).
Coefficients are relative to thebasechoice of cleanreport.
Dependent variable is coded 0 if the audit report is clean, 1 otherwise.. Explanatory variables are
defined in Table 2.
The results of the estimation of the multinomial model of audit reporting on the
estimation sample of public and private companies are reported in Table A2. It is
easy to see that the significant determinants of audit modifications differ both across
modification types and between private and public companies, with the exception of
the audit lag (LAG) and the prior year going-concern audit report dummy variable
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(GC), which positively increase the likelihood of both modification types in all
companies, as expected. The prior year non going-concern audit report dummy
variable (NGC) is positively associated with going-concern modifications in both
public andprivate companies, but is onlysignificant in private companies.
TableA2
Estimation Results forMultinomial Model of Audit Reporting
Private companies Public companies
Variable Non-GC modification GCmodification Non-GC modification GCmodification
In{ASSE) 0.169 •• -0.158 -0.011 -0.463 •
(0.058) (0.081) (0.110) (0.217)
SUDSID -0.285 -0.181 -0.354 -0.111
(0.153) (0.225) (0.519) (0.610)
QUICK 0.038 -1.080 •• 0.145 -1.865 •
(0.OS9) (0.229) (0.094) (0.746)
GEAR 0.009 0.028 • 0.058 •• -0.059
(0.013) (0.013) (0.022) (0.057)
LOSS -0.109 0.785 •• 0.462 1.493 •
(0.217) (0.219) (0.536) (0.609)
CONT -0.005 0.070 •• 0.351 -0.806
(0.016) (0.015) (1.488) (1.210)
DIG -0.483 •• 0.436 -0.654 0.634
(0.169) (0.234) (0.496) (0.589)
In(AF) -0.150 0.200 • 0.345 0.688
(0.099) (0.135) (0.218) (0.364)
In(NAF) -0.018 -0.020 -0.293 0.196
(0.080) (0.095) (0.138) (0.209)
LAG 0.002 •• 0.003 •• 0.003 •• 0.005 ••
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
GC 2.944 •• 5.020 •• 4.635 •• 5.481 ••
(0.283) (0.265) (0.800) (0.929)
NGC 5.476 •• 3.097 •• 5.569 •• 1.967
(0.165) (0.271) (0.462) (1.143)
DIY -0.161 -0.519 • 0.646 -0.997
(O.lSO) (O.218) (O.363) (0.756)
LIST -1.059 -1.885
(0.647) (0.980)
constant -6.126 •• -5.184 •• -6.553 •• -3.679 ••
(0.488) (0.669) (1.031) (1.124)
Observations 6,218 760
F(26, 6,192) • 70.41 •• F(28,732)=11.11 ••
Notes:
• • statistically significant at the 5% level.
•• • statistically significant at the 1% level.
Standard errors arereported in (parentheses).
Coefficients arerelative to thebase choice of clean report.
Dependent variable is audit report type. Explanatory variables aredefined inTable 2.
A 'GC' modification is one which relates to going-concern,
259
Large private companies are more likely to receive non going-concern related
modifications thanotherprivate companies, which is consistent with high asset values
relative to liabilities increasing the chance of disagreement-type modifications.
Private companies choosing Big 6 auditors are significantly less likely to receive non
going-concern modifications than otherprivate companies, but, as before, this should
not be taken to suggest that Big 6 auditors are lower quality than other auditors, as
there maybe self-selection bias.
As expected, private companies with high financial risk (GEAR), poor
liquidity (QUICK and LOSS), that report material contingent liabilities (CONT) or
which do not pay dividends (DIV), are more likely to receive going-concern
modifications than other private companies. High audit fees (In(AF» in private
companies are also associated with going-concern related modifications, suggesting
thathigh audit fees in this context indicate increased audit work.
In contrast, fewer variables are significant in explaining audit modifications in
public companies. Public companies with high financial risk (GEAR) are more likely
to receive non going-concern related modifications than other public companies.
Small public companies, and those with poor liquidity (QUICK and LOSS) are, as
expected, more likely to receive going-concern modifications. High audit fees
('In(AF)') in public companies are also associated with going-concern modifications,
suggesting again that high fees in this context indicate increased audit work, although
the association is not significant. Similarly, although payment of dividends is
negatively associated with going-concern related modifications, it is not significantly
so.
Even after controlling for other company characteristics, Tables Al and A2
show that persistence in audit reporting is highly significant in explaining current year
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audit reports (GC andNGC). Table A3 reports persistence among public and private
companies in both the estimation and the holdout samples. This information is
required to assess the relative performance of the multinomial models in Table A2
against the nalve prediction model. The naive prediction model consists of predicting
thecurrent year audit report type to be equal to the prioryear audit report type.
TableA3
Persistence in Audit Reporting
Current Year Clean
Prior Year Audit Report























4,639 47 27 4,713
327 852 35 1,214
114 34 143 291
5,080 933 205 6,218
625 4 2 631
39 52 6 97
14 2 16 32
678 58 24 760
Notes:
A 'GC' modification is one which relates to going-concern.
From Table A3, we can see that there are 327 first time non going-concern related
modifications, and 114 first time going-concern related modifications, among the
private companies in the estimation sample. Among the public companies in the
estimation sample, there are 39 non going-concern related, and 14 going-concern
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related, first time modifications. In the holdout sample, there arc 105 first time non
going-concern related modifications, and 41 first time going-concern related
modifications, among the private companies. Among the public companies in the
holdout sample, there are 15 non going-concern related, and 7 going-concern related,
first time modifications.
Persistence in audit modifications appears less strong among public companies
in the holdout sample than among the other groups of companies, and, as before, less
strong in going-concern related modifications in general. The former is likely due to
the small number of public companies in the holdout sample; the latter is reasonable
as going-concern difficulties are likely to be 'resolved' through bankruptcy in a
number of cases, so that repeated modifications become less likely due to sample
attrition. These suggest that the multinomial legit model may do better in predicting
(particularly going-concern related) modified audit reports in public companies,
compared to the naive model.
To determine whether this is the case, as before the predictive power of the
multinomiallogit model is compared to that of the standard logit model and the naive
model, this time separately over public and private companies. Table A4a displays
the predicted probabilities of non going-concern related audit modifications, and
Table A4b displays the predicted probabilities of going-concern related audit
modifications. Each Table reports predicted probabilities for theestimation sample in
Panel A, and the holdout sample in Panel B. Predicted probabilities for private and
public companies are reported separately.
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Table A4a
Estimated Probabilities of Non Going-Concern Related Audit Report Modifications
Actual Audit Report
Clean Non-GC modification GCmodification
PanelA: Estimation Sample
Private Companies
Estimated Probability:Mean 0.013 0.453 0.111
Median 0.007 0.597 0.051
Std. Dey. 0.061 0.294 0.193
t-Statistic 95.157 21.583
P-Value (one-tailed) 0.000 0.000
"I!-Statistic 892.496 130.332
P-Value (one-tailed) 0.000 0.000
Number 4,713 1,214 291
Minimum 0.001 0.002 0.000
Maximum 0.810 0.846 0.857
Public Companies
Estimated Probability:Mean 0.009 0.352 0.104
Median 0.004 0.388 0.045




P-Value (one-tailed) 0.000 0.000
Number 631 97 32
Minimum 0.001 0.001 0.002
Maximum 0.517 0.906 0.610
PanelB: Holdout Sample
Private Companies
Estimated Probability:Mean 0.013 0.464 0.103
Median 0.007 0.609 0.031
Std. Dey. 0.055 0.292 0.180
r-Statistic 57.479 12.530
P·Value (one-tailed) 0.000 0.000
"I:-Statistic 276.375 28.536
p.Value (one-tailed) 0.000 0.000
Number 1,570 404 97
Minimum 0.001 0.003 0.000
Maximum 0.721 0.835 0.731
Public Companies
Estimated Probability:Mean 0.012 0.339 0.086
Median 0.004 0.464 0.006
Std. Dey. 0.069 0.324 0.112
r-Statistic 12.993 3.304
P-Value (one-tailed) 0.000 0.000
X2.Statistic 10.127 2.391
reValue (one-tailed) 0.001 0.122
Number 211 33 11
Minimum 0.000 0.001 0.002
Maximum 0.812 0.949 0.249
Notes:
A 'GC' modification is onewhich relates to going-concern.
t-statistics (x2-statistics) testdifference between means (medians) of modified andcleanreport samples.
We can see from Table A4a that the predicted probabilities of non going-concern
related audit modifications are on average significantly greater for companies
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receiving audit report modifications than for those receiving clean audit reports, in
bothpublic andprivate companies andboththe estimation and holdout samples.
This is especially true for companies receiving non going-concern related
audit modifications. For these private (public) companies in the estimation sample,
the mean predicted probability of receiving a non going-concern related modification
is 0.453 (0.352) and the median 0.597 (0.388), compared to 0.111 (0.104) and 0.051
(0.045) for companies receiving going-concern related modifications, and 0.013
(0.009) and 0.007 (0.004) for companies receiving clean audit reports. For these
private (public) companies in the holdout sample, the mean predicted probability of
receiving a non going-concern related modification is 0.464 (0.339) and the median
0.609 (0.464), compared to 0.103 (0.086) and 0.031 (0.006) for companies receiving
going-concern related modifications, and 0.013 (0.012) and 0.007 (0.004) for
companies receiving cleanaudit reports.
From Table A4b, we can see that the predicted probabilities of going-concern
related modifications are also on average significantly greater for companies receiving
audit report modifications than for those receiving clean audit reports, in both public
and private companies and in both the estimation and holdout samples. In particular,
for private (public) companies receiving going-concern related modifications in the
estimation sample, the mean predicted probability of receiving a going-concern
related modification is 0.204 (0.282) and the median 0.078 (0.075), compared to
0.028 (0.024) and 0.012 (0.003) for companies receiving non going-concern related
modifications, and 0.004 (0.003) and 0.002 (0.001) for companies receiving clean
audit reports. For these private (public) companies in the holdout sample, the mean
predicted probability of receiving a going-concern related modification is 0.205
(0.148) and the median 0.088 (0.014), compared to 0.025 (0.020) and 0.011 (0.004)
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for companies receiving non going-concern related modifications, and 0.005 (0.003)
and 0.002 (0.001) for companies receiving cleanaudit reports.
The outcome with the highest predicted probability can be assigned as the
predicted outcome for each observation. A summary of outcomes predicted in this
way from the multinomiallogit model, versus actual outcomes, is reported in Panel A
of TableA5a for companies in the estimation sample, and in Panel A of TableASb for
companies in theholdout sample.
Panel A in Table A5a (A5b) shows that in the estimation (holdout) sample,
using a simple prediction rule based on the predicted probabilities of the different
audit report outcomes can result in considerable misspecification of the outcomes,
particularly in going-concern audit modifications. For example, in TableASb we can
see that only 16 of the 97 private companies in the holdout sample that receive going-
concern related audit modifications are successfully predicted, and only 1 of the 11 .
public companies in the holdout sample.
Panel B in Tables 8a and 8b reports the percentages of audit report types
correctly predicted, for a range of different cut-offprobabilities. Reducing the cut-off
probability increases the percentage of modified audit reports that are correctly
predicted for both company types and for both the estimation and holdout samples,
but reduces that of clean audit reports. This is acceptable if the cost of failing to
correctly predict an audit modification (a Type I error) sufficiently exceeds that of
failing to correctly predict a clean audit report (a Type II error). Panel B in both




Estimated Probabilities of Going-Concern Related Audit Report Modifications
ActualAuditReport
Clean Non-GC modification GCmodification
Panel A: Estimation Sample
Private Companies
Estimated Probability:Mean 0.004 0.028 0.204
Median 0.002 0.012 0.078
Std. Dev. 0.023 0.074 0.235
r-Statistic 18.799 54.209
P-Value (one-tailed) 0.000 0.000
..l-Statistic 656.702 248.547
P-Value (one-tailed) 0.000 0.000
Number 4,713 1,214 291
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000
Maximum 0.687 0.868 1.000
Public Companies
Estimated Probability:Mean 0.003 0.024 0.282
Median 0.001 0.003 0.075
Std. Dev. 0.018 0.064 0.321
t-Statistic 6.594 21.471
P-Value (one-tailed) 0.000 0.000
·l-Statistic 28.558 29.647
P-Value (one-tailed) 0.000 0.000
Number 631 97 32
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000
Maximum 0.355 0.421 0.834
Panel B: Holdout Sample
Private Companies
Estimated Probability:Mean 0.005 0.025 0.205
Median 0.002 0.011 0.088
Std. Dev. 0.024 0.060 0.246
t-Statistic 10.739 30.276
P-Value (one-tailed) 0.000 0.000
x2-Statistic 213.633 55.270
P-Value (one-tailed) 0.000 0.000
Number 1,570 404 97
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000
Maximum 0.372 0.604 1.000
Public Companies
Estimated Probability:Mean 0.003 0.020 0.148
Median 0.001 0.004 0.014
Std. Dev. 0.005 0.055 0.193
r-Statistic 4.576 11.354
P-Value (one-tailed) 0.000 0.000
X2-Statistic 2.838 7.748
P-Value (one-tailed) 0.092 0.005
Number 211 33 11
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000
Maximum 0.041 0.305 0.558
Notes:
A 'GC' modification is one whichrelates to going-concern,
t-statistics test difference between means of modified and cleanreport samples.
X2-statistics test difference between medians of modified and cleanreportsamples.
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TableA5a
Predictive Power in Estimation Sample
Panel A Predicted Audit Report
Actual Audit Report Clean non-GC GC Total
Private companies
Clean 4,669 41 3 4,713
non-GC modification 384 819 11 1,214
GC modification 214 31 46 291
Total 5,267 891 60 6,218
Public companies
Clean 629 2 0 631
non-GC modification 58 38 1 97
GC modification 18 2 12 32
Total 705 42 13 760
Panel B % Correctly Classified Type! Type II
Cut-OffProbability clean Non-GC GC overall errorrate errorrate
Private companies
0.2 98.6 70.2 42.6 90.4 0.308 0.014
0.1 98.5 70.2 47.4 90.6 0.296 0.015
0.05 98.4 70.2 48.1 90.5 0.292 0.016
0.025 98.2 70.3 49.1 90.4 0.290 0.018
0.01 86.0 76.7 54.0 82.6 0.207 0.140
Public companies
0.2 99.0 55.7 43.8 91.2 0.419 0.010
0.1 98.9 56.7 43.8 91.2 0.411 0.011
0.05 98.7 58.8 50.0 91.6 0.364 0.013
0.025 96.8 59.8 53.1 90.3 0.333 0.032
0.01 79.9 69.1 62.5 77.8 0.225 0.201
Panel C % Correctly Classified Type! Type II
Naive Prediction Rule clean Non-GC GC overall errorrate errorrate
Private companies 98.4 70.2 49.1 90.6 0.293 0.016
Public companies 99.0 53.6 50.0 91.2 0.411 0.010
Notes:
Panel A reports predicted audit report outcomes equal to the audit report outcome
with highest predicted probability, for the estimation sample.
Panel B reports error rates, and the percentage of audit report outcomes correctly
predicted in the estimation sample, where the predicted outcome is a non-GC (GC)
. modification if the predicted probability of a non-GC (GC) modification exceeds both
the cut-offprobability and the predicted probability of a GC (non-GC) modification,
anda clean report otherwise. A Type I error is defined as classifying a modified audit
report as clean, and a Type II error is defined as classifying a clean audit report as
modified.
Panel C reports comparative figures to Panel B, based on the alternative naive
prediction rule 'predicted audit report outcome is equal to prioryearaudit report' .
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TablcA5b
Predictive Powerin Holdout Sample
Panel A Predicted AuditReport
Actual AuditReport Clean non-GC GC Total
Privatecompanies
Clean 1,557 13 0 1,570
non-GC modification 124 278 2 404
GC modification 71 10 16 97
Total 1,752 301 18 2,071
Public companies
Clean 209 2 0 211
non-GC modification 17 16 0 33
GCmodification 10 0 1 11
Total 236 18 1 255
Panel B % Correctly Classified Type! Type II
Cut-OffProbability clean Non-GC GC overall errorrate error rate
Private companies
0.2 98.6 71.5 41.2 90.6 0.305 0.014
0.1 98.5 71.8 45.4 90.8 0.293 0.015
0.05 98.3 71.8 45.4 90.6 0.291 0.017
0.025 98.0 72.0 46.4 90.5 0.287 0.020
0.01 85.9 77.2 52.6 82.6 0.218 0.141
Public companies
0.2 99.1 54.5 27.3 90.2 0.500 0.009
0.1 99.1 54.5 36.4 90.6 0.477 0.009
0.05 99.1 54.5 36.4 90.6 0.455 0.009
0.025 98.1 54.5 36.4 89.8 0.409 0.019
0.01 79.1 57.6 63.6 75.7 0.250 0.209
Panel C % Correctly Classified Type I Type II
NatvePrediction Rule clean Non-GC GC overall errorrate error rate
Privatecompanies 98.4 71.5 47.4 90.7 0.291 0.016
Public companies 99.1 51.5 36.3 90.2 0.500 0.009
Notes:
Panel A reports predicted audit report outcomes equal to the audit report outcome
with highest predicted probability, for theholdout sample.
Panel B reports error rates, and the percentage of audit report outcomes correctly
predicted in the holdout sample, where the predicted outcome is a non-GC (GC)
modification if the predicted probability of a non-GC (GC) modification exceeds both
the cut-off probability and the predicted probability of a GC (non-GC) modification,
and a cleanreport otherwise. A Type I error is defined as classifying a modified audit
report as clean, and a Type II error is defined as classifying a clean audit report as
modified.
Panel C reports comparative figures to Panel B, based on the alternative naive
prediction rule 'predicted audit reportoutcome is equal to prioryear audit report'.
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Note thatType I and Type II errors do not distinguish between different types of audit
modification, so that a Type I error corresponds to predicting that a modified audit
report is clean, and a Type II error corresponds to predicting that a clean audit report
is modified. Type I errors decrease as the cut-off probability is reduced; Type II
errors increase.
Comparative figures for the naive alternative strategy are reported in Panel C
of Tables 8a and 8b. The multinomial model with a cut-off probability of 0.025
correctly predicts substantially more audit modifications for public companies than
the naive alternative strategy, in both the estimation and holdout samples. With a cut-
off probability of 0.01, the multinomial model correctly predicts substantially more
audit modifications for both public and private companies, in both the estimation and
holdout samples.
The prediction errorcosts from themultinomiallogit model are now compared
to those from the naive prediction rule and from using the standard logit model
(coefficient estimates reported in Table AI). The relative prediction error costs for
the holdout sample are reported in Table A6, for a range of relative costs of Type I
and Type II errors. Note that in line with the previous research, Type I errors are
believed to be more costly thanTypeII errors.
For each level of relative Type I and TypeII errorcosts, the cut-offprobability
is chosen so as to minimise error costs in the estimation sample. Type I and Type II
error rates are reported for each cut-off probability. For sufficiently high relative
error costs, the multinomial model of audit reporting results in lower misclassification
costs than either the naive strategy, or the standard logit model. However, the
improvements are marginal, particularly over the standard logitmodel.
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Table A6
Misclassification Costs and Errors in the Holdout Sample
Relative Costs ofType Cut-Off Type! Type II Costof Model Costof Model
I andTypeII Errors Probability Error Error Errors Relative Errors Relative
which Rate in Rate in to Costof to Costof
Minimises Holdout Holdout Errors from Errors from
Model Error Sample Sample Naive Dichotomous




1:1 0.2935 0.333 0.013 0.994 1.022
5:1 0.0525 0.291 0.017 1.011 1.011
10:1 0.0310 0.287 0.018 0.997 0.996
15:1 0.0146 0.267 0.045 1.010 0.943
20:1 0.0145 0.265 0.045 0.983 0.966
Public Companies
1:1 0.2450 0.523 0.009 1.047 1.047
5:1 0.0485 0.455 0.009 0.916 0.958
10:1 0.0204 0.409 0.043 0.914 0.987
15:1 0.0204 0.409 0.043 0.883 0.991










* = the alternative natve prediction rule is to predict audit reports equal to the prior
year audit report. Error rates are reported in Table 8b.
** = error rates, using the coefficients from the dichotomous logit model of audit
reporting estimated over the estimation sample to predict modified audit reports in the
























1:1 0.2450 0.500 0.009
5:1 0.0485 0.477 0.009
10:1 0.0204 0.409 0.047
15:1 0.0204 0.409 0.047
20:1 0.0204 0.409 0.047
A Type I error is defined as classifying a modified audit report as clean, and a Type II
error is defined as classifying a clean audit report as modified.
Error costs are calculated assuming the proportion of modified audit reports tt in the
population is 0.067. Error costs are ax(Type I error rate)x(Relative Type I error cost)
+ (1 - a)x(Type II error rate)x1.
Relative error costs are the ratio of the error costs for the multinomiallogit model to
those for the alternative strategy/model.
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Even at the high relative cost of Type I to Type II errors of 20:1 and the
corresponding cut-offprobabilities of 0.0145 (0.0204) for private (public) companies,
misclassiflcation costs generated by the multinomial model are 96.6% of those






THEEFFECTS OF TRANSFORMATIONS ONAUDIT FEE RESIDUALS
In this Appendix I consider three different model specifications, as follows:
1. Untransformed dependent and explanatory variables.
2. Log-transformed dependent, size, complexity and gearing variables.
3. Rank-transformed dependent, size, complexity and gearing variables,
as reported in thebodyof the chapter.
I simulate residuals for each specification using results obtained from the estimation
of the 'traditional' audit fee regression model as in Eq. (3.1). In other words, the
model is estimated over all companies in the sample and includes the auditor size
dummy variable BIGj among the explanatory variables. For example, the residuals
plotted in Graphs 3.1 and 3.2 are obtained from the results of the estimation reported
in Column 1,Table 4.
The explanatory variables which are log-transformed in specification (2)
above are precisely those which have a skewed distribution as identified in the
descriptive statistics of Table 2. Specification (3) is identical to that employed in the
chapter. The transformed explanatory variables are assets employed (ASSE) and
sales turnover (REV), number of SIC codes (SIC), number of domestic and overseas
subsidiaries (OS and OS), and capital gearing (GEAR).
In order to make log transformations of variables which take zero or negative
values (such as ASSE), a constant is first added to each observation of the variable.
The constant is the smallest integer which, when added to each observation of the
variable, renders all observations ofthat variable greater than zero.
Both histogram plots of residuals and scatter plots of residuals against fitted
values are reported here. Graphs 1.1 and 1.2 relate to specification (1) above, using
274
untransforrncd variables, Graphs 2.1 and 2.2 relate to specification (2) using log-
transformed variables, and Graphs 3.1 and 3.2 relate to specification (3) using rank-
transformed variables. The results of the estimations of the 'traditional' audit fee
regression models are also reported in each case.
It is clear from the residuals plots that specification (3), using rank-
transformations, produces the closest to normally-distributed residuals. Log-
transformations also improve the normality of the residuals, although to a lesser
degree, but require somewhat arbitrary manipulation of the observations before the
transformation ca be applied.
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Specification 1
Residuals for the 'traditional' audit fee model, untransfonned variables.
Table Bl
Estimation results (t-statistics in parentheses)


























Variables are defined in Table 1, Chapter 3.
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DETAILS OF ESTIMATION OFDISCRETIONARY ACCRUALS
The model and method used forestimating discretionary accruals arc described in
detail in Chapter 4. Tables Bland B2 give descriptive statistics for the variables used
to estimate the discretionary accruals, and the estimated model coefficients,
respectively.
Table Cl
Estimating DA- Descriptive Statistics ofVariables by Industry
Variable Mean Median Standard Min Afax
Deviation
Mineral Extraction
TAt / At-I 0.020 -0.031 0.230 -0.272 0.787
1/ At-I 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
LlREVt / At-I 0.202 0.061 0.464 -0.224 1.626
LlRECt / At.} 0.078 0.007 0.214 -0.050 0.875
PPEt / At-} 1.012 0.847 1.058 0.116 6.155
Estimated DA
-0.035 -0.064 0.196 -0.344 0.676
General Industrials
TAt / At.}
-0.049 -0.059 0.263 -1.577 1.138
1/ At. l 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008
~REVtl At.} 0.219 0.090 1.288 -8.009 11.623
dRECt / At.} 0.037 0.010 0.317 -2.301 2.672
PPEt/ At-} 0.556 0.508 0.380 0.011 3.266
Estimated DA
-0.016 -0.015 0.246 -1.416 1.208
Consumer Goods
TAt I At. l -0.053 -0.049 0.261 -1.645 1.683
1 / At-I 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003
LlREVt I At.l 0.148 0.070 1.371 -10.434 9.404
LlRECt / At.l 0.044 0.005 0.243 -0.411 2.104
PPEt/ At-} 0.759 0.693 0.461 0.055 3.814
Estimated DA 0.024 0.014 0.205 -0.565 1.117
Services
TAt / At.} -0.169 -0.054 2.997 -57.762 3.691
1 / At.} 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.006
dREVt / At.} 0.863 0.194 2.596 -2.698 25.281
llliECt / At.} 0.038 0.029 3.059 -57.866 7.374
PPEt/ At.} 0.886 0.693 2.624 -1.674 50.061
Estimated DA 0.649 0.618 1.138 -15.414 5.628
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'VholcsaleTrade
TAt I At.t 0.047 ..0.019 0.360 ..0.832 2.029
1I At.t 0.000 0.000 0.001 ..0.006 0.002
dREVtl At.l 0.953 0.324 2.375 -2.604 19.374
i.\RECtI At.l 0.195 0.063 0.584 -0.685 4.909
PPE. I At.l 0.549 0.379 1.170 -0.012 12.255
Estimated DA 0.012 ..0.022 0.308 -1.266 1.574
Real Estate
TAil AI.! 0.529 ..0.050 3.815 -5.873 16.098
1/ At.l 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.004
i.\REV. I At.! 0.261 0.000 0.620 -0.147 2.573
i.\REC. I At.! 1.907 0.023 8.766 -2.242 40.085
PPE.I At.t 0.826 0.034 3.394 0.000 15.630
Estimated DA -2.689 0.044 12.818 -58.549 2.122
Table C2
Estimating DA- Eq. (1) Fitted Coefficients by Industry
Industry .. .. .. R1 No.Obs.a PI Pl
Mineral Extraction -25.535 0.214 0.031 36.4% 30
General Industrials 35.472 0.090 -0.095 23.3% 383
Consumer Goods -270.017 0.102 ..0.076 46.7% 131
Services 136.499 0.144 -1.079 87.1% 380
Wholesale Trade 88.881 0.080 -0.054 34.9% 111
Real Estate -455.114 -1.461 1.152 93.9% 21
Total 1,056
NOles:
Variables aredefined in Section 2.
There are 30 companies in the Mineral Extraction industry group, 383 in General
Industrials, 131 in Consumer Goods, 380 in Services, 111 in Wholesale Trade, and 21
in Real Estate. 8 of the companies arc missing BIG, 10 are missing NEX, and 1 is
missing OS. These 19 companies are therefore dropped from the subsequent
regressions.
